Sensible responses. I think we can shelve metaphysical now since what it has been said to contain is part of reality anyway and reality may be said to contain all and all is what we know and what we do not (yet) know. I am not sure Peirce (or Wittgenstein of even Nietzsche would disagree. But then again if they agreed where would discussion be?
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 4:59 PM, Eric Charles < eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, > Thank you for the thoughtful answer. (And Jon for the links.) It will take > me a bit to digest and respond. My initial inclination is to say that > everything you pointed to does seem important, but doesn't seem obviously > to hinge on anything I can easily understand as a difference between > nominalists and realists (as I still struggle to understand the asserted > key distinction). I will try to express more complete thoughts shortly. > > Best, > Eric > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > <echar...@american.edu> > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 9:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Hi Eric, List, >> >> Let me address the last question you ask: what practical difference does >> makes in your or my action as to which side of this debate one happens to >> be on? >> >> Peirce suggests that the longstanding debates between nominalists and >> realists over questions concerning the reality--or lack thereof--of things >> that have a general character, such as laws of nature, natural kinds, >> general properties, continuous processes of growth and the like, cut across >> all areas of philosophical inquiry. In our more philosophically reflective >> moments, I suspect that most intelligent people are able to see that deeper >> assumptions and commitments are at work in the way we pay attention to some >> aspects of the phenomena that we observe and not others, and in the way >> that we affirm some ideals as being more admirable than others, and in way >> that we seek to respect some interpretations of the principles of fairness >> and virtue over others, and in favoring some methods of inquiry over others >> when pressed with questions that have no obvious answers (e.g., in the >> natural and social sciences). Many of these assumptions and commitments are >> metaphysical in character, and many of these metaphysical issues connect to >> longstanding debates concerning nominalism and realism. >> >> As Peirce points out, one of the fundamental ways in which we might >> understand these metaphysical conceptions is in the degree of importance or >> kind of significance that one attaches to various aspects of both our >> common and our more specialized forms of experience of our shared world. >> So, we should ask how the different assumptions and commitments that one >> might hold shape the following sorts of things: >> >> 1. our common sense understanding of ourselves and the world of which we >> are a part; >> 2. our philosophical theorizing about the legitimacy of the ideals, ends >> and principles that inform our cultures larger world view; >> 3. our understanding of how we should analyze the phenomena we observe in >> the aesthetic, the ethical and in the logical dimensions of our feelings, >> actions and thinking. >> >> Like it or not, we all harbor metaphysical assumptions and >> commitments--especially those who proclaim that they have moved beyond the >> need for such things. What is more, these assumptions and commitments color >> the way that we see, hear and feel the world. In fact, they so deeply color >> our experience that we often have a hard time even conceiving of other >> sorts of metaphysical assumptions and commitment that might lead us to >> feel, experience, act and think about the world in very different ways. >> >> Practically speaking, we see that scientists in all areas of inquiry are >> facing unanswered questions that have a metaphysical character. Do all of >> the laws of nature really have the form of a deterministic set of >> mathematical equations, or is there real chance at work in the world. If >> chance is real, are the possibilities that have not yet materialized real >> as possibilities nonetheless? If so, what role do those unrealized >> possibilities have in understanding the manner in which some general >> regularities in the natural or social realms are growing in their order and >> systematic character? These kinds of questions surface in cosmology as we >> seek to explain how space has come to take its shape, and how life first >> evolved in the cosmos, and how self-directed thinking evolving in creatures >> such as humans. For each of these sorts of questions, how should we analyze >> the phenomena that we observe, and what methods should we use to formulate >> hypotheses and put the competing explanations to the test? The debates >> about nominalism and realism dramatically shape the answers that we are >> willing to consider and to take seriously. >> >> Let us turn, now, to the ethical, legal and political parts of our lives. >> It seems obvious to me that, for the last several decades, there has been a >> growing penchant among some of those who are prominent figures in the >> worlds of business and politics to eschew the importance of the best >> evidence and methods we have for discovering the various sorts of facts of >> great practical importance. In my own judgment, the last election cycle has >> elevated this growing trend to a sort of tragic-comedy. For example, some >> business leaders and politicians who have gained considerable power seem to >> care little for inquiry concerning what is true. Rather, these figures seem >> to be at the leading edge of what might be a larger shift in our cultural >> priorities from an attentiveness to and care for such things as seeking the >> truth about what justice requires in a world that is becoming more globally >> connected, and about how we should respond to the best evidence we have >> that burning fossil fuels is causing climate change, or how me could reduce >> rather than increase the risk that aggressive actions in the international >> realm might lead to the use of nuclear weapons, etc.--to more immediate >> questions about how they can employ various means in the focused pursuit of >> such goals as seeking more power, wealth and fame. Plato and Aristotle saw >> these sorts of trends as harmful for the vitality of their classical Greek >> culture. I believe that the growing prominence of these same sorts of >> trends are equally harmful for the vitality of our own contemporary culture. >> >> Yours, >> >> Jeff >> >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 6:19 PM >> To: Eric Charles >> Cc: Peirce-L >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism >> >> Eric, List: >> >> Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. >> >> * Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by >> humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. >> * Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and >> events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. >> >> In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that >> some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/i >> n/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<htt >> p://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> >> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com<mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>> >> wrote: >> Oh hey, my first post to the list.... >> >> I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, >> this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism >> distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I >> understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest >> appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or >> disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. >> >> With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the >> nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The >> best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that >> I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic >> privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it >> make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a >> collection, or just a collection of "reals"? >> >> I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at >> explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue >> is at argument here.... or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by >> explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of >> this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly >> believe one way or the other?). >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Supervisory Survey Statistician >> U.S. Marine Corps >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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