Jon A., List: Is it right to say that "generals are constituted of individuals"? For Peirce, generality is continuity, and my understanding is that no continuum is "constituted of individuals," since no collection of individuals is truly continuous.
Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 8:18 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I've been sticking to the minimal term set of “generals” > and “individuals”, partly because several years of real > and functional analysis and topology have attached other > meanings to words like “continuous” and “singular” that, > even though Peirce anticipated many aspects of them, > would divert us too much if I interjected them here. > > But, more importantly, I want to avoid the illusion > that we can escape the bounds of semiotic relativity > by introducing any number of ontological distinctions. > > This leaves where we always are, signing in a sign relation > as fish swim in a sea, partly aware our local environment, > dimly conscious of the vastness beyond. In that semiotic > setting all our signs have general or plural denotations > and connotations. It is only in relation to one another > that signs can be sorted in accord with the ways that > some of their senses subsume the senses of others. > > The language of instances and instantiations can be useful here, > allowing us to express the idea that generals are constituted of > individuals but individuals are constituted of further instances. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > On 2/3/2017 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > >> Jon A., List: >> >> These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter. >> >> JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake >> a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around >> and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? >> >> JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, >> that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, >> and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than >> an ontological essence. >> >> JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy >> between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal >> thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less >> ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in >> their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds >> than >> mere grammatical category. >> >> Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals >> are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in >> every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist says that >> reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we >> use >> to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality >> consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to >> facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original >> question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative >> to the other? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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