Dear list:
Why not consider instead: “What do you make to be the meaning of "George Washington"?” Or “a statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket…” For if the names are of “a *type*, or *form*, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may *conform*, but which none of them can *exactly* be,” then valuation must have something to do with a particular being a general or a general being a universal. For how else can a particular ever be a general when this regular in the general will never be this irregular in the particular? Therefore, to avoid “metaphysical nonsense”, it is good to remember when an utterer is asserting that a term is intentioned as a *formal* and not a *material* consequence. If two men think differently either may be right…If a demonstration appears perfectly conclusive to one person and not so to another, it may be that there is some fallacy in it.… the opinions of most persons upon most subjects may be entirely neglected. But if the object of reasoning is to settle questions, then let us exclude a part of those things which are inconsistent with the true end. This is a maxim constantly neglected, for some persons seem to think the chief use of the power of reasoning is its own exercise.“ Passages modified from “What Pragmatism Is” and Writings of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. 2; “Rules for Investigation” and “Practical Logic”. Hth, Jerry R On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 5:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Jan 9, 2017, at 4:44 PM, jacob longshore <strate...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > Yes, I think you're right about that. Peirce's definitions of "generals" > are framed in terms of parts of a whole (and therefore*finite*), whereas > "universal" would apply to an *infinite *number of possible entities. > This distinction he holds throughout his career. > > > I’m not sure the part to whole relation entails finitude depending upon > what one means by that. Consider a square. You can cut it in half and have > two parts but each part is still continuous in the Peircean sense even if > we might say they have finite area. Again the discussion of Cantor and > Dedekind is useful here. In particular Peirce’s modal realism in his mature > phase of the late 1890’s onward pretty well requires possibilities as > continuous of a sort. > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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