John C, Helmut, Clark, list, Perhaps you've seen this recent report, "Verlinde's new theory of gravity passes first test." In a word, Verlinde's theory sees gravity as an emergent phenomenon which does not involve dark matter.
[Verlinde's theory] explains the mechanism behind gravity with his alternative to Einstein's theory, but also the origin of the mysterious extra gravity, which astronomers currently attribute to dark matter. Verlinde's new theory <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity> predicts how much gravity there must be, based only on the mass of the visible matter <http://phys.org/tags/visible+matter/>. http://phys.org/news/2016-12-verlinde-theory-gravity.html#jCp See also: First proposed back in 2010 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785>, the new hypothesis states that gravity might behave and arise very differently than Einstein predicted, and an independent study of more than 30,000 galaxies has now found the first evidence to back this up. http://www.sciencealert.com/a-controversial-new-gravity-hypothesis-has-passed-its-first-test This initial test is described here: [Astronomer Margot Brouwer at the Leiden Observatory] and her team measured the distribution of gravity around more than 33,000 galaxies to put Verlinde's prediction to the test. She concludes that Verlinde's theory agrees well with the measured gravity distribution. The results have been accepted for publication in the British journal Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2016/12/-new-theory-of-gravity-as-an-emergent-phenomena-in-the-universe-first-tests-looks-interesting.html Needless to say, Verlinde's theory is quite controversial. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Dec 11, 2016 at 4:19 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Dark matter was first hypothesized in the 1930s to explain the motion of > galaxies that could not be explained by the visible matter. It is called > matter, because it exerts a gravitational effect. So there is good > observational evidence for it. Other explanations, involving variations in > the theory of gravity, have so far failed to fit the observations. What we > don’t know is what makes it up. Also, there might be some other explanation > for the observations, but that is pure speculation. > > > > I agree with the criticism of string theory. > > > > John Collier > > Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate > > Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Sunday, 11 December 2016 1:14 AM > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy) > > > > Helmut, list, > > > > Helmut wrote: > > > > The hypothesis is dark matter, but there is no dark matter available for > experiments. Also the string theory is not verifiable with experiments, > because the hypothetic strings are smaller than anything detectable. So > nowadays physics is somehow comparable with medieval scholastic theology. > > > > Sometimes some of these postmodern theories (how many string theories have > been proposed now?--I think over 12; and 'dark matter' seems almost an > oxymoron), many of these mathematical-physical theories seem to me more > closely related to science fiction than to science. It doesn't mean that > some of them might not be 'true', but in at least certain cases (such as > string theory) there's no way in which we'll ever know. > > > > But, on the other hand, just as Peirce's early cosmology is quite > interesting and highly 'suggestive'--at least to some folk--of how things > may *be* or *have come to be*, so some of these mathematical-physical > theories are as well. > > > > I personally prefer science fiction (which I very much enjoy) expressed as > 'pure' literature, film, etc. (even as it mixes in some of the physics > such as that just mentioned above). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 5:30 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Gary, List, > > you wrote: > > > > "I can't make much sense of your "trichotomy," but its theoretical content > at least would find its place in the third division of logic as semeiotic, > namely, methodeutic (also called speculative or, theoretical rhetoric), for > there one is concerned with all that is involved in, shall we say, > optimizing scientific inquiry, especially in a *complete inquiry* > involving hypothesis formation, the deduction of the implications of given > hypotheses for the purposes of devising experiments to test them, and the > inductive testing of them (any given hypothesis may fail the test)." > > > > Yes, that is what I meant, but with the difference, that the last part not > necessarily has to be an induction, it also may be another abductive > hypothesis. Especially so, when it is not possible to make experiments that > deal with the observed problem, like eg.: It is observed, that the galaxy > rims rotate faster than they should according to any sensible calculation. > The hypothesis is dark matter, but there is no dark matter available for > experiments. Also the string theory is not verifiable with experiments, > because the hypothetic strings are smaller than anything detectable. So > nowadays physics is somehow comparable with medieval scholastic theology. > The latter was based on logic and belief, trying to bring the two together, > and modern physics is based on mathematics (logic) and competing hypotheses > (beliefs), also looking for conformities betweeen the two. So, maybe that > is the at the beginning of the thread articulated difference between the > disciplines: In chemistry it is always possible to make experiments, but in > physics it is not anymore? > > Best, > > helmut > > > > > > 10. Dezember 2016 um 20:51 Uhr > "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > > Helmut, List, > > > > The trichotomic division of Physical Science (not only physics, but all > the physical sciences) which we've been discussing in this thread is that > outlined in the third branch of Science of Discovery (= pure, or, > theoretical science), that is, *Idioscopy*, or, the Special Sciences. As > I'd earlier mentioned ,*Physics* (i.e., Physical Science) is one of two > comprising Idioscopy, the other being Psychical Science. > > > > All three divisions of *Science of Discovery*, I.Mathematics, II. > Cenoscopy, or Cenoscopic Philosophy (1. phenomenology, 2. normative science > == i. theoretical esthetics, ii. theoretical ethics, iii. logic as > semeiotic, III metaphysics) are principally concerned with developing > *theory*, even though they can--and often quasi-necessarily do--employ > examples from the practical sciences and ordinary experience. > > > > Helmut wrote: "I guess that about science there is a duality: research > and teaching." > > > > For Peirce, besides *Science of Discovery* (theoretical research > science), there are two other* Grand Divisions of Science*, namely *Science > of Review*, which brings scientific findings together in such forms as > writings on the philosophy of science, as well as in digests and outlines > (including Peirce's own Outline Classification of Science), and, as well, > *Practical > Science* (applied science). > > > > So, I would think that teaching (including university teaching) concerns > itself especially with Science of Review since the findings of theoretical > science are organized there (*not* in classificatory or observational > physics as you suggested). . > > > > You wrote: "Surprising observation plus existing hypoteses (like > phlogiston): 1ns// experiments and their results: 2ns//modified old, or > completely new hypothesis: 3ns." > > > > I can't make much sense of your "trichotomy," but its theoretical content > at least would find its place in the third division of logic as semeiotic, > namely, methodeutic (also called speculative or, theoretical rhetoric), for > there one is concerned with all that is involved in, shall we say, > optimizing scientific inquiry, especially in a *complete inquiry* > involving hypothesis formation, the deduction of the implications of given > hypotheses for the purposes of devising experiments to test them, and the > inductive testing of them (any given hypothesis may fail the test). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 12:56 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote: > > Gary, list, > > I guess that about science there is a duality: research and teaching, like > in a university. Now I wonder, whether descriptive science is part of the > investigative/inquiry process (research), or is it a means of communication > with other scientists like colleagues and students, so about teaching? I > mean, does the trichomity "classificatorial physics/ nomological physics/ > descriptive physics" cover the whole scientific area, which is both > research and teaching? And, if one would separate these two functions, eg. > one would focus solely on inquiry/research, then there would be a different > trichotomity? Eg.: Surprising observation plus existing hypoteses (like > phlogiston): 1ns// experiments and their results: 2ns//modified old, or > completely new hypothesis: 3ns. Or something. About the trichotomy > "classification/nomology/description" I would guess, that nomology is a > matter of research only, classification of both research and teaching, and > description of teaching alone. Is that so? > > Best, > > Helmut > > > > 07. Dezember 2016 um 22:09 Uhr > "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > > > Jacob, Clark, Jon S, John, list, > > > > Jacob wrote: > > > > Peirce's classification is not static [. . .] so that a field began as a > descriptive science and developed into a classificatory one. As a field's > body of understanding grows, it becomes more lawlike because it discovers > laws governing that area of inquiry. > > > > I think that this is essentially correct in one important, even commanding > sense. But the passage Jon quoted from "An Outline Classification of the > Sciences" suggests that it the movement might be in two directions. Here's > the passage shortened to help bring out the point, I hope. > > CSP: Nomological physics discovers the ubiquitous phenomena of the > physical universe, formulates their laws [. . .] Classificatory physics > describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the > laws discovered by nomological physics *with *which it ultimately tends > to coalesce*. Descriptive physics describes individual objects [. . .] > endeavors to explain their phenomena *by the principles of nomological > and classificatory physics*, and *tends ultimately itself to become > classificatory*. (CP 1.188, emphasis added). > > At the outset of his discussion of his classification, Peirce comments: > > > > It turns out that in most cases the divisions are Trichotomic; the First > of the Three members relating to universal elements or laws, the Second > arranging classes of forms and seeking to bring them under universal laws, > the Third going into the utmost detail, describing individual phenomena and > endeavoring to explain them (CP 1.180). > > > > So, according to this trichotomic schema, Nomological physics, being > concerned essentially with discovering laws may be seen to be associated > with 3ns, Classificatory physics, in "arranging classes of forms" with 1ns, > and Descriptive physics, in "describing individual phenomena" with 2ns. So, > employing a trikonic diagram: > > > > Classificatory physics (1ns) > > |> Nomological physics (3ns) > > Descriptive physics (2ns) > > > > > > So, what I'm suggesting is that while I would tend to agree with Jacob > that the movement is principally from Descriptive through Classificatory , > to Nomological physics (2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns), following what I've termed the > vector (that is, categorial pathway) of *determination*, on the other > hand, the passage which Jon quoted (e.g. "Classificatory physics > describes and classifies physical forms *and seeks to explain them by the > laws discovered by nomological physics") s*uggests that the reverse vector* > may* also in play, at least to some extent, that is commencing > with--rather than arriving at--Nomological physics (3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns), > what I've termed the vector of *representation*. > > > > So, for example, Nomonological physics "draws upon metaphysics and upon > mathematics *for principles," **not-*-or at least not essentially--from > the two other branches of physics in the classification. > > > > Indeed, one can see this reverse movement in other parts of the > Classification of Sciences (for example, in the three branches of logic as > semeiotic). In the present instance, a comparison with Nomonological, > Classificatory, and Descriptive Psychics (the other wing of Idioscopy, > i.e., the "special sciences") might prove helpful. The Psychical Sciences > are discussed at CP 1.187. > > > > The above comments are offered as mere suggestions for further inquiry. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > > > On Wed, Dec 7, 2016 at 2:48 PM, jacob longshore <strate...@hotmail.com> > wrote: > > Clark, List, > > > > This is an unprepared reply (= my books aren't available to me now), but > if I remember right, Peirce's classification is not static. In the 1898 > lectures on *Reasoning and the Logic of Things *(I think), he mentions > how the various disciplines evolve - even the Platonic forms are dynamic in > this respect - so that a field began as a descriptive science and developed > into a classificatory one. As a field's body of understanding grows, it > becomes more lawlike because it discovers laws governing that area of > inquiry. > > > > I don't have my books unpacked yet, so I can't cite pages, but I think > it's in the above work. And I could well be misunderstanding things. But > this is how I recall my understanding (!) of Peirce on his classification > of the sciences. > > > > Best, > > Jacob > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 7, 2016 6:54 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy) > > > > I’ll confess that much of Peirce’s classification of the sciences never > made much sense to me - if only because in practice anyone actually working > in any field seemed to not fit the category. However the above type of > classifications seem much more useful in that they are talking about > aspects or modes one uses. As John noted these are always at play to > varying degrees in any science. > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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