Jon A.S., Kirsti, list,
Regarding Peirce about reflected-on qualities as generals, I was basing
that on the same text as contains CP 1.427 quoted by Jon A.S. That is
"§2. Quality" http://www.textlog.de/4282.html in "The Logic of
Mathematics; An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within," an MS
from circa 1896.
From CP 1.422:
[....] In other words, it is concrete things you do not believe in;
qualities, that is, generals — which is another word for the same
thing — you not only believe in but believe that they alone compose
the universe. [....]
From CP 1.425:
[....] When we say that qualities are general, are partial
determinations, are mere potentialities, etc., all that is true of
qualities reflected upon; but these things do not belong to the
quality-element of experience. [....]
Best, Ben
On 1/15/2017 11:47 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Kirsti, List:
Not surprisingly, I have found that Peirce was exactly right when he
stated, "Of all conceptions Continuity is by far the most difficult
for Philosophy to handle" (RLT:242). I think that the light bulb
finally came on for me when I stopped focusing on a line as consisting
of potential vs. actual points, and instead recognized that it
consists of continuous line segments all the way down. This reflects
the distinction that I just mentioned in my response to Jon A. between
the singular (point) and the individual (continuous line segment). A
true singularity--determinate in every conceivable respect--would be a
/dis/continuity, and hence is only an ideal.
As you noted, it is important to keep in mind that the points or line
segments do not /comprise / the continuum; the latter is the more
fundamental concept. Hence Peirce changed "the question of nominalism
and realism"--rather than, "Are generals real?" it became, "Are any
continua real?" (RLT:160) In that sense, I disagree with your
subsequent post directed at Ben--a quality /is/ general, because it is
a continuum; it just has a different /kind / of generality/continuity
from a habit or law. In fact, Peirce explicitly contrasted the
degenerate or negative generality of a quality as permanent or eternal
possibility with the genuine or positive generality of a law as
conditional necessity (CP 1.427).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 8:46 AM, <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
Jon A.S.
First: see my recent response to Jon Awbrey.
Second: In developing his theory of true continuity, CSP used the
basic geometrical notions of a line and a point. (According to his
architecture of sciences, which presents not just an architecture of
sciences, but more so a method for proceeding with any questions).
CSP grew dissatisfied with the ancient view as well as the Kantian
view of continuity. The latist view of CSP was that there are no
points in true continuity, neither does it consist of points, however
small, however near to each other.
BUT, as a methodological advice, he wrote that it is admissible to
separate of point in the continuity in question, IF it is done with a
deliberate aim & a readyness to leave from separation to unification
as soon as possible.
In separating any point within the continuum in question, continuity
gets violated. But this violation may and can be mended. - The point,
thus sepateted, must be re-posioned into the contunuity it was
originally pointed out.
To understand all this, it is necessary to truly understand the
essence of ordinal (nin contrast to cardinal) mathematics,simplest
arihmetics, in the philosophy of CSP.
The Fist, the Second, the Third.... Then at least a little bit new
Fist, Second, Third...
CSP came to the conclusion that his categories beared a resemblance
with the three moments by Hegel. - After having been mocking Hegel's
Logic (with good reasons!)
What, for Peirce ( and me), is universal is change, chance
(spontaneity) and continuity. But, mind you, all together.
>From exlusion of existent individuals (points in a line) does not
follow that existent individuals do not matter. - it just follows
that from any collection og existent indivuals ( collection of
points) it is not possible to construe a continuum. - However hard it
may be tried.
Continuity as an abstraction does not amount to understanding real
continuity. With figments of your imaginations you can do (almost)
anything with a whim of your mind. But even then there is the ALMOST.
The 'not quite', a residual.
Well. You asked about the relation between universal and general. But
from the viewpoint of taking existent individuals as the starting
point. - Which is wrong.
It presents a nominalistic starting point. - Are generals real? was
the formulations CSP gave for the basic philosphical disagreement in
the Middle Ages between the Thomists and the Scotists. - Since then,
the nominalistic view has absolute taken the upper hand. - It rules
our minds, from the first grade at school onwards.
I truly appreciate your posts to the list. A very good understanding
they present, with due accuracy. - Very seldom met qualities, very
seldom...
With appreciation,
Kirsti
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