Jon, List, Nice post, and rereading it, quite hlepfull. However, I don't think that a consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may for mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least in my opinion.
So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.* For Deacon constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the Tao, I know that this is no news to you!). More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those constraints which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more complex than the constituents of a process because the complexity of such absential constraints is tied to their not being physical things: take away the spokes and the tire and the hub just disappears. Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the organizing power of constraints in his book, *Turning Signs http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm <http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm>*, a work which I've highly recommended in the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp. it's penultimate Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another thread. (I should note that for both authors discussions of *constraint* include but go beyond semeiotic science, although perhaps not beyond semiosis itself.) In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment in your message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you termed "mutual constraints": JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed, they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage. So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation. I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg it. Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain*, gives an example of such mutual constraints in this sniippet. As *Deacon* (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the adapting’ (122) in Fuhrman, *Turning Signs*, Chapter 13. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Gary, > > Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint: > > • The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M. > > Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint: > > • The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z. > > So any way we choose to define a triadic relation > we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint. > > In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation > we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form: > > • L ⊆ O × S × I > > where: > O is the set of all objects under discussion, > S is the set of all signs under discussion, and > I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion. > > The concepts of constraint, definition, determination, > lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis > in the idea that one set is a subset of another set. > > Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask: > > • What bearings do these types of global constraints > have on various local settings we might select? > > And conversely: > > • To what extent do various types of local constraints combine > to constrain or determine various types of global constraint? > > There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed, > they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage. > So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine > signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility > that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation. > > Time for Tacos! > > Jon > > On 4/19/2017 3:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Jon A, List, >> >> I'd written: "... it would seem that what may very well be needed, >> then, is our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, >> and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains." >> >> I read through your links on 'determination' and, while interesting in >> their own right, I didn't find anything that helped in this matter of >> getting a better grasp of specifically "*triadic forms* of constraint, >> determination, and interaction. . ." >> >> As to what Peirce means by 'Object' in the context of semiosis, while I >> think that his positing two Objects, the Immediate and the Dynamic, add a >> necessary complexity to the notion of Object, that many, perhaps most >> Peircean semioticians are clear enough on this, thus, for example,allowing >> Dynamic Objects to be members of any of the three Universes of >> Experience.. >> However, how these Objects function in relation to the various forms of >> the >> three Interpretants he also offers late in his career has probably not >> been >> sufficiently clarified. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary Rr >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> >> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >> >> Gary, all ... >>> >>> I'm not sure I have the leisure or stamina to run through >>> these issues one more time, and I begin to suspect there >>> may be some deeper-lying issues that would have to be >>> resolved before any kind of communication could occur. >>> >>> I'm thinking I may go back to my initial subject line, >>> as the “failure to communicate” in this setting seems >>> to have more to do with the full pragmatic meaning of >>> the word “object” and its being such poor echo of the >>> Greek “pragma”. >>> >>> At any rate, I re-posted an old post under a separate heading >>> with lots o' links to earlier discussions and relevant readings >>> on the subject of determination, just in case. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On 4/16/2017 7:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>> >>> Jon A, List, >>>> >>>> Jon A wrote: >>>> >>>> People will continue to be confused about determination >>>> >>>>> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the >>>>> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and >>>>> sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language >>>>> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination, >>>>> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and >>>>> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order. >>>>> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about, >>>>> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds >>>>> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids, >>>>> stripes, or pockets. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have >>>> argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my >>>> understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of >>>> determination >>>> which does not capture triadic 'determination'. >>>> >>>> So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our >>>> unpacking >>>> the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that >>>> are >>>> not captured by S-R chains." >>>> >>>> Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the >>>> context >>>> of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of >>>> new >>>> concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind >>>> around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that >>>> certain >>>> 'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least >>>> as >>>> important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in >>>> consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried >>>> discussing >>>> some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at >>>> the >>>> time, for reasons just noted.) >>>> >>>> This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and >>>> scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of >>>> this >>>> thread. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *C 745* >>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>>> >>>> On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >>>> >>>> | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.” >>>> >>>>> | >>>>> | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, >>>>> 3) >>>>> | >>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio >>>>> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/ >>>>> >>>>> | The object of reasoning is to find out, >>>>> | from the consideration of what we already know, >>>>> | something else which we do not know. >>>>> | >>>>> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html >>>>> >>>>> If the object of an investigation is >>>>> to find out something we did not know >>>>> then the clues and evidence discovered >>>>> are the signs that determine that object. >>>>> >>>>> We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ... >>>>> but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ... >>>>> >>>>> People will continue to be confused about determination >>>>> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the >>>>> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and >>>>> sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language >>>>> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination, >>>>> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and >>>>> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order. >>>>> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about, >>>>> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds >>>>> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids, >>>>> stripes, or pockets. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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