Edwina, List: JS: I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.
ET: Jon, no, my argument with you was about your adamant denial, to the point of what I felt were personal attacks, that my comments fit into the first two approaches, and your insistence that your views were to be accepted as the accurate interpretations. Just as I suspected, we disagree about which approach your comments reflect--I see them as falling under #3 (at best), you see them as falling under #1 and/or #2. There is no need to continue that debate, but I do see no basis for characterizing anything that I have said previously as "personal attacks." Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jeff, list - thank you for the interesting breakdown of different > approaches to the study of Peirce. I'm not sure that #4 has any relevance > other than the case where people misuse Peircean [ and other] analyses to > somehow support their own views. > > Jon, no, my argument with you was about your adamant denial, to the point > of what I felt were personal attacks, that my comments fit into the first > two approaches, and your insistence that your views were to be accepted > as the accurate interpretations. > > Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do > affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we > cannot begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who > self-describes as a 'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than > my own, as I self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even > the term 'god' would therefore differ. > > And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce. > Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce > described himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 2:10 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jeff, List: > > Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's > writings. I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was > rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about > whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce. I > have been operating under the assumption that this term should be confined > to #1 and #2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than > going beyond them. I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really > belong on the List. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Hello Clark, List, >> >> I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that >> might guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was >> developing. Let's distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum: >> >> 1. Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim >> is to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views. >> >> 2. Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape, >> where the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments >> working from the assumptions and methods he was employing. >> >> 3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose >> of putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case. >> >> 4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very >> little attention to or care for what Peirce wrote. >> >> For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be >> considered reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might >> have been avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of >> inquiries belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I >> do believe it is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a >> given post--and to make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be >> talking past one another. All things considered, I believe that you are >> correct in saying that Peirce thinks that the third sort of approach and >> aim should, in general, be controlling over the first and second. Having >> said that, he has written quite a lot on what it is to do the first or >> second sort of thing well or poorly. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 <928%20523-8354> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM >> *To:* Peirce-L >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >> >> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we >> variously may think for our own parts. >> >> I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the >> social changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks >> ago I think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the >> experiment might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is >> the community of inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a >> fruitful avenue to consider. >> >> That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s >> just that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the >> person proposing them. One danger I see in Peircean studies is that it >> falls into the trap of becoming purely about exegesis of Peirce’s thought. >> That’s an important step - especially given that many aspects of Peirce’s >> thought were so poorly understood for so many years. But when his thought >> isn’t extended beyond that, when a quote of Peirce becomes like a Bible >> verse quoted by a fundamentalist religious believer, I think we’re missing >> something fundamental about Peirce’s aims. (Not saying anyone here is doing >> that mind you - just that I think it’s an ever present danger I myself fall >> into occasionally) In Peircean terms we confuse the dynamic object with the >> immediate object. >> >> On Sep 25, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent >> that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does >> not offer rules for instinct. >> >> Ben, do you think that Peirce distinguishes between those good at guesses >> or hypothesis formation and those who are not? >> >> For instance in a more contemporary context we’d distinguish between the >> hypothesis of a scientist working in their area of knowledge and someone >> not with that background. It seems to me that while Peirce usually >> discusses critical common sensism in the context of regular broad social >> common sense that it applies even better to subgroups. That is subgroups >> develop a common sense based upon their experience over years. >> >> It seems to me that if we distinguish the initial application of >> abduction towards a hypothesis with repeated community testing of the >> concept then things do get a bit trickier. I recognize that the discussion >> the past few days has primarily been on this initial application of >> abduction. The question then becomes to what degree continued inquiry upon >> what we might call metaphysical remains abductive and to what degree it >> goes beyond this. >> >> Again science offers many examples here. Ideas often are not falsified by >> continued inquiry and experimentation. Rather they simply fall out of favor >> slowly as alternative hypothesis seems more persuasive. That is the normal >> idea of verification or falsification never happens simply because our >> experiments are themselves so theory laden. (As Quine pointed out long ago >> although which I think one can find within Peirce as well) In turn this >> lines up with his critical common sensism. >> >> Allow me a quote from the archives. In this case from Teresa Calvet from >> way back in Feb 2006. >> >> The bare definition of pragmaticism, writes Peirce (in "What Pragmatism >> Is "), "could convey no satisfactory comprehension of it to the most >> apprehensive of minds" of the doctrines "without the previous acceptance >> (or virtual acceptance) of which pragmaticism itself would be a nullity" >> (CP 5.416). Peirce says here that these preliminary propositions "might all >> be included under the vague maxim, 'Dismiss make-believes'", a maxim that >> could also be called, "the adoption of the general philosophy of common >> sense". This normative exhortation "do not make believe; (...) recognize, >> as you must, that there is much that you do not doubt, in the least" (CP >> 5.416) was enounced before by Peirce, in 1868, in "Some Consequences of >> Four Incapacities" (W2, p. 212). Instead of presenting Peirce simply as >> anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: "Although >> pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the >> English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of >> common sense" (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism "involves a >> complete rupture with nominalism" (CP 8.208). To illustrate Peirce's >> position, William Davis suggests (already in 1972) the analogy of a jig-saw >> puzzle, "where each new bit adds significance to the whole, although each >> bit is incomplete in itself and there is no real foundation piece upon >> which all else is based. Any piece will do to start with, where nothing is >> infallible in principle, though much does not fail in practice" (Peirce's >> Epistemology, p. 20). Ten years later Susan Haack also uses that image (in >> the last section, "The Jigsaw of Knowledge", of her paper "Descartes, >> Peirce and the Cognitive Community"). But we could also cite here the >> following paragraph of "Some consequences of four incapacities": >> "Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far >> as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to >> careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its >> arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not >> form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose >> fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and >> intimately connected" (W2, p. 213). >> >> One could then open Peirce's 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (and >> present his conception of philosophy). It is also in these conferences that >> Peirce formulates three propositions which appear to him to put the edge on >> the maxim of pragmatism (or three cotary propositions): 1) there are no >> conceptions that are not given in perceptual judgments [or: all conceptions >> are given in perceptual judgments] (this is Peirce's interpretation of the >> slogan Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu); 2) >> perceptual judgments contain general elements; and 3) abductive inference >> "shades into perceptual judgments without any sharp demarcation between >> them" and states that "the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully covers the >> entire logic of abduction" (CP 5.196). >> >> It’s that last point I wish to emphasize. Abduction "shades into >> perceptual judgments without any sharp demarcation between them.” This is >> very much akin to what philosophers of science since at least the middle of >> the 20th century have noted about competing theories that can explain data. >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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