Jeff, List: Peirce's architectonic required that metaphysics must derive its principles from logic, rather than the other way around. My impression is that there is not consensus on this arrangement, and in particular, that at least some nominalists would insist that metaphysics is more basic than logic. Once again, the question arises--what practical difference does it make?
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Eric, Ben, List, > > Would it make any difference if, in addition to the different > interpretations of the regularities concerning the apples in the orchard, > we also included different interpretations of the principles of reasoning? > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. Does > the adoption of these different theories of reasoning lead to different > practical results when it comes to criticizing and evaluating the abductive > and inductive inferences in virtue of which one formulates and tests > hypotheses concerning the regularities we observe with respect to such > things as apples in an orchard or bags of beans in a barn? > > To what extent can we evaluate the adequacy of competing metaphysical > theories without also taking into account the theories of logic from which > they derive their structure and much of their content. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Eric Charles <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 11:09 AM > *To:* Benjamin Udell > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > Ben, > There was an attempt, on the earlier thread I initiated, to provide an > example similar to your east-west divide of the apple field. There, as now, > I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would adhere one to a > particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would imagine it was > relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing the field in > such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases predisposed you one > way or the other. > > I could, as a nominalist, insist that though the division be an arbitrary > convention, we follow the rule none the less. I also could insist, as a > realist, that east-west is far more than a *mere* convention of language, > and explain the logic of using it as a criteria. > > Similarly I could, as a nominalist, insist that the arbitrary convention > of east-west have no hold over my ability to pick apples where I please. I > could also insist, as a realist, that east-west, while having a local > relative meaning has no global meaning that would allow it to serve as a > useful arbiter in this case. > > Etc., etc. > > Whether or not 'generals' are 'real' doesn't necessitate my using - or > rejecting the use of - those concepts in such an abstracted example. Or, to > phrase it differently, whether I suspect that, in the end times, the > opinion of honest investigators will allow for 'east' and 'west', doesn't > matter a lick to how divide up the field right now. This is similar to the > how we can have fruitful discussions about the impact of race in America, > and solutions to the problems race-based thinking has caused, all while > also acknowledging that 'race' is a BS concept, which is likely to be done > away with by honest inquirers long before the end times are here. > > If you think that being a nominalist is likely to correspond to certain > other tendencies, based on your observations of the distribution of ideas > we happen to see in current society, that is another matter all together. > Such matters are not logical consequences of adopting one view or the > other, they are happenstance correlates, and so (as far as I understand it) > would not count for Peirce's pragmatic maxim. > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps >
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