Jon,
While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities, I don’t
think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for Peirce. Indeed he says
that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular. Harvard Lecture 6
(EP2:208-9):
[[ That which is not general is singular; and the singular is that which
reacts. The being of a singular may consist in the being of other singulars
which are its parts. … For every proposition whatsoever refers as to its
subject to a singular actually reacting upon the utterer of it and actually
reacting upon the interpreter of it. All propositions relate to the same
ever-reacting singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. ]]
Gary f.
} For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.
[Wittgenstein] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 15-Jan-17 11:47
Kirsti, List:
Not surprisingly, I have found that Peirce was exactly right when he stated,
"Of all conceptions Continuity is by far the most difficult for Philosophy to
handle" (RLT:242). I think that the light bulb finally came on for me when I
stopped focusing on a line as consisting of potential vs. actual points, and
instead recognized that it consists of continuous line segments all the way
down. This reflects the distinction that I just mentioned in my response to
Jon A. between the singular (point) and the individual (continuous line
segment). A true singularity--determinate in every conceivable respect--would
be a discontinuity, and hence is only an ideal.
As you noted, it is important to keep in mind that the points or line segments
do not comprise the continuum; the latter is the more fundamental concept.
Hence Peirce changed "the question of nominalism and realism"--rather than,
"Are generals real?" it became, "Are any continua real?" (RLT:160) In that
sense, I disagree with your subsequent post directed at Ben--a quality is
general, because it is a continuum; it just has a different kind of
generality/continuity from a habit or law. In fact, Peirce explicitly
contrasted the degenerate or negative generality of a quality as permanent or
eternal possibility with the genuine or positive generality of a law as
conditional necessity (CP 1.427).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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