Dear list: Here is an additional perspective to help interpretation:
“Socrates seems to have regarded the change which he brought about as a return to “sobriety” and “moderation” from the “madness” of his predecessors. In contradistinction to his predecessors, he did not separate wisdom from moderation. In present-day parlance one can describe the change in question as a return to “common sense” or to “the world of common sense.” That to which the question “What is?” points is the *eidos* of a thing, the shape or form or character or “idea” of a thing. It is no accident that the term *eidos* signifies primarily that which is visible to all without any particular effort or what one might call the “surface” of the things. Socrates started not from what is first in itself or first by nature but from what is first for us, from what comes to sight first, from the phenomena.” ~Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History Best, Jerry R On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > Jeff, List: > > JD: 1. The glory of God as *Ens necessarium* is that, in the division of > labor, it is his part to create. > > JD: 2. The glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens > necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create. > > > I must confess, I am having a hard time with this intransitive use of > "create." Both Emerson's original line about the farmer and these > adaptations of it leave me asking, "Create *what*?" In what sense can > someone *create *without creating *something*? > > JD: 3. Is the God as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient in his > originative capacity, or is his capacity to create homogeneities of > connectedness out of variety within and between the three universes of > experience dependent on something else? > > > Not surprisingly, my answer is the first option. If God is *Ens > necessarium*, necessary Being, then He is not dependent on *anything*. > That is why questions about His origins are inherently nonsensical. > > JD: 4. Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* > self-sufficient in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create > homogeneities of connectedness out of variety within and between the three > universes of experience dependent on something else? > > > Again, I find this substitution invalid. Now, if you take out "as *Ens > necessarium*," then my answer is obvious--the Mind-like Reasonableness in > Nature is dependent on something else. Peirce neither states nor implies > that the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature is *Ens necessarium*; the > former is part of Creation, the latter is the Creator. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 3:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List, >> >> I hope it was clear that my aim in formulating and then reformulating a >> series of assertinos and questions that pertain to Peirce's claims about >> God as creator of the three universes of experience in "The Neglected >> Argument" was clear. It was a deliberate attempt to follow the scholastic >> procedure in approaching disagreements between disputants. That is, I was >> hoping to close some of the distance between the parties (e.g., Jon S and >> Edwina) by exploring where there might be some common ground. >> >> Here are two versions of an assertion I was trying to frame by drawing on >> Emersons's quote in his discussion of the farmer followed by two versions >> of a question. My goal was to think a bit more about the different senses >> in which Peirce might be saying that God is a creator. Given the fact that >> I grew up on a farm and spent much of my youth baling hay and tending to >> cows bearing calves, the allusion has a special resonance with my own >> experience. >> >> 1. The glory of God as * Ens necessarium* is that, in the division of >> labor, it is his part to create. >> >> 2. The glory of the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens >> necessarium* is that, in the division of labor, it is its part to create. >> >> 3. Is the God as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient in his originative >> capacity, or is his capacity to create homogeneities of connectedness out >> of variety within and between the three universes of experience dependent >> on something else? >> >> 4. Is the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* >> self-sufficient >> in its originative capacity, or is its capacity to create homogeneities of >> connectedness out of variety within and between the three universes >> of experience dependent on something else? >> >> One of the lessons I draw from "The Neglected Argument" is that answers >> to the largest questions often drawn on conceptions that are, by their very >> nature, quite vague. What is more, I think we should be cautious >> about seeking greater precision in the use of these conceptions than is >> really needed or warranted. I deliberately tried to avoid imposing specific >> claims about what is immanent in nature or what is separate from it as well >> as claims about what might or might not be operating as a form of >> self-organization and the like. >> >> For my part, I take these to be open questions, and we should be careful >> about the way we might try re-frame the questions or formulate hypotheses >> as tentative answers. I am trying to follow the critical >> common-sensist approach in holding off on imposing too much exactness on >> the questions or the answers when addressing these large matters. After >> all, our shared common sense has been evolving for many thousands of years >> and it probably contains forms of wisdom that surpass my abilities as a >> relatively solitary and short-lived thinker. >> >> Having said that about my own common-sense way of coming at these >> questions and answers, I do feel a need to push further as a person who >> engages in philosophy. But I try to keep in mind that the philosophical >> inquiries are theoretical in character and, across the board, they are >> highly prone to error. A quick look at the history of philosophy should be >> enough to confirm anyone's suspicions that, as a scientific form in >> inquiry, it is still in its relative infancy in working out its methods as >> compared to say, math or astronomy. >> >> So, I have ideas about how we might reconstruct several of Peirce's lines >> of inquiry in "The Neglected Argument", but I see several major strands to >> the inquiries and I see several methods at work. Moving beyond a >> reconstruction of his argument, I believe that we can and should pursue >> these different lines of inquiry--and that we should seek to do so as part >> of a larger community of inquiry that seeks common ground and that is >> drawing on commonly accepted methods and kinds of observations. >> >> --Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:10 PM >> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories >> >> Gary R, Jon, Jeffrey, list etc... >> >> Self-generation, self-origination of the universe within the fundamental >> categories of organization of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - as >> outlined in 1.412, is to me, NOT inexplicable but entirely plausible and >> logical. [It IS a Big Bang outline]. The Universe then proceeds to evolve, >> as a complex and networked merger of Mind and Matter - again, outlined in >> Peirce's various analyses of evolution [tychasm, agapasm]..To me, it is a >> valid explanation. >> >> To require a metaphysical, agent/creator of this universe is to me - >> utterly inexplicable and illogical. After all it does not explain the >> origin of this metaphysical agent/creator!!!. >> >> As I keep saying, there are these two competing theories, both of which >> quite frankly, are outside of any empirical proof. Therefore, one >> *believes* - and I mean the word -* believes* - in one and not the >> other. >> >> I do NOT find the outline of a metaphysical agent/creator to be >> explicable in any way. It rests on non-scientific means; i.e., one believes >> because of authority or tenacity. Of course this belief, like its >> opposite, is not empirically provable, but it is, to me, not >> even logically explicable...because, for all the ancient reasons - one then >> has to ask: And what was the origin of this metaphysical agent/creator. The >> usual Scholastic answer is: There Is No Origin. Which means you are back to >> the circle: you believe or don't believe. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 3:35 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories >> >> Jon, Edwina, List, >> >> Two things have been clarified for me from this discussion. First, that >> as Jon noted, Peirce would unquestionably* not* "sanction calling a >> proposition "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe >> *inexplicable*." >> >> The self-generation or self-creation of the Universe is such an illogical >> proposition. What Peirce offers in his early cosmological musings, as >> difficult as they certainly are to analyze and interpret, increasingly make >> better sense--at least for me--of the origins of the Universe than the >> competing theory, the Big Bang, for which Great Singularity there has never >> been a persuasive, or pretty much any, reason given. >> >> So, as I'm now seeing it, this great scientist, philosopher, and logician >> (semiotician), i.e., Peirce, arrives at his early cosmology (which >> necessitates God) because for him this is the only reasonable solution to >> the ancient question of why there is anything rather than nothing and why >> it takes the (for Peirce) trichotomic form which it does. That he employs >> the fruits of his intellectual labors over a lifetime, including his notion >> of Three Universes, in an attempt at a reasonable answer to this question >> is much less the action of a believer (an certainly not a theologian, for >> he famously rather despised theology), than as a scientist. >> >> Second, from his own words it is clear that Peirce would never >> "substitute "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens >> necessarium*." >> >> Jon has argued this repeatedly and so well that I have nothing to add to >> his argumentation. >> >> But this brings me back to the first point, namely, that for Peirce a >> principal, perhaps *the* principal purpose of science and reason is >> exactly to make the world explicable. As Terry Eagleton writes in *Reason, >> Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* in words which >> could be Peirce's: >> >> We may. . . inquire what we are to make of the fact that even before we >> have begun to reason properly, that the world is in principle reasonable in >> the first place (129). >> >> >> In additional, Eagleton comments, following Aquinas' dictum that "all >> virtues have their source in love": >> >> Love is the ultimate form of soberly disenchanted realism, which is why >> it is the twin of truth (122), >> >> >> But that would get us into a discussion of Peirce's non-traditional view >> of Christianity, which is, even if deeply related, a distinctly different >> topic than the Reality of God in the N.A. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> ET: That is, whether the universe is self-generated/created as well as >>> self-organized, or, requires an non-immanent agential creator. Both are >>> logical ... >>> >>> >>> I hardly think that Peirce would sanction calling a proposition >>> "logical" that renders the origin of the entire universe *inexplicable*. >>> Self-generation/creation does not even qualify as an admissible hypothesis >>> according to his criteria, since it does not *explain *anything. Julie >>> Andrews sang it well--"Nothing comes from nothing, nothing ever could." >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R, list: >>>> >>>> Exactly. You wrote: >>>> "For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything >>>> but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's >>>> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), >>>> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds' >>>> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most >>>> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't >>>> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these >>>> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon." >>>> >>>> That was also my point. The two paradigms are not, either one of them, >>>> empirically, provable. That is, whether the universe is >>>> self-generated/created as well as self-organized, or, requires an >>>> non-immanent agential creator. Both are logical, but, both rely totally on >>>> belief. So, there can't be any 'rapprochement'. You either believe in one >>>> or the other. And therefore, there's not much use arguing about them! >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Saturday, October 22, 2016 1:03 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories >>>> >>>> Jon S, Edwina, Jeff D, List, >>>> >>>> Jon wrote: I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute "the >>>> Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens necessarium*. >>>> As I have pointed out before, Peirce made it very clear in the manuscript >>>> drafts for "A Neglected Argument" that what he meant by "God" is*not* >>>> someone >>>> or something that is "immanent in Nature." I have also previously noted >>>> the distinction between "self-organization" (of that which already has >>>> Being), which is perfectly plausible and even evident in the world today, >>>> and "self-creation" or "self-generation" (something coming into Being on >>>> its own out of nothing), which I find completely implausible. >>>> >>>> I agree, Jon, and have myself over the years argued that ""Mind-like >>>> Reasonableness in Nature" is a valid concept (along with >>>> "self-organization") only *after *the creation of a cosmos, or, as you >>>> put it, after there is Being. I too find the notion of "self-generation" >>>> and "self-creation" completely implausible and inexplicable. >>>> >>>> But didn't we just recently have this discussion (remember Platonism vs >>>> Aristotelianism?) in contemplating, for prime example, the blackboard >>>> analogy (to which Jon added the interesting 'dimension' of a whiteboard)? >>>> For those who are unwilling to accept *Ens Necessarium* as anything >>>> but "Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" (which appears to be Edwina's >>>> position, although I'm not as certain as to where Jeff stands on this), >>>> then there is no God, no need for God, and exactly *nothing '*preceeds' >>>> the odd self-creation of the Universe, presumably at the moment of the most >>>> singular and peculiar of singularities, the putative Big Bang. So, I don't >>>> expect there will be anything approaching a rapprochement in these >>>> fundamentally opposed positions any time soon. >>>> >>>> Meanwhile, and while I think , Jeff, that you may be tending to >>>> over-emphasize the importance of developments in the existential graphs in >>>> consideration of the Categories/Universes problematic in the N.A. (I don't >>>> recall a single mention of EGs in that piece), your most recent post does >>>> offer some intriguing hints as to how we might begin to rethink aspects of >>>> the relation between the Categories and the Universes, or at least that is >>>> my first impression. But how, say, the Gamma graphs might figure in all >>>> this, I have no idea whatsover. >>>> >>>> >>>> Jeff concluded: So, in "The Neglected Argument", Peirce may very well >>>> be examining--on an observational basis--the different ways that we might >>>> think about the phenomenological account of the universes and categories in >>>> common experience for the sake of refining his explanations of how the >>>> logical conceptions of the universes of discourse and categories should be >>>> applied to those abductive inferences that give rise to our >>>> most global hypotheses. >>>> >>>> >>>> For me at least there have always been uncanny, unresolved tensions >>>> between the phenomenological, the logical, and the metaphysical in The >>>> Neglected Argument. The attempt to unravel them seems to me of the greatest >>>> potential value. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *C 745* >>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>> >>>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Edwina, Jeff, List: >>>>> >>>>> This highlights one of my strong initial misgivings about Jeff's posts >>>>> from last night. I do not see it as valid *at all* to substitute >>>>> "the Mind-like Reasonableness in Nature" for "God" as *Ens >>>>> necessarium*. As I have pointed out before, Peirce made it very >>>>> clear in the manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument" that what he >>>>> meant by "God" is *not* someone or something that is "immanent in >>>>> Nature." I have also previously noted the distinction between >>>>> "self-organization" (of that which already has Being), which is perfectly >>>>> plausible and even evident in the world today, and "self-creation" or >>>>> "self-generation" (something coming into Being on its own out of nothing), >>>>> which I find completely implausible. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jeffrey- very nice outline. My view is that "the Mind-like >>>>>> Reasonableness in Nature as *Ens necessarium* self-sufficient in its >>>>>> originative capacity, "...for Peirce rejected the Cartesian separation of >>>>>> Mind and Matter. Therefore, Mind, as a necessary component of Matter, >>>>>> self-organizes that same Matter and its Laws - by means of the three >>>>>> Categories which enable it to do just that. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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