Gary,
Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:
• The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.
Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:
• The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.
So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.
In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:
• L ⊆ O × S × I
where:
O is the set of all objects under discussion,
S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.
The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.
Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:
• What bearings do these types of global constraints
have on various local settings we might select?
And conversely:
• To what extent do various types of local constraints combine
to constrain or determine various types of global constraint?
There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.
Time for Tacos!
Jon
On 4/19/2017 3:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon A, List,
I'd written: "... it would seem that what may very well be needed,
then, is our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination,
and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains."
I read through your links on 'determination' and, while interesting in
their own right, I didn't find anything that helped in this matter of
getting a better grasp of specifically "*triadic forms* of constraint,
determination, and interaction. . ."
As to what Peirce means by 'Object' in the context of semiosis, while I
think that his positing two Objects, the Immediate and the Dynamic, add a
necessary complexity to the notion of Object, that many, perhaps most
Peircean semioticians are clear enough on this, thus, for example,allowing
Dynamic Objects to be members of any of the three Universes of Experience..
However, how these Objects function in relation to the various forms of the
three Interpretants he also offers late in his career has probably not been
sufficiently clarified.
Best,
Gary Rr
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Gary, all ...
I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through
these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there
may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be
resolved before any kind of communication could occur.
I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line,
as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems
to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of
the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the
Greek “pragma”.
At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading
with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings
on the subject of determination, just in case.
Regards,
Jon
On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon A, List,
Jon A wrote:
People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.
I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.
So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."
Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that
certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
time, for reasons just noted.)
This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of
this
thread.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
| “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
|
| — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
| The object of reasoning is to find out,
| from the consideration of what we already know,
| something else which we do not know.
|
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
If the object of an investigation is
to find out something we did not know
then the clues and evidence discovered
are the signs that determine that object.
We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...
People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.
Regards,
Jon
--
inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
