> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and > Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation > with Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket > rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an > Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree with > Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at least > after about 1896.
I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot depends upon what we mean by the terms. That may reflect part of the disagreement. (see below) > On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a > Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The > difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the > particular. Depending upon the sense of ‘function’ I’m not sure a Platonist would necessarily disagree. Again though there are different ways historically in both antiquity and the modern era that self-described Platonists conceived of intellectual objects. > Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have > non-embedded reality. I’m not quite sure what you mean by that. My sense is you’re referring to something like Armstrong universals. Is that about correct? Only with instead of matter the way Armstrong conceived of it you have what you call the triadic sign as being ‘matter’ as it were. > ...they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic > Sign. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. And, I > agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are > 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to > me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational > only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign > totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is > vital. I’m not quite sure I understand. This is why I brought up the Armstrong parallels. My question is really over the term ‘function.’ I know I’m being pedantic here so I apologize in advance. I’m just thinking of what you referred to earlier in 1.412 and especially 6.612ff. Do you see that indeterminacy in which firstness “occurs” as just triadic signs that are chaotic or do you see the firstness there as independent of triadic signs? Genuinely curious as I think the texts could perhaps be read both ways. (Although I’d want to reread them again before giving a firm opinion)
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