Jeff, list: Here is an even more compact argument that we should admire:
By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/complete-sign By "*Complete*", then, is meant...? one two three... Object Sign Interpretant... utterer interpreter commens... Father Son Spirit... *Ens*? God? hth, Jerry R On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon, List, > > > I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some > patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's > remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by > focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create. > > > The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of > "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the > three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In > particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was > created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How > is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created > from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good > questions. > > > Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question > of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of > creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive > meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action. > Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for > this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The > Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that, > in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” > > > > If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as *Ens > necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to > create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the > glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* is > that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.” > > > Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the > capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about > origination: > > > Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP > 2.89 > > Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a > self-sufficient act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in > terms that others might find are more palatable to their ears: > > > Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient > in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something > from nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) > dependent on something else? > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM > > *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories > > Jeff, List: > > JD: In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using > the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then > which does he seem to have in mind? > > > Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his > first (transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as > his initial example? > > CSP: To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce > without the prior existence of the material used, or of other things like > the thing produced; produce out of nothing. (http://triggs.djvu.org/ > century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create) > > > Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as *Ens > necessarium* in some of the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument." > > CSP: "He by Whom the three Universes of Experience are, supposedly, > getting, directly or indirectly, created from Nothing--soberly, from less > than a blank." (R 841) > > CSP: "Reality is not determined by signification; but supposing Him Real, > then out of Nothing, out of less than a Blank, He is creating the three > Universes of Experience." (R 843) > > CSP: "He who is creating the three Universes of Experience from Nothing; > soberly, from less than a blank." (R 843) > > > I think that we are on pretty solid ground here. > > JD: So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then > we turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our > experience of space and time. > > > "Homogeneities of connectedness" sound like continuities (Thirdness) to > me, and thus bring this passage to mind. > > CSP: But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an > element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform > more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as > logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is > proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can > approximate. We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies > the only possibility of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903) > > > I do not wish to seem impatient or dismissive--I sincerely appreciate your > characteristically thoughtful contributions to this and other > discussions--but how does this help me figure out Universes vs. Categories? > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Hi Jon, Gary R, List, >> >> You asked, "Where does this leave us?" >> >> I believe it leaves us with three related areas of inquiry--mathematical >> logic, phenomenology and semiotics--that we can draw on for the sake of >> gaining better insight in the questions you've been asking >> about universes, realms and the modal features of our assertions. Each has >> its own methods, and we should use them selectively to probe for better >> answers to those questions. >> >> The real trick is putting the results of those areas of inquiry together >> properly in order to address the really hard questions in cosmological >> metaphysics and in the special science of cosmology. >> >> Before turning to such questions of metaphysics and the special science >> of cosmology, my understanding is that this discussion started with a look >> at the opening moves in "A Neglected Argument." In what sense might God as >> *ens >> necessarium *really be creator of the three universes of experience? Or, >> better yet, in what way might the hypotheses involving such a conception of >> ens necessarium help to explain puzzling features of these global aspects >> of our ordinary experience? It will help, I think, to look a little closer >> at what Peirce might mean by "creator." He provided definitions of "create" >> and "creation" for the Century dictionary. Why don't we look there to see >> what hints might be found. >> >> He says that create has several meanings. He provides 5 senses of the >> transitive use of the verb, and then one sense of the transitive. In saying >> the God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive >> or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem >> to have in mind? >> >> Once that is done, it might help to look closely at what is calling out >> for explanation within each of these three universes and also between the >> three. Peirce is pretty good at describing what he has observed, so let's >> see what is to be found--quite publicly--in our experience as well. The >> feature that stands out to me are descriptions of this sort "Let the Muser, >> for example, after well appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the >> unspeakable variety of each Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of >> the nature of homogeneities of connectedness in each; and what a pectacle >> will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small >> part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighbouring parts >> as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity. >> >> So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we >> turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in >> our experience of space and time. The homogeneities of connectedness are >> similar, in some respects, to the those found in the quality of the sound >> of a trombone moving through the tones, or those found in the change of the >> colors found in the setting of the sun in evening. Why does these colors, >> sounds have such homogeneities of connectedness, and why are they similar >> to those found in space in time? >> >> The notion of a homogeneity of connectedness has a rich history in both >> math and philosophy. Given the fact that he talked of bringing unity to the >> manifold of impressions in the start of "A New List of the Categories", it >> might be worth starting there. The reference is clearly to Kant's >> discussion in the first *Critique* of what is necessary for brining the >> manifold of sense into a synthetic unity. The condition of homogeneity is >> key for understanding how it is possible for such synthesis. How might we >> understand Peirce's take on this condition for cognizing the >> manifold--either early on in the discussion of the New List or much later >> in the Neglected Argument? >> >> This, I think, is not an easy question to answer. As a starting point, I >> think it might help to focus on what Peirce says about the "play" of the >> imagination. This is a clear reference to Kant's and Schiller's discussion >> of such play on the part of a Muser who is engaged in aesthetic >> contemplation. This transition from phenomenological analysis to aesthetic >> contemplation holds, I think, an especially interesting move on Peirce's >> part--especially when it comes to understanding how an aesthetic condition >> for seeking homogeneities of connectedness in our experience might find its >> source. >> >> --Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM >> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard >> *Cc:* Peirce-L >> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories >> >> Jeff, List: >> >> Thanks, that was helpful but still leaves me with questions. >> >> JD: Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, >> realms and categories: >> >> >> It remains unclear to me what distinctions (if any) we should draw in >> defining these three terms, even within each of the three types of inquiry >> that you listed. >> >> JD: Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his >> phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," >> the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. >> >> >> I agree up to a point, especially since Peirce calls them Universes of >> *Experience*. However, he also defines each Universe on the basis of >> that in which the *Being *of its members consists, which suggests a >> *metaphysical >> *aspect to them; and of course, the overall subject of the article is >> the Reality of God, which is obviously a metaphysical topic. What makes >> this especially tricky is that phenomenology/phaneroscopy *precedes >> *logic/semeiotic >> in the architectonic of the sciences, but metaphysics *follows *it. I >> take this to mean that semeiotic can depend on phaneroscopy, but is not >> supposed to depend on metaphysics. Where does this leave us? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 10:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >>> Hi Jon S, Gary R, List, >>> >>> Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of >>> oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions >>> you are finding vexing. >>> >>> Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms >>> and categories: >>> >>> 1. The simple systems of formal algebraic and graphical logics--being >>> developed as a part of mathematics >>> >>> 2. The phenomenological inquiries. >>> >>> 3. The semiotic inquiries. >>> >>> Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his >>> phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," >>> the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. >>> >>> In the development of the formal systems of algebraic logic and >>> existential graphs, Peirce builds various conceptions that model different >>> universes of discourse and categories. In these different formal systems, >>> the universes and modal notions are treated differently. For instance, the >>> universes of discourse are handled differently in the alpha, beta, and the >>> various systems of the gamma graphs. >>> >>> In the development of the semiotic theory, he uses the formal systems of >>> logical for the purpose of refining the classifications and explanations of >>> the sign relations and patterns of inference. At this point, he needs a >>> philosophical interpretation of the mathematical models--including >>> interpretations of what a sheet of assertion means in the context of the >>> alpha graphs, the beta graphs, and the various versions of the gamma graphs. >>> >>> It might be helpful to think of the phenomenological inquiries >>> concerning the three universes of experience as remarks concerning the more >>> "global" features of our observations--where those observations are >>> informing the classifications and philosophical explanations that being >>> generated in the semiotic theory. >>> >>> Each of these three lines of inquiry--formal logic as a part of >>> mathematics, phenomenological, and semiotic--are informing the others, but >>> in different ways. For instance, in the context of the formal logic, Peirce >>> sees no need to pick between the different ways of conceiving of the >>> universes of discourse and the modal features of the assertions. The alpha >>> system of graphs can make do with a much simpler version of a universe of >>> discourse than is needed for the various systems of the gamma graphs. It >>> isn't the case that one version is right or wrong. They are just different >>> formal systems--like the different systems of numbers (e.g., rationals, >>> reals, surreals) or different systems involving continuity (e.g., topology >>> of one two or three dimensions, projective geometry, metrical geometries). >>> Clearly, some of these different formal systems are more "basic" than the >>> others in some senses, but we should remember that, in the final >>> analysis, they are just different formal systems starting with different >>> sets of initial definitions, postulates and axioms. We seek to build >>> formal system that manifest virtues such as balance and symmetry, but even >>> the systems that lack these virtues may be of some special interest for >>> particular problems. >>> >>> Of course, when we move from these three forms of inquiry to >>> metaphysics, we then need to press the question: what it the best >>> explanation of the nature of what exists as objects and what is real as >>> general? At this point, we can then make use of the prior work that has >>> been done in the math, phenomenology and logic to address the questions of >>> cosmological metaphysics that are so interesting--but hard to answer well. >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 8:18 AM >>> *To:* Peirce-L >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories >>> >>> List: >>> >>> Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on >>> Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that >>> Peirce added the caveat that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to >>> Universes and Predicates to Categories "is a question for careful study" >>> (CP 4.545). He then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis >>> of propositions to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to view >>> Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). At least, I >>> think he did ... >>> >>> CSP: Let us, at least, *provide *for such a [destined] mode of being >>> in our system of >>> diagrammatization, since it *may *turn out to be needed and, as I >>> think, surely will. >>> >>> CSP: I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny >>> that every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the >>> most part very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are >>> receptacles of the Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode >>> of analyzing propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548) >>> >>> >>> The second sentence here is key, but it is tough to decipher. I assume >>> that "explain why" refers to the preceding assertion that a third mode of >>> being will be needed. The rest is very muddled. What is the relevance of >>> whether "every proposition can be represented"? What, specifically, did >>> Peirce find "very convenient"? Most importantly, what "mode of analyzing >>> propositions" could he not deem to be satisfactory? Am I right to take >>> this as referring to "your view that the Universes are receptacles of the >>> Subjects alone"? >>> >>> I think so, because Peirce went on to suggest, as an alternative, "the >>> principle that each Universe consists, not of Subjects, but the one of True >>> assertions, the other of False, but each to the effect that there is >>> something of a given description." The rest of CP 4.548 is an analysis of >>> two specific propositions using both methods, showing that the alternative >>> is more correct. But this means that there are only *two *Universes, >>> not three; and they consist of True and False assertions, not Ideas, >>> Things/Facts, and Habits/Laws/Continua. Given the context, I gather that >>> these may refer to the Sheet of Assertion and that which is fenced off from >>> it by a cut. So apparently this passage is apparently not about the >>> "Universes of Experience" at all! Peirce then came back to Categories in >>> CP 4.549. >>> >>> CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, >>> but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have >>> explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of >>> hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create *entia rationis* that >>> are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning >>> predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being >>> subjects thought of. >>> >>> >>> As I also mentioned in the other thread, hypostatic abstraction enables >>> us to convert predicates into subjects. Does this mean that even if we >>> assign subjects to Universes and predicates to Categories, it turns out to >>> be a distinction without a difference? >>> >>> CSP We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of >>> another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic >>> abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. >>> Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the >>> characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are not >>> yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that >>> the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes >>> of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On >>> the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in >>> the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our >>> system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever >>> needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into *Realms >>> *for the different Predicaments. >>> >>> >>> Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified >>> as "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or >>> Freedom from Destiny)." We also have "Realms for the different >>> Predicaments," which are what we used to call "Categories," but these >>> divisions "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being"; >>> instead, "the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the >>> different Modes of Being." Peirce leaves it at that ... and thus I am >>> still confused about Universes and Categories. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong >>>>>> to different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between >>>>>> subjects that belong to different universes of discourse. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in >>>>>> Peirce's theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes. How do we >>>>>> reconcile your summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, >>>>>> which >>>>>> indicates that Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to >>>>>> Categories? Which 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in >>>>>> 1908--"categories of being" or "universes of discourse"? >>>>>> >>>>>> JD: I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between >>>>>> the realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in >>>>>> his >>>>>> later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity >>>>>> and >>>>>> was operating as this very high level of the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking >>>>>> about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about >>>>>> Universes. Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again >>>>>> employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but >>>>>> I >>>>>> am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas. >>>>>> >>>>>> JD: My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due >>>>>> to my daughter’s health issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the >>>>>> rest of your family. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>> >>>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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