Hi Gary, List,
I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list)
have at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness
or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the
"surprising fact" that causes us to question the generals in
Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results of abductive
logic informs the possibilities to be considered anew in the next
sequence of inquiry, so informs what to consider in Firstness. By
this thought, abduction is really a bridge between Thirdness and
Firstness in a dynamic process.
In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most
concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most
pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you
are making here. In that context, then, virtually any "conditional
proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration could/would be
instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even unicorns fit under this
umbrella, since we know of no natural reason to discount a
horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under this
formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen
as real.
While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it
ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the CSP
quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned"
criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional
proposition".
I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character of what
gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are obviously real).
But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a notion that any
possible is real simply because it is possible. My sense is there is
more here.
BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?
Thanks!
Mike
On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Mike, List,
Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation
of that post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.
I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint
of what I've termed the_ vector of involution_, commencing at 3ns,
which involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of
considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet
of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence and reality in
a logico-grammatical sleight of hand ("quantified variables") which
makes _everything_ "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is"
stand for not only existence, but also reality. While the problem is
difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's (and
Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.
You quoted me, then asked:
GR: As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it
is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last
branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.
MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).
I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly
important to point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be."
But I believe that the first question we ought try to answer is why
Peirce says that "it is the reality of some possibilities that
pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon."
My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some"
of those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses
which might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing,
show themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce
writes:
Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you
please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their
substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being
of the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of being true,
that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such as the
proposition expresses, independently of being thought to be so in
any judgment, or being represented to be so in any other symbol of
any man or men. BUT THAT AMOUNTS TO SAYING THAT POSSIBILITY IS
SOMETIMES OF A REAL KIND. (Issues of Pragmatism, EP2:354, emphasis
added).
This, I believe, is how inquiry progresses, how we approach "the
truth of certain matters," that 'truth," or, better, knowledge,
sometimes bringing about, for example, technologies which are of
benefit to us. Perhaps it is yet possible to imagine that we might
evolve our humane consciousness, the final frontier of evolution as
Peirce saw it. But this has little--if any--hope of happening if we
cannot conceive powerful abductions, hypotheses, _possibilities_. .
. This, I would maintain, _is_ the work of individuals.
Best,
Gary R
GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
718 482-5690 [5]
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 9:33 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com>
wrote:
Hi Gary, List,
Excellent response. However, the snippet below caught my eye:
As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it is
the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last
branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.
Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).
Thanks, Mike
On 10/18/2017 7:54 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it is
the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last
branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.
--
__________________________________________
Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225 [1]
skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com [2]
http://mkbergman.com [3]
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman [4]
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