Dear list: I wish to point out just how ridiculously clear this statement is:
"...Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as representation." Best, J On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 9:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List, > > > Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of > NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of > filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the > Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back > on this published essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on > his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as > representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely > accepts at about the time he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says > in these early works in light of the modifications he later made--such that > the first category is monadic quality, the second category is dyadic brute > reaction, and the third category is triadic thought, then we can draw on > what he says there to understand a number of points on those first three > pages. > > > Let's start with this question: why is the sign (or representamen), which > is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the > simplest of the three? > > > Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the > "On a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge > in three parts: > > > i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a > representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground, > where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality. > > > ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute > reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground. > > > iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of > interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate > and interpretant. > > > If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single, > double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his > understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants, > then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes > from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more > complex correlates. > > > Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has > largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and > triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his > more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face > value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that > he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM > *To:* Gary Fuhrman > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic > > Gary F., List: > > Consider these two passages. > > CSP: The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of > the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of > that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The > Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most > complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being > a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ... (CP 2.235-236; > 1903) > > > CSP: It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; > it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a > Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the > Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign > itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the > Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six > trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if > they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908) > > > If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with > "Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second > passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines > the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate. This is the > only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate > trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such > that* the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the > Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere > possibilities. Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten > Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:49 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Jon S, see insert below … >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:40 >> >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that >> Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant >> ... >> >> Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me. That >> passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second >> Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the >> First Correlate (Sign). >> >> [GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by >> mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination. >> Try fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind, >> and then read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent >> with your understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is >> consistent with the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you >> agree with. >> >> >> >> It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that >> “These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations >> into ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three >> trichotomies *of sign types*, they would not divide *signs* into the >> same ten classes that Peirce gives us later in NDTR. >> >> >> >> I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in >> what each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous >> with "constrain the mode of." >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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