Gary F., Ben, List: I agree with Ben that Peirce used "singular" in a different sense in the 1903 Harvard Lecture that Gary F. referenced. More so even than "individual," he seems to have had in mind how he elsewhere defined "existence"--that which *reacts *with other like things in the environment. Consequently, when he characterized "the totality of all real objects" as a "singular," I suspect that he was referring to everything that *exists*, not everything that is *real*--since in his view, the latter includes *generals*, which by definition are *not *singular.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 12:50 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., Jon A.S., list, > > Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all > real objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that which > he elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing singulars in > Peirce's other sense of "singular," that which can only be at one place and > one date and occupies no time and no space, i.e., that which some nowadays > would call a point-instant. Peirce did not always adhere to his > terminological distinction (e.g., in "Questions On Reality" in 1868 > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm ) between > "singular" (short for "singular individual") and "individual" (short for > "general individual"). In another example of his shifting between > "individual" and "singular", Peirce defines "sinsign" as an individual that > serves as a sign - I mean that he did not require sinsigns to be > point-instants - yet he uses the "sin-" of "singular" rather than some root > related to "individual" or the like in order to coin the word "sinsign." > > Best, Ben > > On 1/15/2017 1:07 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > Jon, > > While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities, I > don’t think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for Peirce. > Indeed he says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular. > Harvard Lecture 6 (EP2:208-9): > > [[ That which is not general is singular; and the singular is that which > reacts. The being of a singular may consist in the being of other singulars > which are its parts. … For every proposition whatsoever refers as to its > subject to a singular actually reacting upon the utterer of it and actually > reacting upon the interpreter of it. All propositions relate to the same > ever-reacting singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. ]] > > Gary f. > > } For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this > simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. > [Wittgenstein] { > > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway > >
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