Three Threads, No Waiting ...
Peirce List -- The Object Of Reasoning Is To Find Out (TOORITFO)
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00260.html
GR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00263.html
EC:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00291.html
Peirce List -- Triadic Forms of Constraint, Determination, Interaction
GR:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00263.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00306.html
JBD:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00309.html
Peirce List -- Definition and Determination
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00302.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00303.html
JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-04/msg00307.html
Because, you know, if you're gonna toss a sop to Cerberus,
You'd better toss three ...
Jeff, List,
There are many places where Peirce uses the word “object”
in the full “pragma”tic sense, so much so that it demands
a very selective attention not to remark on them. I cited
a couple at the top of this discussion but perhaps the most
critical locution for the sake of pragmatism is stated here:
| Consider what effects that might conceivably
| have practical bearings you conceive the
| objects of your conception to have. Then,
| your conception of those effects is the
| whole of your conception of the object.
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
Regards,
Jon
On 4/19/2017 1:40 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Jon A, List,
Peirce suggests that others have been confused by the way he talks about "objects" in the context of the
theory of semiotics, and he tries to straighten matters out in a Dec. 14 1908 Letter to Lady Welby. He uses the word
"object" in the sense of in which "obiectum" (objectum?) "was first made a substantive early
in the XIIIth century" (Semiotics and Significs, 69).
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2017 10:05 AM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction
Gary, all ...
I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.
I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.
At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.
Regards,
Jon
On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon A, List,
Jon A wrote:
People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.
I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.
So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."
Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
time, for reasons just noted.)
This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this
thread.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
| “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
|
| — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
| The object of reasoning is to find out,
| from the consideration of what we already know,
| something else which we do not know.
|
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
If the object of an investigation is
to find out something we did not know
then the clues and evidence discovered
are the signs that determine that object.
We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...
People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.
Regards,
Jon
--
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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