> On Feb 6, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote: > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, > are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that > are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, > then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the > realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which > is a virtue, no doubt).
I’ll confess it’s been a while since I last studied Mill in any depth, but going by my distant memory I’d say the bigger facet between Mill and Peirce is vagueness. That is much of Mill’s writing presupposes that the entities in question are present in some way to consciousness or at least to some logical analysis. Peirce in contrast has a very significant logic of vagueness such that some properties are indeterminate but not available to the inquirer. This obviously problematizes Mill’s meta-ethic. My distant memory is that it also is a problem for his epistemology. His associationism I just don’t remember well at all so that may avoid this problem but I’d not be shocked to discover that depends upon fully determinate parts out of which larger knowledge is built. (My distance memory is that Mill is somewhat similar to Husserl & Russell in therms of knowledge by acquaintance but I might be completely wrong on that) That’s somewhat of a tangent to your point but I raise it more to note that there are other elements of logic/metaphysics that are pretty crucial in distinguishing Peirce from his rough contemporaries. In a sense the nominalist presupposes less, but there are practical implications for what they do presuppose and often they presuppose more than Peirce. (The common assumption of completeness that really didn’t come under sustained attack until the mid to late 20th century is an example) I think externalism is an other example of this. Admittedly those who allow for robust knowledge by acquaintance can do more here. But I think that a more robust externalism is pretty important metaphysically although that does become significant in the more early 20th century with Sartre, Heidegger and others. (The reemergence of pragmatism as strong position with Putnam and others also comes to question these assumptions) All of this is a round about way of saying I’m pretty skeptical the issue is always realism/nominalism. I think I’d want to see a solid argument to think it’s not dwarfed by other factors.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
