Ben and Jon,
That’s right — or as I would put it, “singular” as a predicate in the semiotic context refers to the reactivity (or existence or Secondness) of its object. The singular/individual distinction is not relevant here as it is in a mathematical context, where all the objects are hypothetical. The ideality of a point is no different from the ideality of a line; they differ in dimensionality. The reality of a dynamic object, on the other hand, is inseparable from its existence, its Secondness to the sign which it determines to determine an interpretant. So the reality/existence distinction does not apply here either. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 15-Jan-17 14:05 Gary F., Ben, List: I agree with Ben that Peirce used "singular" in a different sense in the 1903 Harvard Lecture that Gary F. referenced. More so even than "individual," he seems to have had in mind how he elsewhere defined "existence"--that which reacts with other like things in the environment. Consequently, when he characterized "the totality of all real objects" as a "singular," I suspect that he was referring to everything that exists, not everything that is real--since in his view, the latter includes generals, which by definition are not singular. On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com <mailto:baud...@gmail.com> > wrote: Gary F., Jon A.S., list, Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all real objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that which he elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing singulars in Peirce's other sense of "singular," that which can only be at one place and one date and occupies no time and no space, i.e., that which some nowadays would call a point-instant. Peirce did not always adhere to his terminological distinction (e.g., in "Questions On Reality" in 1868 http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm> ) between "singular" (short for "singular individual") and "individual" (short for "general individual"). In another example of his shifting between "individual" and "singular", Peirce defines "sinsign" as an individual that serves as a sign - I mean that he did not require sinsigns to be point-instants - yet he uses the "sin-" of "singular" rather than some root related to "individual" or the like in order to coin the word "sinsign." Best, Ben On 1/15/2017 1:07 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Jon, While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities, I don’t think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for Peirce. Indeed he says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular. Harvard Lecture 6 (EP2:208-9): [[ That which is not general is singular; and the singular is that which reacts. The being of a singular may consist in the being of other singulars which are its parts. … For every proposition whatsoever refers as to its subject to a singular actually reacting upon the utterer of it and actually reacting upon the interpreter of it. All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. ]] Gary f. } For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. [Wittgenstein] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
