Jeff, Jon S, Gary F, List, Jeff wrote: "Let's start with this question: why is the sign (or representamen), which is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the simplest of the three? "
GR: The sign is simplest, is first, is a 1ns, *because* it is a mere possibility. Of all the forms (characters) of an object that *might* be represented in a sign, something is "singled out," so to speak--a mere* form (the ground) *which *may* be represented in the way some, *this*, sign represents it). Jeff continues: "i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground, where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality. " It may be that "This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign.' But I don't think that this is necessarily so: *every sign* is a 1ns, for it was a mere possibility of being represented, but now *is* represented in *ths* paticular sign (a quali-/sin-/ or legisgin) and in the course of time (I disagree with Jon A here--*time is essential* in semeiosis,although much less so in pure logic) the representamen *will* help bring us closer to the *truth* of the sign as it is--in time--self-correcdting as semeiosis is. Jeff continued: "ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground. " GR: The second correlate *is* the objecti, but part of it's "double reference" is outside the sign (the DO) while the "ground" (the 'form' abstracted from that DO) is implicated in the IO (is the IO?). JD: "iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate and interpretant." GR: I'm not sure what you mean by writing this. The third correlate *is* the interpretant; so while the DO determines the ground (IO) which determines the Representamen (is that what you meant by "correlate" above?), what* is **determined* (in a non-dyadic sense discussed at length on this list) IS the Intreprentant. (What might be conceived as 'triple' are the three kinds of Interpretants.) Jeff continued: "If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single, double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants, then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more complex correlates." GR: I can't say I see a "modified version" here as the Representamen IS always a 1ns in Peirce's theory (even when it mediates between the Object and the Interpretant), the Object IS a 2ns, and the Interprentant IS a 3ns. Still (and given that there are 6 vectors, or possible paths, through a triadic relation), it is the case that a 2ns (Object) can determine a 1ns (Representament) for an Interpretant (3ns). I call this the "vector of determination" (in Peirce's sense of semiotic determination). *But*, it goes without saying that the representament may be any of the 10 (or, I suppose, 660 classes of signs. Question: Isn't this kind of analysis rather 'standard'? Or am I kidding myself? . Jeff concluded: "Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works." GR: I think Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy are wrong (what is their textual support?) and I agree with you that there are single, double, and triple references in his semiotic theory from the get go all the way to its maturist expression; that is, as you wrote, "that he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works." I guess I ought to drop my mic here. . . Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List, > > > Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of > NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of > filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the > Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back > on this published essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on > his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as > representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely > accepts at about the time he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says > in these early works in light of the modifications he later made--such that > the first category is monadic quality, the second category is dyadic brute > reaction, and the third category is triadic thought, then we can draw on > what he says there to understand a number of points on those first three > pages. > > > Let's start with this question: why is the sign (or representamen), which > is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the > simplest of the three? > > > Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the > "On a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge > in three parts: > > > i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a > representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground, > where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality. > > > ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute > reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground. > > > iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of > interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate > and interpretant. > > > If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single, > double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his > understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants, > then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes > from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more > complex correlates. > > > Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has > largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and > triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his > more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face > value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that > he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM > *To:* Gary Fuhrman > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic > > Gary F., List: > > Consider these two passages. > > CSP: The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of > the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of > that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The > Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most > complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being > a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ... (CP 2.235-236; > 1903) > > > CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; > it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a > Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the > Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign > itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the > Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six > trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if > they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908) > > > If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with > "Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second > passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines > the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate. This is the > only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate > trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such > that* the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the > Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere > possibilities. Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten > Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:49 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Jon S, see insert below … >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:40 >> >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that >> Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant >> ... >> >> Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me. That >> passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second >> Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the >> First Correlate (Sign). >> >> [GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by >> mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination. >> Try fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind, >> and then read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent >> with your understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is >> consistent with the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you >> agree with. >> >> >> >> It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that >> “These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations >> into ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three >> trichotomies *of sign types*, they would not divide *signs* into the >> same ten classes that Peirce gives us later in NDTR. >> >> >> >> I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in >> what each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous >> with "constrain the mode of." >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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