> On Apr 6, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the > physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What > class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we describe a > law of nature in human language, an equation, or other representation of it; > I am talking about the law of nature itself, the real general that governs > actual occurrences.
My sense is that laws of nature are merely habits. As John suggested we can see symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms such that non-fundamental physical laws are the somewhat chance created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness. I’m not quite sure what question you’re asking though. As you mentioned, it seems they are legisigns. The interesting thing is each instance of a legisign is a replica or sinsign. So each time matter acts according to the legisign that act is a sinsign. > What is its Dynamic Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its potential > instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O relation? It is > not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)? What > is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given actual instantiation, perhaps? How > should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or > Rheme, like a term? A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word “the” will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if it were not for the law which renders it so. (CP 2.246) A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by "existent," existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the Symbol. (CP 2.249) So I’d say the object is the general that is the set of instantiations. Note that Peirce only starts distinguishing legisign from symbol in 1903. So often prior to that when discussing symbols he also is including legisigns.
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