Hi Eric, List,
In my response to the last question you raised about "what practical difference" does it make whether one's deeper assumptions and commitments are nominalist or realist in character, I was thinking of several places where Peirce emphasizes the following sort of point: According to the nominalistic view, the only value which an idea has is to represent the fact, and therefore the only respect in which a system of ideas has more value than the sum of the values of the ideas of which it is composed is that it is compendious; while, according to the realistic view, this is more or less incorrect depending upon how far the realism be pushed. (CP 4.1; my emphasis) My aim was in making the response was twofold: 1. to stress the differences in the value or significance that that one ascribes to various things depending on one's assumptions and commitments; 2. to lay emphasis on the fact that the division between assumptions and commitments that are more realistic or more nominalistic in character has a dramatic effect on the (a) the phenomena that we take to be significant when we are making observations (b) the ideals one holds to be most attractive for their own sake (c) the interpretation of the standards of conduct that one takes to impose obligations on the conduct of life and (d) the manner in which we will adopt and apply various methods in order to answer the questions we face. By emphasizing the differences in value and significance that one attributes to various ideas, conceptions, principles that form a part of our common sense understanding of oneself and one's world, I believe that we arrive at a better way to capturing much of the practical significance of affirming or denying different sets of assumptions and commitments that are more nominalist or realist in character. There will also be differences in terms of the propositions that one affirms or denies when engaged in the practice of developing and testing competing philosophical theories of metaphysics that are designed to explain the deeper character of the things that one holds to be real. At the same time, we should see that, for many philosophers, the metaphysical theories that they affirm end up having a dramatic impact on the views in math, phenomenology, aesthetics, ethics and semiotics that they are willing to consider. I agree with Peirce on this matter: we should be wary of getting the metaphysical cart before our mathematical, phenomenological and normative science horses. Otherwise, we run the risk of unduly biasing and prejudicing the results of our inquiries in these areas. The practical differences between holding assumptions and commitments in our common sense understanding--as well as in our philosophical theorizing--that are more nominalistic or realistic in character is, as far as I can see, actually having a surprisingly dramatic effect on the evolution of our modern practices of art, religion, politics and law . . . as well as science. As such, all one needs to do to see the practical differences is to open one's eyes to the world we find ourselves living in and then try to see it through the differently colored lenses of the "glasses" we happening to be wearing as individuals. One of the main points of building philosophical theories is to help us better see how the assumptions and commitments that shape our individual perspective on the world as well as our shared "modern" common sense understanding is to help us understand that the assumptions and commitments that happen to shape the way we see and understanding ourselves and our world are not the only set of colored glasses that happen to be available to us. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Eric Charles <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, January 28, 2017 10:18 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism Jeff, Thank you for the thoughtful answer. (And Jon for the links.) It will take me a bit to digest and respond. My initial inclination is to say that everything you pointed to does seem important, but doesn't seem obviously to hinge on anything I can easily understand as a difference between nominalists and realists (as I still struggle to understand the asserted key distinction). I will try to express more complete thoughts shortly. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps <mailto:[email protected]> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 9:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi Eric, List, Let me address the last question you ask: what practical difference does makes in your or my action as to which side of this debate one happens to be on? Peirce suggests that the longstanding debates between nominalists and realists over questions concerning the reality--or lack thereof--of things that have a general character, such as laws of nature, natural kinds, general properties, continuous processes of growth and the like, cut across all areas of philosophical inquiry. In our more philosophically reflective moments, I suspect that most intelligent people are able to see that deeper assumptions and commitments are at work in the way we pay attention to some aspects of the phenomena that we observe and not others, and in the way that we affirm some ideals as being more admirable than others, and in way that we seek to respect some interpretations of the principles of fairness and virtue over others, and in favoring some methods of inquiry over others when pressed with questions that have no obvious answers (e.g., in the natural and social sciences). Many of these assumptions and commitments are metaphysical in character, and many of these metaphysical issues connect to longstanding debates concerning nominalism and realism. As Peirce points out, one of the fundamental ways in which we might understand these metaphysical conceptions is in the degree of importance or kind of significance that one attaches to various aspects of both our common and our more specialized forms of experience of our shared world. So, we should ask how the different assumptions and commitments that one might hold shape the following sorts of things: 1. our common sense understanding of ourselves and the world of which we are a part; 2. our philosophical theorizing about the legitimacy of the ideals, ends and principles that inform our cultures larger world view; 3. our understanding of how we should analyze the phenomena we observe in the aesthetic, the ethical and in the logical dimensions of our feelings, actions and thinking. Like it or not, we all harbor metaphysical assumptions and commitments--especially those who proclaim that they have moved beyond the need for such things. What is more, these assumptions and commitments color the way that we see, hear and feel the world. In fact, they so deeply color our experience that we often have a hard time even conceiving of other sorts of metaphysical assumptions and commitment that might lead us to feel, experience, act and think about the world in very different ways. Practically speaking, we see that scientists in all areas of inquiry are facing unanswered questions that have a metaphysical character. Do all of the laws of nature really have the form of a deterministic set of mathematical equations, or is there real chance at work in the world. If chance is real, are the possibilities that have not yet materialized real as possibilities nonetheless? If so, what role do those unrealized possibilities have in understanding the manner in which some general regularities in the natural or social realms are growing in their order and systematic character? These kinds of questions surface in cosmology as we seek to explain how space has come to take its shape, and how life first evolved in the cosmos, and how self-directed thinking evolving in creatures such as humans. For each of these sorts of questions, how should we analyze the phenomena that we observe, and what methods should we use to formulate hypotheses and put the competing explanations to the test? The debates about nominalism and realism dramatically shape the answers that we are willing to consider and to take seriously. Let us turn, now, to the ethical, legal and political parts of our lives. It seems obvious to me that, for the last several decades, there has been a growing penchant among some of those who are prominent figures in the worlds of business and politics to eschew the importance of the best evidence and methods we have for discovering the various sorts of facts of great practical importance. In my own judgment, the last election cycle has elevated this growing trend to a sort of tragic-comedy. For example, some business leaders and politicians who have gained considerable power seem to care little for inquiry concerning what is true. Rather, these figures seem to be at the leading edge of what might be a larger shift in our cultural priorities from an attentiveness to and care for such things as seeking the truth about what justice requires in a world that is becoming more globally connected, and about how we should respond to the best evidence we have that burning fossil fuels is causing climate change, or how me could reduce rather than increase the risk that aggressive actions in the international realm might lead to the use of nuclear weapons, etc.--to more immediate questions about how they can employ various means in the focused pursuit of such goals as seeking more power, wealth and fame. Plato and Aristotle saw these sorts of trends as harmful for the vitality of their classical Greek culture. I believe that the growing prominence of these same sorts of trends are equally harmful for the vitality of our own contemporary culture. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt [[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 6:19 PM To: Eric Charles Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism Eric, List: Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. * Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. * Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt><http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt><http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: Oh hey, my first post to the list.... I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"? I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here.... or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?). Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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