I keep wondering to what these wonderful posts refer. I am not being ironical or sarcastic. Jeff's first paragraph sweeping description of first, second and third is beautiful. But to what does it refer? What is its practical effect? How is it used?
Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is a list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called memorial maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage which is indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the consideration of the first, the sign. That is the effect, the practical outcome of the triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua non of inquiry itself? Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all aim at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be taught to replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture and understanding generally. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 7:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Clark, List, > > > The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions > concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of > the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real > that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves > to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles > of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of > metaphysics. > > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like > Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like > Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of > metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the > things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to > presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the > differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of > the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special > sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and > principles that ought to govern inquiry. > > > On that front, I believe the differences between these types of > positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are > real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding > how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative > theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from > within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to > engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are > engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter. > > > When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their > proper order, I support these sorts of moves. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism > > > On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and > realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of > Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different > philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. > > > Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely > interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical > since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference > between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. > Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course > matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity > playing a very different role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly > content to allow terms to refer to an infinite number of entities even if > some are more like mathematical constructivists requiring a bit more care. > > As I think I said a week or two ago when we get to set theory things may > get a bit trickier since of course famously allowing loose set membership > leads to paradoxes. Perhaps one can make a stronger argument in set theory > and set construction that realism vs. nominalism matters far more. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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