Edwina, List: I agree with your comments, but they involve a shift in the meaning of "individual" from "singular subject" (logical/metaphysical) to "human being" (social/political). What I take Eric to be asking--and what has come to interest me, as well--is whether there are other "conceivable practical effects" (CP 5.196; 1903) that are clearly different between these two concepts.
- Extreme nominalism = reality consists entirely of individuals, so there are no real generals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about things that are similar in some way. - Extreme realism = reality consists entirely of generals, so there are no real individuals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about things that are distinct in some way. Given Peirce's nearly lifelong crusade against all forms of nominalism, it seems like we should be able to identify additional "conditional experiential consequences" (CP 6.470; 1908) that sharply distinguish it from his own "extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208; c. 1905). I think you are probably on the right track with the idea that science studies objects in their generality, rather than their individuality. I also keep coming back to the related notion that nominalism accepts aspects of reality as incognizable and laws of nature as inexplicable, thus blocking the way of inquiry. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Eric - great fun. > > But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual > 'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space. > So, both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And > after all, that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all > probability, neither cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So, > does the concept of 'general' have any value? > > I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But, > when one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things > and have continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral > concepts, and general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then, > philosophical realism moves in to declare that these concepts have a > general reality that is articulated in individual instantiations. > TREE--->this particular tree. > > What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I > think that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the > individual as the key agent of thought and moves the community, the > long-term community, into that role. It prevents subjective relativism, > prevents the notion that each individual can directly and individually > perfectly KNOW the world and insists instead on that community of scholars > and indeed, denies full knowledge...because, realism says that information > is not found in ONE individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and > as such, requires a different approach than direct singular observation. > > I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects > of the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great > difference in actual knowledge of our external world. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Cc:* Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) <nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > *Sent:* Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists > entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate > discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely > of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse. > If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the > practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other? > > Uh oh. > > I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list > discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just* > people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to > convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again > being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question > resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what > distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be > different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. > > ----- > > Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill > baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end > of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to > the truck. "Look at how similar those two are," you say to yourself one > day while watching them. > > "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been > speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he > continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more > different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You > continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. > > "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or > generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking > up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with > each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes > points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any > two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind > bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is > collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is > *just*, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and > doesn't correspond at all with reality." > > After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the > pickers. > > "... and?..." you ply. > > "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, > over there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea > that these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, > what makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of > individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the > store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that > Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago. Bill-on-the-left has > the properties of being a singular thing, but the identity label itself > is just convenient ways to refer to complex composite beings, and don't get > at any sort of 'essence' at all. Those individual names are *just*, he > insist, a weird linguistic device to facilitate discourse. Quite to the > contrary, Jim would insist, if there is anything going on here that honest > inquirers would agree about after the dust settles, it is that 'apples' > were put in 'baskets', and that makes those generals real." > > "Huh," you insist, "that is all very fascinating, but I can detect no > difference in their behavior that would correspond to such a dramatic > seeming difference in thinking. Do they not both pick, and bucket, and > deliver in the same manner? And wait in the same line, in the same way, to > receive the same pay, with the same sullenness?" > > "Well yes," says the stranger, "but trust me, they are very, very > different. As I said, one is a nominalist, and the other a realist in the > pragmatic vein. Men with such contrasting sets of ideas couldn't be more > different." > > "Huh," you repeat, "aside from the words and phrases they would invoke > in a conversation about the specific topic you brought up, what conditions > could we arrange so as to see the difference in belief manifest as clear > differences in behavior? (Granting probability, and all that.) " > > "Well, you couldn't," says the stranger, "they are differences in belief, > not differences in habit." > > "Ah," you reply confidently, "it is too bad your thinking is not as clear > as mine. Belief is habit. As such, if there is no difference in habit > between the two that would - granted probability, and all that - manifest > itself under some arranged circumstances, then the two beliefs are > equivalent, no matter what the words might mislead you into thinking. Thus, > if you don't mind, I'll continue to think that the two people are very > similar." > > Another long pause ensued, and the man offered, sounding less certain, > "Well, I suppose they would relatively-reflexively complain differently, > under circumstances we could arrange, and those > differences-in-verbal-complaint would be logically connected with the > distinction I have pointed out." > > "Ah," you reply again, "I suppose that might indeed count as a > habit-of-thought, or something like that. But I already mentioned that I am > concerned with the ideas, not the words used to express the ideas. And > even if I were to allow mere differences in verbal responses, which I am > not sure I am terribly inclined to do, that would surely be amongst the > least of differences worth considering, and so I will still - thank you > very much - view them as quite similar. Good day." > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > <echar...@american.edu> > > On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Jon A., List: >> >> These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter. >> >> JA: It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake >> a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around >> and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? >> >> JA: Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to >> discourse, that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of >> discourse, and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather >> than an ontological essence. >> >> JA: This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the >> controversy between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of >> nominal thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily >> any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are >> secure in their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical >> grounds than mere grammatical category. >> >> >> Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all >> individuals are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular >> (determinate in every conceivable respect)? In other words, the nominalist >> says that reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only >> names we use to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says >> that reality consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names >> we use to facilitate discourse. If so, how does this help answer Eric's >> original question about the practical differences that one view manifests >> relative to the other? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >> >>> Peircers, >>> >>> I continue to review the multiple threads from January >>> on Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism (GRIN), >>> forming as they do such a near-at-hand microcosm of >>> eternally recurring themes. In the process I found >>> myself drawn back to previous encounters with the >>> whole panoply of puzzles that always arises here. >>> So here's a few pieces of prologue from the past: >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> November 2000 >>> >>> JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virt >>> ual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80 >>> %A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> November 2002 >>> >>> JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20070226082502/http://suo.ieee >>> .org/ontology/msg04332.html >>> >>> Any genuine appreciation of what Peirce has to say about identity, >>> indices, names, proper or otherwise, and the putative distinctions >>> between individual, particular, and general terms will have to deal >>> with what he wrote in 1870 about the “doctrine of individuals”. >>> >>> Notice that this statement, together with the maxims >>> that “Whatever has comprehension must be general” >>> and “Whatever has extension must be composite”, >>> pull the rug — and all of the elephants — >>> out from underneath the nominal thinker's >>> wishful thinking to find ontological >>> security in individual names, which >>> said nominal thinker has confused >>> with the names of individuals, >>> to turn a phrase back on same. >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%80 >>> %A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals#DOI._Note_1 >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> January 2015 >>> >>> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-01/msg00175.html >>> >>> By theoretical entities I mean things like classes, >>> properties, qualities, sets, situations, or states >>> of affairs, in general, the putative denotations of >>> theoretical concepts, formulas, sentences, in brief, >>> the ostensible objects of signs. >>> >>> A conventional statement of Ockham's Razor is — >>> >>> • “Entities shall not be multiplied beyond necessity.” >>> >>> That is still good advice, as practical maxims go, but >>> a pragmatist will read that as practical necessity or >>> utility, qualifying the things that we need to posit >>> in order to think at all, without getting lost in >>> endless circumlocutions of perfectly good notions. >>> >>> Nominalistic revolts are well-intentioned when they >>> naturally arise, seeking to clear away the clutter >>> of ostentatious entities ostensibly denoted by >>> signs that do not denote. >>> >>> But that is no different in its basic intention than >>> what Peirce sought to do, clarifying metaphysics >>> though the application of the Pragmatic Maxim. >>> >>> Taking the long view, then, pragmatism can be seen as >>> a moderate continuation of Ockham's revolt, substituting >>> a principled revolution for what tends to descend to >>> a reign of terror. >>> >>> http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 >>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-t >>> heoretical-entities-1/ >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> March 2015 >>> >>> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00096.html >>> >>> Inquiry Blog: >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-th >>> eoretical-entities-1/ >>> >>> Peirce List: >>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 >>> FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800 >>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15817 >>> FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15818 >>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15826 >>> JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15832 >>> FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15857 >>> FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15858 >>> >>> I don't see that we differ much on the question of Peirce's realism, >>> not so much on the question of what he knew as when he knew it, maybe. >>> I have never bought that multi-stage story of Peirce's development as >>> much as others do. The way I read him, he started out writing technical >>> works for audiences trained in mathematical and scientific disciplines. >>> They may not have had quite as much mental flexibility as he assumed but >>> their natural dispositions and practical training possessed them of that >>> basic “scientific attitude” that I tried to thumbnail sketch recently on >>> a not unrelated thread. This had the effect that Peirce simply did not >>> have to articulate a whole of lot of assumptions that were already taken >>> for granted by his audience. That would have been a case of “teaching >>> grandpa to suck eggs”, as the folksy idiom goes. As various >>> not-so-simple >>> twists of fate would have it, one of the big things that changed with the >>> passing years was the increasing diversity of audiences that he >>> addressed, >>> and I think this accounts for a greater share of the variance in what he >>> wrote than is widely acknowledged. Just for instance, the acceptance of >>> “real possibles” that makes up the bread-and-butter of probability theory >>> and statistical inference would hardly need arguing in those early papers >>> with the same dogged insistence it took to justify it to later audiences. >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> March 2015 >>> >>> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-03/msg00099.html >>> >>> Because it has come up once again, let me just mention one more time >>> why I think Peirce's theory of individuals has such a radical bearing >>> on the whole question of nominalism vs. realism. >>> >>> It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake >>> a general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn >>> around and mistake an individual name for the name of an individual? >>> >>> Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, >>> that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, >>> and so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an >>> ontological essence. >>> >>> This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy >>> between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal >>> thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily >>> any less ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether >>> signs are secure in their denotations has to be determined on >>> more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical category. >>> >>> If I may append a self-quotation, >>> here are a few from the turn of >>> the millennium: >>> >>> http://web.archive.org/web/20030927022020/http://suo.ieee.or >>> g/ontology/msg04332.html >>> http://web.archive.org/web/20070705085032/http://suo.ieee.or >>> g/ontology/thrd24.html#04332 >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Mathematical_Demon >>> stration_and_the_Doctrine_of_Individuals >>> >>> Additional References: >>> >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/22/mathematical-demons >>> tration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-1/ >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/23/mathematical-demons >>> tration-the-doctrine-of-individuals-2/ >>> >>> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o >>> >>> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >>> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >>> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >> >>
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