Jeff, Thank you for the thoughtful answer. (And Jon for the links.) It will take me a bit to digest and respond. My initial inclination is to say that everything you pointed to does seem important, but doesn't seem obviously to hinge on anything I can easily understand as a difference between nominalists and realists (as I still struggle to understand the asserted key distinction). I will try to express more complete thoughts shortly.
Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps <echar...@american.edu> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 9:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Eric, List, > > Let me address the last question you ask: what practical difference does > makes in your or my action as to which side of this debate one happens to > be on? > > Peirce suggests that the longstanding debates between nominalists and > realists over questions concerning the reality--or lack thereof--of things > that have a general character, such as laws of nature, natural kinds, > general properties, continuous processes of growth and the like, cut across > all areas of philosophical inquiry. In our more philosophically reflective > moments, I suspect that most intelligent people are able to see that deeper > assumptions and commitments are at work in the way we pay attention to some > aspects of the phenomena that we observe and not others, and in the way > that we affirm some ideals as being more admirable than others, and in way > that we seek to respect some interpretations of the principles of fairness > and virtue over others, and in favoring some methods of inquiry over others > when pressed with questions that have no obvious answers (e.g., in the > natural and social sciences). Many of these assumptions and commitments are > metaphysical in character, and many of these metaphysical issues connect to > longstanding debates concerning nominalism and realism. > > As Peirce points out, one of the fundamental ways in which we might > understand these metaphysical conceptions is in the degree of importance or > kind of significance that one attaches to various aspects of both our > common and our more specialized forms of experience of our shared world. > So, we should ask how the different assumptions and commitments that one > might hold shape the following sorts of things: > > 1. our common sense understanding of ourselves and the world of which we > are a part; > 2. our philosophical theorizing about the legitimacy of the ideals, ends > and principles that inform our cultures larger world view; > 3. our understanding of how we should analyze the phenomena we observe in > the aesthetic, the ethical and in the logical dimensions of our feelings, > actions and thinking. > > Like it or not, we all harbor metaphysical assumptions and > commitments--especially those who proclaim that they have moved beyond the > need for such things. What is more, these assumptions and commitments color > the way that we see, hear and feel the world. In fact, they so deeply color > our experience that we often have a hard time even conceiving of other > sorts of metaphysical assumptions and commitment that might lead us to > feel, experience, act and think about the world in very different ways. > > Practically speaking, we see that scientists in all areas of inquiry are > facing unanswered questions that have a metaphysical character. Do all of > the laws of nature really have the form of a deterministic set of > mathematical equations, or is there real chance at work in the world. If > chance is real, are the possibilities that have not yet materialized real > as possibilities nonetheless? If so, what role do those unrealized > possibilities have in understanding the manner in which some general > regularities in the natural or social realms are growing in their order and > systematic character? These kinds of questions surface in cosmology as we > seek to explain how space has come to take its shape, and how life first > evolved in the cosmos, and how self-directed thinking evolving in creatures > such as humans. For each of these sorts of questions, how should we analyze > the phenomena that we observe, and what methods should we use to formulate > hypotheses and put the competing explanations to the test? The debates > about nominalism and realism dramatically shape the answers that we are > willing to consider and to take seriously. > > Let us turn, now, to the ethical, legal and political parts of our lives. > It seems obvious to me that, for the last several decades, there has been a > growing penchant among some of those who are prominent figures in the > worlds of business and politics to eschew the importance of the best > evidence and methods we have for discovering the various sorts of facts of > great practical importance. In my own judgment, the last election cycle has > elevated this growing trend to a sort of tragic-comedy. For example, some > business leaders and politicians who have gained considerable power seem to > care little for inquiry concerning what is true. Rather, these figures seem > to be at the leading edge of what might be a larger shift in our cultural > priorities from an attentiveness to and care for such things as seeking the > truth about what justice requires in a world that is becoming more globally > connected, and about how we should respond to the best evidence we have > that burning fossil fuels is causing climate change, or how me could reduce > rather than increase the risk that aggressive actions in the international > realm might lead to the use of nuclear weapons, etc.--to more immediate > questions about how they can employ various means in the focused pursuit of > such goals as seeking more power, wealth and fame. Plato and Aristotle saw > these sorts of trends as harmful for the vitality of their classical Greek > culture. I believe that the growing prominence of these same sorts of > trends are equally harmful for the vitality of our own contemporary culture. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 6:19 PM > To: Eric Charles > Cc: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism > > Eric, List: > > Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. > > * Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by > humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. > * Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and > events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. > > In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that > some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/ > in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<htt > p://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com<mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>> > wrote: > Oh hey, my first post to the list.... > > I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, > this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism > distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I > understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest > appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or > disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. > > With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the > nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The > best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that > I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic > privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it > make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a > collection, or just a collection of "reals"? > > I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at > explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue > is at argument here.... or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by > explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of > this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly > believe one way or the other?). > > Best, > Eric > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
