Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,
I hope it was clear that my aim in formulating and then reformulating a series of assertinos and questions that pertain to Peirce's claims about God as creator of the three universes of experience in "The Neglected Argument" was clear. It was a deliberate attempt to follow the scholastic procedure in approaching disagreements between disputants. That is, I was hoping to close some of the distance between the parties (e.g., Jon S and Edwina) by exploring where there might be some common ground. Here are two versions of an assertion I was trying to frame by drawing on Emersons's quote in his discussion of the farmer followed by two versions of a question. My goal was to think a bit more about the different senses in which Peirce might be saying that God is a creator. Given the fact that I grew up on a farm and spent much of my youth baling hay and tending to cows bearing calves, the allusion has a special resonance with my own experience. 1. The glory of God as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is his part to create. 2. The glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium is that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create. 3. Is the God as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in his originative capacity, or is his capacity to create homogeneities of connectedness out of variety within and between the three universes of experience dependent on something else? 4. Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create homogeneities of connectedness out of variety within and between the three universes of experience dependent on something else? One of the lessons I draw from "The Neglected Argument" is that answers to the largest questions often drawn on conceptions that are, by their very nature, quite vague. What is more, I think we should be cautious about seeking greater precision in the use of these conceptions than is really needed or warranted. I deliberately tried to avoid imposing specific claims about what is immanent in nature or what is separate from it as well as claims about what might or might not be operating as a form of self-organization and the like. For my part, I take these to be open questions, and we should be careful about the way we might try re-frame the questions or formulate hypotheses as tentative answers. I am trying to follow the critical common-sensist approach in holding off on imposing too much exactness on the questions or the answers when addressing these large matters. After all, our shared common sense has been evolving for many thousands of years and it probably contains forms of wisdom that surpass my abilities as a relatively solitary and short-lived thinker. Having said that about my own common-sense way of coming at these questions and answers, I do feel a need to push further as a person who engages in philosophy. But I try to keep in mind that the philosophical inquiries are theoretical in character and, across the board, they are highly prone to error. A quick look at the history of philosophy should be enough to confirm anyone's suspicions that, as a scientific form in inquiry, it is still in its relative infancy in working out its methods as compared to say, math or astronomy. So, I have ideas about how we might reconstruct several of Peirce's lines of inquiry in "The Neglected Argument", but I see several major strands to the inquiries and I see several methods at work. Moving beyond a reconstruction of his argument, I believe that we can and should pursue these different lines of inquiry--and that we should seek to do so as part of a larger community of inquiry that seeks common ground and that is drawing on commonly accepted methods and kinds of observations. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:10 PM To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc... Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as outlined in 1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and logical. [It IS a Big Bang outline]. The Universe then proceeds to evolve, as a complex and networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in Peirce's various analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a valid explanation. To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me - utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator!!!. As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one believes - and I mean the word - believes - in one and not the other. I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes because of authority or tenacity. Of course this belief, like its opposite, is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not even logically explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then has to ask: And what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The usual Scholastic answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to the circle: you believe or don't believe. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> To: Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jon, Edwina, List, Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that as Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably not "sanction calling a proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe inexplicable." The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as difficult as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make better sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the competing theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never been a persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given. So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician (semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which necessitates God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to the ancient question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why it takes the (for Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs the fruits of his intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion of Three Universes, in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question is much less the action of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for he famously rather despised theology), than as a scientist. Second, from his own words it is clear that Peirce would never "substitute "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium." Jon has argued this repeatedly and so well that I have nothing to add to his argumentation. But this brings me back to the first point, namely, that for Peirce a principal, perhaps the principal purpose of science and reason is exactly to make the world explicable. As Terry Eagleton writes in Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate in words which could be Peirce's: We may. . . inquire what we are to make of the fact that even before we have begun to reason properly, that the world is in principle reasonable in the first place (129). In additional, Eagleton comments, following Aquinas' dictum that "all virtues have their source in love": Love is the ultimate form of soberly disenchanted realism, which is why it is the twin of truth (122), But that would get us into a discussion of Peirce's non-traditional view of Christianity, which is, even if deeply related, a distinctly different topic than the Reality of God in the N.A. Best, Gary R : Love is the ultimate form of soberly [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Edwina, List: ET: That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical ... I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe inexplicable. Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis according to his criteria, since it does not explain anything. Julie Andrews sang it well--"Nothing comes from nothing, nothing ever could." Regards, Jon On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Gary R, list: Exactly. You wrote: "For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon." That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them! Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> To: Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List, Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium. As I have pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" isnot someone or something that is "immanent in Nature." I have also previously noted the distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible. I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with "self-organization") only after the creation of a cosmos, or, as you put it, after there is Being. I too find the notion of "self-generation" and "self-creation" completely implausible and inexplicable. But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard analogy (to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? For those who are unwilling to accept Ens Necessarium as anything but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly nothing 'preceeds' the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these fundamentally opposed positions any time soon. Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't recall a single mention of EGs in that piece), your most recent post does offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of the relation between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is my first impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all this, I have no idea whatsover. Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well be examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might think about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in common experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the logical conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be applied to those abductive inferences that give rise to our most global hypotheses. For me at least there have always been uncanny, unresolved tensions between the phenomenological, the logical, and the metaphysical in The Neglected Argument. The attempt to unravel them seems to me of the greatest potential value. Best, Gary R [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Edwina, Jeff, List: This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts from last night. I do not see it as valid at all to substitute "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as Ens necessarium. As I have pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is not someone or something that is "immanent in Nature." I have also previously noted the distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as Ens necessarium self-sufficient in its originative capacity, "...for Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of Mind and Matter. Therefore, Mind, as a necessary component of Matter, self-organizes that same Matter and its Laws - by means of the three Categories which enable it to do just that. Edwina ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ________________________________ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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