Jon, List, Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did." But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of pragmatism" in this essay. He writes: "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465). So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect, at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought *not *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule of pragmatism). As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's "rich suggestiveness"). In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable *uberty*, or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384). [EP2:553, fn 7] As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to some considerable degree. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > GR: But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the > pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our > approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to > the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care" > (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that > it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what > Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my > thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all > three stages of a complete inquiry). > > GR: So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM > provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 > text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to > resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. > > > I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that > there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the > "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of > pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did. > The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said, > "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three > stages of a complete inquiry)." Abduction, when employed with "solicitous > care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the > smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475, > EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security. The > hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441). The PM, on the other > hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. > But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465). > > GR: The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes > up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security > and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should > we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? > > > To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by generating > new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating those > hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by > evaluating those hypotheses against experience. As you hinted, Houser's > comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only > one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List, >> >> Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: "Peirce >> made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential >> fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them not >> just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to different levels >> of logic - very apples versus oranges " >> >> I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, all >> nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one question >> which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this. >> >> Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article >> (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty" >> (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this >> text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that >> "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that >> "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which >> abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it >> seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security." >> >> But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic >> maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our >> approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not >> contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for >> solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" >> to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but >> the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical >> analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry >> (including all three stages of a complete inquiry). >> >> So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM provides >> the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 text (or >> at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to resolve in my >> thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. >> >> The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up >> each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security >> and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should >> we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >
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