Gary R., List: GR: But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three stages of a complete inquiry).
GR: So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did. The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said, "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three stages of a complete inquiry)." Abduction, when employed with "solicitous care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475, EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security. The hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441). The PM, on the other hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465). GR: The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by generating new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating those hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by evaluating those hypotheses against experience. As you hinted, Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List, > > Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: "Peirce > made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential > fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them not > just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to different levels > of logic - very apples versus oranges " > > I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, all > nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one question > which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this. > > Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article > (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty" > (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this > text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that > "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that > "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which > abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it > seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security." > > But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic > maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our > approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not > contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for > solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" > to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but > the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical > analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry > (including all three stages of a complete inquiry). > > So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM provides > the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 text (or > at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to resolve in my > thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. > > The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up each > of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security and > abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should we > think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >
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