Jerry C., List: In the long quote that I included in my last post, Peirce acknowledged that the Sign sometimes *creates *its Object; but nevertheless, it remains the case that the Object *determines *the Sign, which shows that Peirce's usage of "determination" is not at all equivalent to *causation*.
CSP: It may be asked, for example, how a lying or erroneous Sign is determined by its Object, or how if, as not infrequently happens, the Object is brought into existence by the Sign ... The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the sign ... The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it [the Object] determines the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer. (CP 8.178; 1909) What do you mean by "metrological potentials" or "metrological considerations"? How do they relate to the thread topic? Would you mind providing some examples? Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 12:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, List: > > On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jerry C., List: > > To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring? > > I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/ > antecedent /… > > Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object >> determines the Sign, >> >> The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object > determines the sign is open. The meaning is context dependent in normal > linguistic usage. > > *In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the > Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to > determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the > argument.) * > > N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological > sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical > and mathematical disciplines. > > What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses? > > My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference > terms) that have meaning such that a message can be composed. > > In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering > symbols infer metrological potentials. > > In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological > considerations are often excluded. > > IMHO, of course. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < > jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > >> Jon: >> >> JC: I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you. >> >> >> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object >> determines the Sign, >> >> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically. >> >> JC: Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of >> the interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter? >> >> >> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary >> hypothesis”; >> >> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis. >> >> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical >> or scientific reasoning? >> >> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the >> propositions you are proposing? >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: >> >>> List, Jon: >>> >>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object >>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant? >>> >>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you. >>> >>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the >>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter? >>> >>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective: >>> >>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind. >>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” >>> by a range of metrologies. >>> >>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of >>> interpretant while other measurements are *essential to determining the >>> identity* of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!) >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>
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