Gary R, Jon S, List,
As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics. In fact, the phenomenological conception of the categories was a leading idea that grew in importance and in its distinction (as compared to the logical conception of the categories and the metaphysical conception of the categories) from 1902 on. The classification of signs, objects, interpretants based on their modal character and the modal character of the relations is grounded from early to late on the division between possibles, existents and necessitates. The explanations of the relations of determination, reference, representation, signification, assurance, validity, and the like all hinge on this modal division from beginning to end without waver. Having said that, I do see that Peirce was significantly rethinking the relations between the quantifiers and the modal operators between 1903 and the end. I don't see that he dropped the discussion of the modal categories in the context of the formal logic in favor of trying to conceive of these relations entirely in terms of universes and sub-universes of discourse. Rather, he was actively experimenting and dramatically rethinking the relations between them. Consider the rich explanations of the developments of the gamma graphs that Don Roberts provides in chapters 5-7 of his monograph on the existential graphs. One can nicely trace the development of the conceptions by looking at the index and seeing how Peirce used the conceptions of universes and categories at each of the major stages in the development of the gamma graphs. While the developments are complex, let me summarize a few prominent sets of ideas that Peirce experimented with between 1898 and 1910. Starting in 1898, Peirce introduced developments of the lines that connect spots in order to handle hypostatic abstraction, potentials and graphs of graphs. He tried tapered thickened lines in order to deal with ordered sequences, branches with numbered Rhos in order to express relations of different orders of acidity, capital letters to represent selectives and spatially ordered branching connections on numbered "carrots" for potentials to handle relations between possibilities, abstractions and existent objects. Thus far, all of the major developments are experiments on the lines connecting spots. He introduces a wavy line that goes around a symbol for gamma expressions of the alpha graph, but that is not a special kind of cut or boundary. Rather, it is just a way of highlighting the symbol (e.g., a selective, an assertion, etc.) to say what it precisely expresses. In Logical Tracts No. 2, Peirce introduced the dotted, wavy, and saw rims, but these too were used to talk about the things inside the rims as different kinds of abstractions. They don't really introduce new kinds of boundaries into the diagrammatic space that is the sheet of assertion. Having tried a lot of experiments on the lines connecting spots, he then starts to experiment with variations on the cuts and scrolls to introduce new kinds of boundaries. Already, in the early development of the cut, he had already tried one variation on the continuous line forming a loop. In place of a single line looping around an area to form a boundary between two areas, he blackened in the area to represent the pseudograph as a way of expressing that everything in that area is false, regardless of the kind of possible expression that might be in that area. That is, it obliterates that area entirely. That was a kind of limiting case in the interpretation of the cut or scroll. Things change dramatically with the introduction of the tinctured graphs in 1903. Now, we have the areas inside of cuts colored or shaded in some way to distinguish between different ways of saying that something is actually the case, or possible so, or different ways of being necessitated. The introduction of the tinctures brings a whole host of complications and complexities into the gamma graphs, and Peirce tries a number of different approaches in order to bring more balance and harmony to the system. Without going into the details of what happens from 1906 and after, I think we can already see that the introduction of the tinctures gives rise to new kinds of interpretations of the colored or shaded areas. Instead of having a sheet of assertion that represents a universe of discourse consisting of individual actual objects and facts, where the cuts separate areas into facts that are true and those that are false, the cuts now have dramatically different meanings depending upon whether the area inside, outside or the area of the cut itself is colored or shaded in some way. From this point on, we need a dramatically different interpretation of different universes--where those universes have modal characteristics. In effect, the categories of possibles, actual existents and necessities are still in the system, but they are being interpreted in terms of different universes and sub-universes of discourse. The sub-universes are needed because Peirce is now making distinctions between different kinds and classes of possibles, actuals and necessities in the formal system itself. The development of any system of mathematics is guided by a need to answer questions that have proven to be intractable in some area of inquiry. So too with the existential graphs. The primary purpose of developing these mathematical systems of formal logic is to answer real questions in philosophy, especially questions in the theory of semiotics. As such, the gamma system are formal models that can be used for analytical purposes in the semiotic theory to analyze propositions, inferences, their component parts, and the relations that hold between them--both local and global. While Peirce was keenly interested in analyzing the validity of different kinds of deductive inferences involving different sorts of modal claims, I think he was even more keenly interested in having a mathematical set of tools that could be used to analyze inductive and abductive inference and the observations that inform such synthetic reasoning. (see Roberts, 100; Ms 499(s)). So, let me venture an interpretative hypothesis. One of the guiding ideas in the later development of the gamma graphs involved a set of remarkable experiments in the use of different kinds of areas on the top and bottom of the sheet of assertion, and between multiple pages within a larger book of sheets. The introduction of two sides of a page and the introduction of multiple sheets in a book was driven, in part, by an interest in having a formal system that would be sufficiently rich to enable us to analyze inductive and abductive reasoning. As such, the late developments in the gamma graphs may very well represent a concerted effort to rethink the different ways that one might represent different universes of discourse and categories of possibility, actuality and necessity--where this exploration was being done with an eye to solving longstanding philosophical problems in applying the universes of discourse and the modal categories of possibility, actuals and necessity to the accounts of abductive and inductive inference. So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might think about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be applied to those abductive inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 10:05 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jon S, Jeff D, List, Jon wrote: "There seems to be some evidence that Peirce may have stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life; I want to know whether that is really the case, and if so, what significance we should attribute to this." Jon, you earlier mentioned one piece of 'evidence', as I recall, in support of the notion "that Peirce may have stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life" connected with some of Jappy's recent comments (or was it exactly those comments)? Would you point to that specific piece of evidence (or pieces of evidence) again? Is there additional evidence which you might point to? What does your expression "in favor of" imply imply (if anything)? Assuming there is such (much?) evidence, what significance do *you* attribute to this strange, imo, ceasation of nearly a lifetime of analyzing Categories "in favor of" talk of Universes? For example, it seems to me that it is possible that the Categories are so fully developed in Peirce's theory and thinking that they "go without saying," in a manner of speaking. What date would you point to when Peirce begins this putative switch from Categories to Universes? How many times--and in what places--does he discuss Universes after having 'ceased' discussing Categories? That is, what is the frequency of his discussions of Universes after that time? Is it often or oaccional? Aren't there yet categorial discussions at least as late as the 1908 "Pragmatism" essay? You "supposed" that your claim that there is "evidence that Peirce may have stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes" may have been, as you wrote, "one of my 'aims and motivations,' but it is not really the primary one at the moment, since God as Creator is uncontroversial for me personally." Is such a belief better supported in some way by a cessation of discussions of Categories in favor of Universes? (Well, you say it's "uncontroversial," so I guess it doesn't matter one way or the other?) If so how or how not? Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 11:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jeff, List: JD: I don't detect any impatience ... Thanks for understanding. I need to take some time to digest your two posts from this evening, but I want to respond to one item right away. JD: I was under the impression that you are interested in questions about the universes and categories because you want to dig deeper into Peirce's claim in "The Neglected Argument" that God is creator of all three universes of experience. Let me know if I am mistaken about your aims and motivations. I suppose that is one of my "aims and motivations," but it is not really the primary one at the moment, since God as Creator is uncontroversial for me personally. I am mainly trying to figure out whether, for Peirce, (a) Universes and Categories are basically the same thing; (b) Universes are a specific manifestation of the Categories in phaneroscopy and/or metaphysics; (c) Universes and Categories are two distinct things, and if so, on what basis; or (d) none of the above. There seems to be some evidence that Peirce may have stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life; I want to know whether that is really the case, and if so, what significance we should attribute to this. Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 9:13 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon, List, Let me try to take up the question you posed at the end of your message: "how does this help me figure out Universes vs. Categories?" Well, I was under the impression that you are interested in questions about the universes and categories because you want to dig deeper into Peirce's claim in "The Neglected Argument" that God is creator of all three universes of experience. Let me know if I am mistaken about your aims and motivations. Working on the assumption that we share a common goal, let's take the last question in the earlier email and rephrase it in the following way: is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create rich homogeneities of connectedness within and between the three universes of experience dependent on something else? For the sake of sharpening our discussion, it might help to return to the specific examples of sound, color, space and time that we were considering earlier. Let’s focus the question on those examples: how do the homogeneities of connectedness of qualities of sound and color in a larger universe of possible qualities experience relate to the homogeneities of connectedness in the experience of individuals as being located in a larger realm of space and time? Let us start the transition from the phenomenological analysis to a more normative inquiry in aesthetics. So, we contemplate--in a playful spirit--the homogeneities of connectedness that we find within and between the universe of the possible qualities of experience, the universe of actual objects as individuals at a place and time in our experience, and the universe in which space and time are ordered limitless wholes in experience. Then, having mused about these relationships within and between the universes, we ask: what ideal should inform our deepest hopes as we engage in honest inquiry about the surprising features of our experience of these three universes? If this ideal is to be adequate to the task at hand, then I suspect that it, too, will need to be a sort of limitless whole. That is, it will need to be adequate to inform our aesthetic evaluations of what, among all possible universes of experience, is most attractive, considered for its own sake. What might have originated the homogeneities of connectedness within and between the universes so that they might be experienced as beautiful? The movement to claims about the beauty of this whole of experience gives rise to a need to sort out the universality and necessity that are part and parcel of such a normative evaluation. As Kant points out in the third Critique, the conditions of universality and necessity that attend such an evaluation are inter-subjective in character, and Peirce seems to agree. These conditions require that we be able to use our imaginations in order to find the underlying unity and harmony in the presentations that we are reflecting on aesthetically. These conditions of intersubjective universality and necessity and the requirements of finding unity and harmony are, I believe, at the root of the abductive inference from such musement on the universes to a conclusion about inherent attractiveness of an aesthetic ideal--such as an image of the concrete growth of reasonableness in the world as a whole. I suspect that Peirce's reference to homogeneities of connectedness is a crucial part of what is needed to validate the such an inference to a global hypothesis about what is most attractive as an aesthetic ideal. This idea helps to clarify the formal condition that is essential for the validity of the concluding judgment in the inference. So, let's reconsider the passage you quoted earlier: CSP: But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate. We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903) The element of Reasonableness that he describes can help us explain those surprisingly prevalent homogeneities of connectedness that are found with and between all three universes of experience. If I were to extend his assertion in the last sentence, I would add that in this hope lies the only possibility of successfully engaging in the sorts of self-controlled processes of inference that are necessary for perfecting our habits of feeling and action--as well our our habits of thought. The growth in the unity and harmony of our habits of feeling are the wellspring from with the unity and harmony of our habits of action and thought might grow. When time permits, we might try to dig deeper in an effort to explore the nature of these homogeneities of connectedness found in all three universes of experience. Towards this end, we could draw on mathematical conceptions of spatial homogeneity and connection--such as what are found in a multi-dimensional topology--and we might use those ideas to explore the formal characteristics of the book of the sheets of assertion in the gamma system of the existential graphs. As a parting thought, I wonder how we might think about the way that such interconnected sheets are generated in the first place. That is, what can we say about the formal characteristics of the mathematical generators for such a multidimensional diagrammatic space--where the book is supposed to model the interconnections between the universes of what is possible, what is actual, and what is necessary? Having hinted in this direction, I think we should save that exploration for another time. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 4:25 PM Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Hi Jon, List, I don't detect any impatience, which is good because it will take some patience on our part to dig deeper into the puzzles that stem from Peirce's remarkably compact arguments in "The Neglected Argument." Let me start by focusing on the first points you make about the meaning of create. The references you provide do support the claim that the first meaning of "create" is a good fit with what Peirce says about the creation of the three universes of experience, and I find those references helpful. In particular, they help to focus the attention on the idea of what was created from what. There are a number of ways of looking at the issue. How is something created from nothing? How is existing brute matter created from possibility? How is order created from randomness? These are all good questions. Having said that, I would like to direct attention away from the question of how one thing is created from another to the question of what kind of creativity is being ascribed to God as Ens necessarium? The intransitive meaning of “create” is to originate, or to engage in originative action. Partly for personal reasons, I am intrigued by the example he provides for this intransitive use of the term. He looks at Emerson’s Essay “The Farmer”, and offers the following quote: “the glory of the Farmer is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” If we insert the God into this equation we get: “the glory of God as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create.” Or, for those who find the reference to God hard to make out: “the glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create.” Following this line of thought, what is it to for something to have the capacity to engage in an originative action. Peirce says this about origination: Originality is being such as that being is, regardless of aught else. CP 2.89 Drawing on this idea, we might think of God's creative act as a self-sufficient act of origination. Or, to put it as a question and in terms that others might find are more palatable to their ears: Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create (e.g., something from nothing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) dependent on something else? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 2:25 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jeff, List: JD: In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem to have in mind? Is there a good reason not to take him as straightforwardly using his first (transitive) definition, especially since he quotes Genesis 1:1 as his initial example? CSP: To bring into being; cause to exist; specifically, to produce without the prior existence of the material used, or of other things like the thing produced; produce out of nothing. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=459&query=create) Peirce is more explicit about his meaning in his definitions of God as Ens necessarium in some of the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument." CSP: "He by Whom the three Universes of Experience are, supposedly, getting, directly or indirectly, created from Nothing--soberly, from less than a blank." (R 841) CSP: "Reality is not determined by signification; but supposing Him Real, then out of Nothing, out of less than a Blank, He is creating the three Universes of Experience." (R 843) CSP: "He who is creating the three Universes of Experience from Nothing; soberly, from less than a blank." (R 843) I think that we are on pretty solid ground here. JD: So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience of space and time. "Homogeneities of connectedness" sound like continuities (Thirdness) to me, and thus bring this passage to mind. CSP: But the saving truth is that there is a Thirdness in experience, an element of Reasonableness to which we can train our own reason to conform more and more. If this were not the case, there could be no such thing as logical goodness or badness; and therefore we need not wait until it is proved that there is a reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate. We should at once hope that it is so, since in that hope lies the only possibility of any knowledge. (CP 5.160, EP 2.212; 1903) I do not wish to seem impatient or dismissive--I sincerely appreciate your characteristically thoughtful contributions to this and other discussions--but how does this help me figure out Universes vs. Categories? Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon, Gary R, List, You asked, "Where does this leave us?" I believe it leaves us with three related areas of inquiry--mathematical logic, phenomenology and semiotics--that we can draw on for the sake of gaining better insight in the questions you've been asking about universes, realms and the modal features of our assertions. Each has its own methods, and we should use them selectively to probe for better answers to those questions. The real trick is putting the results of those areas of inquiry together properly in order to address the really hard questions in cosmological metaphysics and in the special science of cosmology. Before turning to such questions of metaphysics and the special science of cosmology, my understanding is that this discussion started with a look at the opening moves in "A Neglected Argument." In what sense might God as ens necessarium really be creator of the three universes of experience? Or, better yet, in what way might the hypotheses involving such a conception of ens necessarium help to explain puzzling features of these global aspects of our ordinary experience? It will help, I think, to look a little closer at what Peirce might mean by "creator." He provided definitions of "create" and "creation" for the Century dictionary. Why don't we look there to see what hints might be found. He says that create has several meanings. He provides 5 senses of the transitive use of the verb, and then one sense of the transitive. In saying the God created these universes of experience, is he using the transitive or the intransitive sense, and if it is the former, then which does he seem to have in mind? Once that is done, it might help to look closely at what is calling out for explanation within each of these three universes and also between the three. Peirce is pretty good at describing what he has observed, so let's see what is to be found--quite publicly--in our experience as well. The feature that stands out to me are descriptions of this sort "Let the Muser, for example, after well appreciating, in its breadth and depth, the unspeakable variety of each Universe, turn to those phenomena that are of the nature of homogeneities of connectedness in each; and what a pectacle will unroll itself! As a mere hint of them I may point out that every small part of space, however remote, is bounded by just such neighbouring parts as every other, without a single exception throughout immensity. So, we're trying to explain the variety in our experience, and then we turn to those homogeneities of connectedness that are found in our experience of space and time. The homogeneities of connectedness are similar, in some respects, to the those found in the quality of the sound of a trombone moving through the tones, or those found in the change of the colors found in the setting of the sun in evening. Why does these colors, sounds have such homogeneities of connectedness, and why are they similar to those found in space in time? The notion of a homogeneity of connectedness has a rich history in both math and philosophy. Given the fact that he talked of bringing unity to the manifold of impressions in the start of "A New List of the Categories", it might be worth starting there. The reference is clearly to Kant's discussion in the first Critique of what is necessary for brining the manifold of sense into a synthetic unity. The condition of homogeneity is key for understanding how it is possible for such synthesis. How might we understand Peirce's take on this condition for cognizing the manifold--either early on in the discussion of the New List or much later in the Neglected Argument? This, I think, is not an easy question to answer. As a starting point, I think it might help to focus on what Peirce says about the "play" of the imagination. This is a clear reference to Kant's and Schiller's discussion of such play on the part of a Muser who is engaged in aesthetic contemplation. This transition from phenomenological analysis to aesthetic contemplation holds, I think, an especially interesting move on Peirce's part--especially when it comes to understanding how an aesthetic condition for seeking homogeneities of connectedness in our experience might find its source. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jeff, List: Thanks, that was helpful but still leaves me with questions. JD: Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and categories: It remains unclear to me what distinctions (if any) we should draw in defining these three terms, even within each of the three types of inquiry that you listed. JD: Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. I agree up to a point, especially since Peirce calls them Universes of Experience. However, he also defines each Universe on the basis of that in which the Being of its members consists, which suggests a metaphysical aspect to them; and of course, the overall subject of the article is the Reality of God, which is obviously a metaphysical topic. What makes this especially tricky is that phenomenology/phaneroscopy precedes logic/semeiotic in the architectonic of the sciences, but metaphysics follows it. I take this to mean that semeiotic can depend on phaneroscopy, but is not supposed to depend on metaphysics. Where does this leave us? Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 10:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon S, Gary R, List, Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions you are finding vexing. Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and categories: 1. The simple systems of formal algebraic and graphical logics--being developed as a part of mathematics 2. The phenomenological inquiries. 3. The semiotic inquiries. Peirce talks about three universes of experience as part of his phenomenological inquiries. In the early pages of "A Neglected Argument," the discussion of these universes is largely phenomenological in character. In the development of the formal systems of algebraic logic and existential graphs, Peirce builds various conceptions that model different universes of discourse and categories. In these different formal systems, the universes and modal notions are treated differently. For instance, the universes of discourse are handled differently in the alpha, beta, and the various systems of the gamma graphs. In the development of the semiotic theory, he uses the formal systems of logical for the purpose of refining the classifications and explanations of the sign relations and patterns of inference. At this point, he needs a philosophical interpretation of the mathematical models--including interpretations of what a sheet of assertion means in the context of the alpha graphs, the beta graphs, and the various versions of the gamma graphs. It might be helpful to think of the phenomenological inquiries concerning the three universes of experience as remarks concerning the more "global" features of our observations--where those observations are informing the classifications and philosophical explanations that being generated in the semiotic theory. Each of these three lines of inquiry--formal logic as a part of mathematics, phenomenological, and semiotic--are informing the others, but in different ways. For instance, in the context of the formal logic, Peirce sees no need to pick between the different ways of conceiving of the universes of discourse and the modal features of the assertions. The alpha system of graphs can make do with a much simpler version of a universe of discourse than is needed for the various systems of the gamma graphs. It isn't the case that one version is right or wrong. They are just different formal systems--like the different systems of numbers (e.g., rationals, reals, surreals) or different systems involving continuity (e.g., topology of one two or three dimensions, projective geometry, metrical geometries). Clearly, some of these different formal systems are more "basic" than the others in some senses, but we should remember that, in the final analysis, they are just different formal systems starting with different sets of initial definitions, postulates and axioms. We seek to build formal system that manifest virtues such as balance and symmetry, but even the systems that lack these virtues may be of some special interest for particular problems. Of course, when we move from these three forms of inquiry to metaphysics, we then need to press the question: what it the best explanation of the nature of what exists as objects and what is real as general? At this point, we can then make use of the prior work that has been done in the math, phenomenology and logic to address the questions of cosmological metaphysics that are so interesting--but hard to answer well. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 8:18 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories List: Following up on the post below--as I mentioned in the thread on Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology), I now notice that Peirce added the caveat that whether it is correct to assign Subjects to Universes and Predicates to Categories "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545). He then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). At least, I think he did ... CSP: Let us, at least, provide for such a [destined] mode of being in our system of diagrammatization, since it may turn out to be needed and, as I think, surely will. CSP: I will proceed to explain why, although I am not prepared to deny that every proposition can be represented, and that I must say, for the most part very conveniently, under your view that the Universes are receptacles of the Subjects alone, I, nevertheless, cannot deem that mode of analyzing propositions to be satisfactory. (CP 4.547-548) The second sentence here is key, but it is tough to decipher. I assume that "explain why" refers to the preceding assertion that a third mode of being will be needed. The rest is very muddled. What is the relevance of whether "every proposition can be represented"? What, specifically, did Peirce find "very convenient"? Most importantly, what "mode of analyzing propositions" could he not deem to be satisfactory? Am I right to take this as referring to "your view that the Universes are receptacles of the Subjects alone"? I think so, because Peirce went on to suggest, as an alternative, "the principle that each Universe consists, not of Subjects, but the one of True assertions, the other of False, but each to the effect that there is something of a given description." The rest of CP 4.548 is an analysis of two specific propositions using both methods, showing that the alternative is more correct. But this means that there are only two Universes, not three; and they consist of True and False assertions, not Ideas, Things/Facts, and Habits/Laws/Continua. Given the context, I gather that these may refer to the Sheet of Assertion and that which is fenced off from it by a cut. So apparently this passage is apparently not about the "Universes of Experience" at all! Peirce then came back to Categories in CP 4.549. CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. As I also mentioned in the other thread, hypostatic abstraction enables us to convert predicates into subjects. Does this mean that even if we assign subjects to Universes and predicates to Categories, it turns out to be a distinction without a difference? CSP We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into Realms for the different Predicaments. Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny)." We also have "Realms for the different Predicaments," which are what we used to call "Categories," but these divisions "must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being"; instead, "the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being." Peirce leaves it at that ... and thus I am still confused about Universes and Categories. Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jeff, List: JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between subjects that belong to different universes of discourse. The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's theoretical framework that Jappy hypothesizes. How do we reconcile your summary here with the "Prolegomena" passage from 1906, which indicates that Subjects belong to Universes and Predicates belong to Categories? Which 1903 term corresponds to "Universes of Experience" in 1908--"categories of being" or "universes of discourse"? JD: I think that Peirce sometimes dropped the distinction between the realms of the logical categories and the realms of the universes in his later writings when he was examining matters of philosophical necessity and was operating as this very high level of the discussion. My impression--which may be incorrect--is that Peirce stopped talking about Categories altogether in his later writings, and only talked about Universes. Jappy specifically claims that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs," but I am not entirely sure that this is also true in other areas. JD: My ability to engage in these discussions has been limited due to my daughter’s health issues. Prayers are ascending for your daughter, as well as for you and the rest of your family. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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