Jon S, Jon A, List,
In a discussion of individuals at 3.612-3 in the Collected Papers, Peirce points to the history of the conception as it has been used by scientists and philosophers. He notes that the conception was worked out in the sciences of astronomy and physics prior to Aristotle, who then provides an account for inquiries involving the classification of different species. After that, he makes a distinction between two logical conceptions of individuals--one drawing on Kant's account and the other on the Stoic account--and seems to support both. §2. INDIVIDUAL Used in logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by its mode of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in logic). (2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is that an individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it might react, or have reacted, against my will. In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within", he characterizes three clauses in the general law of logic. The general law of logic has likewise its three clauses. The monadic clause is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by the double prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one. CP 1.485 Are each of your remarks about the conception of the individual meant to be an interpretation of the logical conception, or are you trying to offer suggestions about how to apply the the logical principles within metaphysics, as he does next, or are you suggesting that conceptions you are articulating the accounts drawn from the special sciences? I don't assume that the conception of the individual is meant to do quite the same work in each of these areas of inquiry. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Friday, February 3, 2017 10:36 AM To: Jon Awbrey Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism Jon A., List: These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter. JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological essence. JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote: Peircers, I continue to review the multiple threads from January on Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism (GRIN), forming as they do such a near-at-hand microcosm of eternally recurring themes. In the process I found myself drawn back to previous encounters with the whole panoply of puzzles that always arises here. So here's a few pieces of prologue from the past: o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o November 2000 JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virtual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o November 2002 JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20070226082502/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04332.html Any genuine appreciation of what Peirce has to say about identity, indices, names, proper or otherwise, and the putative distinctions between individual, particular, and general terms will have to deal with what he wrote in 1870 about the “doctrine of individuals”. Notice that this statement, together with the maxims that “Whatever has comprehension must be general” and “Whatever has extension must be composite”, pull the rug — and all of the elephants — out from underneath the nominal thinker's wishful thinking to find ontological security in individual names, which said nominal thinker has confused with the names of individuals, to turn a phrase back on same. http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals#DOI._Note_1 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o January 2015 JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-01/msg00175.html By theoretical entities I mean things like classes, properties, qualities, sets, situations, or states of affairs, in general, the putative denotations of theoretical concepts, formulas, sentences, in brief, the ostensible objects of signs. A conventional statement of Ockham's Razor is — • “Entities shall not be multiplied beyond necessity.” That is still good advice, as practical maxims go, but a pragmatist will read that as practical necessity or utility, qualifying the things that we need to posit in order to think at all, without getting lost in endless circumlocutions of perfectly good notions. Nominalistic revolts are well-intentioned when they naturally arise, seeking to clear away the clutter of ostentatious entities ostensibly denoted by signs that do not denote. But that is no different in its basic intention than what Peirce sought to do, clarifying metaphysics though the application of the Pragmatic Maxim. Taking the long view, then, pragmatism can be seen as a moderate continuation of Ockham's revolt, substituting a principled revolution for what tends to descend to a reign of terror. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical-entities-1/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o March 2015 JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00096.html Inquiry Blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical-entities-1/ Peirce List: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15817 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15818 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15826 JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15832 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15857 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15858 I don't see that we differ much on the question of Peirce's realism, not so much on the question of what he knew as when he knew it, maybe. I have never bought that multi-stage story of Peirce's development as much as others do. The way I read him, he started out writing technical works for audiences trained in mathematical and scientific disciplines. They may not have had quite as much mental flexibility as he assumed but their natural dispositions and practical training possessed them of that basic “scientific attitude” that I tried to thumbnail sketch recently on a not unrelated thread. This had the effect that Peirce simply did not have to articulate a whole of lot of assumptions that were already taken for granted by his audience. That would have been a case of “teaching grandpa to suck eggs”, as the folksy idiom goes. As various not-so-simple twists of fate would have it, one of the big things that changed with the passing years was the increasing diversity of audiences that he addressed, and I think this accounts for a greater share of the variance in what he wrote than is widely acknowledged. Just for instance, the acceptance of “real possibles” that makes up the bread-and-butter of probability theory and statistical inference would hardly need arguing in those early papers with the same dogged insistence it took to justify it to later audiences. o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o March 2015 JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00099.html Because it has come up once again, let me just mention one more time why I think Peirce's theory of individuals has such a radical bearing on the whole question of nominalism vs. realism. It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological essence. This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. If I may append a self-quotation, here are a few from the turn of the millennium: http://web.archive.org/web/20030927022020/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04332.html http://web.archive.org/web/20070705085032/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd24.html#04332 http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Mathematical_Demonstration_and_the_Doctrine_of_Individuals Additional References: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/22/mathematical-demonstration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-1/ http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/23/mathematical-demonstration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-2/ o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
