Gary F., Jon A.S., list,
Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all
real objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that
which he elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing
singulars in Peirce's other sense of "singular," that which can only be
at one place and one date and occupies no time and no space, i.e., that
which some nowadays would call a point-instant. Peirce did not always
adhere to his terminological distinction (e.g., in "Questions On
Reality" in 1868
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm> )
between "singular" (short for "singular individual") and "individual"
(short for "general individual"). In another example of his shifting
between "individual" and "singular", Peirce defines "sinsign" as an
individual that serves as a sign - I mean that he did not require
sinsigns to be point-instants - yet he uses the "sin-" of "singular"
rather than some root related to "individual" or the like in order to
coin the word "sinsign."
Best, Ben
On 1/15/2017 1:07 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Jon,
While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities,
I don’t think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for
Peirce. Indeed he says that “the totality of all real objects” is a
singular. Harvard Lecture 6 (EP2:208-9):
[[ That which is not general is singular; and the singular is that
which reacts. The being of a singular may consist in the being of
other singulars which are its parts. … For every proposition
whatsoever refers as to its subject to a singular actually reacting
upon the utterer of it and actually reacting upon the interpreter of
it. All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular;
namely, to the totality of all real objects. ]]
Gary f.
} For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely*
disappear. [Wittgenstein] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ /Turning Signs/ gateway
*From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:* 15-Jan-17 11:47
Kirsti, List:
Not surprisingly, I have found that Peirce was exactly right when he
stated, "Of all conceptions Continuity is by far the most difficult
for Philosophy to handle" (RLT:242). I think that the light bulb
finally came on for me when I stopped focusing on a line as consisting
of potential vs. actual points, and instead recognized that it
consists of continuous line segments all the way down. This reflects
the distinction that I just mentioned in my response to Jon A. between
the singular (point) and the individual (continuous line segment). A
true singularity--determinate in every conceivable respect--would be a
/dis/continuity, and hence is only an ideal.
As you noted, it is important to keep in mind that the points or line
segments do not /comprise/ the continuum; the latter is the more
fundamental concept. Hence Peirce changed "the question of nominalism
and realism"--rather than, "Are generals real?" it became, "Are any
continua real?" (RLT:160) In that sense, I disagree with your
subsequent post directed at Ben--a quality /is/ general, because it is
a continuum; it just has a different /kind/ of generality/continuity
from a habit or law. In fact, Peirce explicitly contrasted the
degenerate or negative generality of a quality as permanent or eternal
possibility with the genuine or positive generality of a law as
conditional necessity (CP 1.427).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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