Thread:
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00080.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00088.html
HR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00200.html
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00202.html
JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00203.html
GR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00204.html
HR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00205.html
HR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00210.html

Helmut, List,

Yes, I think that something in that vicinity might be
what's causing people so much trouble with this topic.

Let me just review a few things ...

One thing I always say at these junctures is that people really ought
to take Peirce's advice and study his logic of relative terms and its
relation to what most math and computer sci folks these days would call
the mathematical theory of relations.  Personally I find his 1870 Logic
of Relatives very instructive, partly because he gives such concrete and
simple examples of every abstract abstrusity and (2) because he maintains
a healthy balance between the extensional and intensional views of things,
drawing on both our empiricist and rationalist ways of thinking.  Thereby
hangs another problem people often have with understanding Peirce's logic
and semiotics.  We have what might be called diverse “cognitive styles” or
“intellectual inclinations” that range or swing between the above two poles.
I doubt if there's anything like pure types in the human arena, but thinkers
do tend to lean in one direction or the other, at least, at any given moment.
As a rule, though, we are almost always operating at two different levels of
abstraction, whether we are aware of it or not, and our task is to get better
at doing that, through increased awareness of how thought works.  There is the
level of intension, or rational concepts, and there is the level of extension,
or empirical cases.

Well, the striking of the grandfather clock tells me
it's time for Big Bang Theory, so I'll have to break ...

Regards,

Jon

On 4/13/2017 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Jon [A. Schmidt], List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> “To be honest, given that the Sign relation
> is genuinely /triadic/, I have never fully
> understood why Peirce initially classified
> Signs on the basis of one correlate and two
> /dyadic /relations.  Perhaps others on the
> List can shed some light on that.”
>
> I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread
> with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something
> like the following:
>
> A triadic relation is called irreducible, because
> it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic
> relations.  Compositional reduction is the real kind
> of reduction.  But there is another kind of reduction,
> called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which
> is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to
> reduce.  It is possible for some triadic relations.
>
> Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be
> reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).
>
> My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind
> of projectional reduction:  (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).
>
> It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician.
> But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation
> with itself is possible, so the representamen relation
> can be called relation too, instead of correlate.
>
> Best,
> Helmut

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