John: Thanks for your interesting and provocative insights.
By way of background, I have compared the various theories of nominalism and realism for more than 20 years. I find your values deeply embedded in the assertion that one is a weaker hypothesis than the other. Often, nominalists appeal to the role of authority, historical precedence. (Think of the role of precedence in our legal and political systems.) Some points of your post deserves to be highlighted. > Peirce thought we could get out of this by abduction, but empiricists don't > allow this as part of logic. Nominalism says nothing else about the real > essence of things. Realists have to add something in order to make their > claims. Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more to do > science. > 1. Scientific empiricism, as I understand it, is virtually independent of any concern about abduction. In physics, chemistry and politics, empiricism seeks ways to justify past, present or future events. (Often, with the aid of statistics.) 2. “Names”, as I pointed out, are critical to the logic of chemistry. Each chemical identity is an individual polynomial. It is not historically or grammatically possible to completely separate the concept of nominalism from the concept of names, is it? The thread connecting the concept of nominalism to names may be weak, but it cannot be completely ignored. 3. Now, for the most important comment. It is almost certain that CSP’s notion of abduction as a method to generate a possibility space came directly from the concept of proof of structure. It follows from his notions of medads and graphic relations and relatives and the concept of variable valences of elements. The notion of abduction was a critical part of hybrid logic necessary to develop the simple algebra of labelled bipartite graph theory of the perplex number system. 4. Secondly, realists MUST add something to signs to make their claims. What must be added is the physical evidence that relates the parts (indices) to the whole (sinsigns) such that the abductive hypotheses can be distinguished from one another. 5. The assertion "Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more to do science.” appears rather problematic to me. Cheers Jerry > On Jan 30, 2017, at 4:36 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Jerry, List, > > Nominalism is a weaker hypothesis than Realism, so if something is consistent > with realism, then it is consistent with nominalism. Locked, for example, > distinguished between the nominal essence and the real essence. The former > tells us what we think something is like, while the latter is what the thing > is really like. According to his semiotic theory we only have access to the > nominal essence, which is constructed from our experience. The real essence > we can never directly know. We can get at it only via other signs, which > makes them, by his account, nominal. He also thought that meaning usually > followed the nominal essence, which is historically questionable, but the > difference between what we take to be the real essence and the nominal > essence has to be a nominal distinction. There are no unmediated signs of > reality and, for Locke, there is no way to get out of this mediated > representation. Peirce thought we could get out of this by abduction, but > empiricists don't allow this as part of logic. Nominalism says nothing else > about the real essence of things. Realists have to add something in order to > make their claims. Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything > more to do science. > > So, logically the consistency of realism entails the consistency of > nominalism. > > > Get Outlook for Android <https://aka.ms/ghei36> > > From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com> > Sent: Sunday, January 29, 2017 9:51:30 PM > To: Eric Charles > Cc: Peirce List; Helmut Raulien > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism > > Eric: > >> On Jan 28, 2017, at 4:23 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de >> <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote: >> >> In my view of sytems theory, a system is more than it´s parts, of course, >> and what is more, is real and natural. But in my opinion "natural" does not >> mean "good for us". A sytem that contains other systems, > > > Beyond statistics, I am not aware of your scientific background. Indeed, I > am interested in your views as a statistician with regard to part-whole > illations. For several years, in the 1990’s, I taught a course (at the NIH) > entitled “ Health Risk Analysis” that was an inquiry into the logic of > distributions and pragmatic public health assessment of the “realism” of > chemical and radiation exposures. > > The questions raised in these lectures was a factor that contributed to my > study of logic and CSP’s writings. In my view, Peirce was first a chemist and > logician, and later added to these belief systems various conjectures about > other philosophies. Again, in my view, Peirce crafted his logical beliefs to > be consistent with the chemical sciences as they stood in his era, an era > when the chemical sciences were undergoing rapid development. > > Now, some “leading principles” behind my questions to you. The meta-physical > notion of “nominalism” is simply not consistent with the basic foundational > structures of the chemical sciences as it stood in the late 19 th Century. > Hence, CSP was faced with the logical tension between the empirical evidence > and the structural logic of chemical graph theory with the meta-physical > principle of nominalism. > > The consequences of this logical tension are far-reaching. CSP introduces > the ‘leading principles’ to ground the historical developments of CSP’s > numerous attempts to update his philosophical premises of “relationism” to be > consistent with scientific developments during his era - his efforts to > construct a atomic table of elements, chemical bonding, electricity as > particles, thermodynamics, handedness of molecules, the nature of thought, > etc. These scientific developments led directly to his notions of > mathematical “relations" as grammatical objects, and his constructive notion > of graph theory. > > With these facts as background, I would venture to say that, in part, CSP > rejected the meta-physical notion of nominalism because of the role that the > concept of “name” in chemical calculations. > The role of a chemical name, in its primary scientific function, expresses a > illation between a collection of properties and an individual object > (singular). > Two or more chemical names, when combined, generate a new name. > Sodium and chlorine combine to form a new name, a new particular, a new > individual, a new concept with new attributes.. > Hydrogen and oxygen combine to form a new name, a new particular, a new > individual, a new concept with new attributes. > And so forth for any combination of any number of chemical elements. > These facts manifest themselves concretely. Mathematical calculations for all > chemicals are based on the concepts of atomic weight, atomic valence, > molecular weight, molecular formula, molecular structure, molecular > handedness and molecular forms. Physical measurements are used to determine > the parameters for these calculations. > > Although these simple facts are well documented for a huge number of > examples, the logical implications are almost universally rejected in the > philosophies of man and nature - for example the philosophy of mathematics > (set theory and category theory, etc.) and physics. > > The relationship between the primary role of chemical names as atomic numbers > and molecule numbers and the mathematical notion of a statistical variable or > a dynamic variable is a secondary role for describing the change in chemical > names. (See, for example, the works of Rene Thom on the birth and death of > forms.) > > Today, at least in the scientific world in which I work, it is very rare to > meet a nominalist. > Nevertheless, it appears to me, that many, if not most, bio-semioticians are > nominalists! > > May I ask how you view the role of nominalism in the philosophy of > statistics? > More particularly, what would be the role of nominalism in the expression of > an associative law? > And in the expression a distributive law? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > Research Professor > Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study > George Mason University > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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