Edwina, Gary, Clark, list, ET
I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step.
I agree with both sentences. And I would point out that the referent of an indexical sign may be something about which we know very little. For example, a finger pointing to our destination tells us nothing about what we'll find. Or smoke as a sign of fire tells us very little about the fire. The second sentence supports my point that the scientific laws we derive from our analysis are (a) secondary and (b) fallible approximations to whatever the real laws of nature may be. Gary
the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4 "I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous..."
Thanks for the quotation. Peirce's word 'analogous' supports my term 'metaphor'. A metaphor is an analogy that uses the terminology of one subject to explain an analogous subject. Clark
As John suggested we can see symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms such that non-fundamental physical laws are the somewhat chance created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness.
Those chance-created habits must be supported by some sign-like things that are interpreted by some kind of quasi-minds. An example is DNA, which is a sign-like chemical produced by evolution. Each cell of an organism has a quasi-mind that interprets the DNA as a sign to produce as interpretants other chemicals that serve as signs: hormones, enzymes, RNA, and more DNA. John
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