Dear list:
It is statements like the following that makes the whole matter of adopting CP 5.189 and not CP 5.402 that much more baffling. “When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their proper order, I support these sorts of moves.” ~Jeff Oh well, I suppose this yet another instance where "The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us. …so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements predicated as constituting the definable form. Now since we have shown above that attributes predicated as belonging to the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary, and since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad, or in any other subject whose attributes we select in this way, are predicated as belonging to its essential nature, triad will thus possess these attributes necessarily. Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method. But, in fact, the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a difference — it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped, or biped-animal-tame. In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in view: (1) the admission only of elements in the definable form, (2) the arrangement of these in the right order, (3) the omission of no such elements. The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary, and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it; since there must be one such term. On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration the Many are more ‘elementary’ than the One, and prior to it in their nature.” ~Aristotle Best, Jerry R On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Clark, List, > > > The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions > concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of > the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real > that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves > to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles > of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of > metaphysics. > > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like > Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like > Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of > metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the > things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to > presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the > differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of > the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special > sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and > principles that ought to govern inquiry. > > > On that front, I believe the differences between these types of > positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are > real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding > how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative > theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from > within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to > engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are > engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter. > > > When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their > proper order, I support these sorts of moves. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > > On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. > > > Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely > interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical > since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference > between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. > Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course > matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity > playing a very different role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly > content to allow terms to refer to an infinite number of entities even if > some are more like mathematical constructivists requiring a bit more care. > > As I think I said a week or two ago when we get to set theory things may > get a bit trickier since of course famously allowing loose set membership > leads to paradoxes. Perhaps one can make a stronger argument in set theory > and set construction that realism vs. nominalism matters far more. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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