Jon A., List: These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter.
JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological essence. JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Peircers, > > I continue to review the multiple threads from January > on Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism (GRIN), > forming as they do such a near-at-hand microcosm of > eternally recurring themes. In the process I found > myself drawn back to previous encounters with the > whole panoply of puzzles that always arises here. > So here's a few pieces of prologue from the past: > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > November 2000 > > JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virt > ual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2% > 80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > November 2002 > > JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20070226082502/http://suo.ieee > .org/ontology/msg04332.html > > Any genuine appreciation of what Peirce has to say about identity, > indices, names, proper or otherwise, and the putative distinctions > between individual, particular, and general terms will have to deal > with what he wrote in 1870 about the “doctrine of individuals”. > > Notice that this statement, together with the maxims > that “Whatever has comprehension must be general” > and “Whatever has extension must be composite”, > pull the rug — and all of the elephants — > out from underneath the nominal thinker's > wishful thinking to find ontological > security in individual names, which > said nominal thinker has confused > with the names of individuals, > to turn a phrase back on same. > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2% > 80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals#DOI._Note_1 > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > January 2015 > > JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-01/msg00175.html > > By theoretical entities I mean things like classes, > properties, qualities, sets, situations, or states > of affairs, in general, the putative denotations of > theoretical concepts, formulas, sentences, in brief, > the ostensible objects of signs. > > A conventional statement of Ockham's Razor is — > > • “Entities shall not be multiplied beyond necessity.” > > That is still good advice, as practical maxims go, but > a pragmatist will read that as practical necessity or > utility, qualifying the things that we need to posit > in order to think at all, without getting lost in > endless circumlocutions of perfectly good notions. > > Nominalistic revolts are well-intentioned when they > naturally arise, seeking to clear away the clutter > of ostentatious entities ostensibly denoted by > signs that do not denote. > > But that is no different in its basic intention than > what Peirce sought to do, clarifying metaphysics > though the application of the Pragmatic Maxim. > > Taking the long view, then, pragmatism can be seen as > a moderate continuation of Ockham's revolt, substituting > a principled revolution for what tends to descend to > a reign of terror. > > http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about- > theoretical-entities-1/ > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > March 2015 > > JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00096.html > > Inquiry Blog: > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-th > eoretical-entities-1/ > > Peirce List: > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 > FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15817 > FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15818 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15826 > JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15832 > FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15857 > FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15858 > > I don't see that we differ much on the question of Peirce's realism, > not so much on the question of what he knew as when he knew it, maybe. > I have never bought that multi-stage story of Peirce's development as > much as others do. The way I read him, he started out writing technical > works for audiences trained in mathematical and scientific disciplines. > They may not have had quite as much mental flexibility as he assumed but > their natural dispositions and practical training possessed them of that > basic “scientific attitude” that I tried to thumbnail sketch recently on > a not unrelated thread. This had the effect that Peirce simply did not > have to articulate a whole of lot of assumptions that were already taken > for granted by his audience. That would have been a case of “teaching > grandpa to suck eggs”, as the folksy idiom goes. As various not-so-simple > twists of fate would have it, one of the big things that changed with the > passing years was the increasing diversity of audiences that he addressed, > and I think this accounts for a greater share of the variance in what he > wrote than is widely acknowledged. Just for instance, the acceptance of > “real possibles” that makes up the bread-and-butter of probability theory > and statistical inference would hardly need arguing in those early papers > with the same dogged insistence it took to justify it to later audiences. > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > March 2015 > > JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00099.html > > Because it has come up once again, let me just mention one more time > why I think Peirce's theory of individuals has such a radical bearing > on the whole question of nominalism vs. realism. > > It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake > a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn > around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? > > Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, > that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, > and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an > ontological essence. > > This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy > between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal > thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily > any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether > signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on > more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. > > If I may append a self-quotation, > here are a few from the turn of > the millennium: > > http://web.archive.org/web/20030927022020/http://suo.ieee. > org/ontology/msg04332.html > http://web.archive.org/web/20070705085032/http://suo.ieee. > org/ontology/thrd24.html#04332 > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Mathematical_Demon > stration_and_the_Doctrine_of_Individuals > > Additional References: > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/22/mathematical-demons > tration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-1/ > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/23/mathematical-demons > tration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-2/ > > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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