Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[Mike Bergman]

Hi John, List, On 10/20/2017 7:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote: Since my name was mentioned in the list, I'll say why I believe that methods of reasoning -- induction, abduction, and deduction -- are kinds of arguments (third in the triad predicate-proposition-argument). And that all arguments are segments in a never-ending cycle of inquiry.  Therefore, all of that is Thirdness. John, your name was mentioned because you made this statement: Mike Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those possibilities may be (with citations) Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer program, the variables represent "real possibilities". But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley". Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops. I was (and am) questioning whether plans or computer variables are in any way Firstness; I maintain they are instantiations, even if they deal with an unrealized future, and are therefore Secondness. My original question to Gary (and, now, you) about "some [Firstness] possibilities" which we should be "most concerned to insist upon" remains. The points you then raise only mostly affirm what I was also saying, that the universal categories are a process. Calling them arguments is, I agree, a more clarifying definition. However, that being said, I also think that framing the process question into "starting" and "stopping" points miscontrues my process points; I made no such suggestion. The proper metaphor, which you also state, is the cycle. But, under a cyclic understanding, I do not see everything as being Thirdness. I agree and grant that arguments are in Thirdness -- Peirce makes this point often in discussing his categories applied to logic -- but the components of what might go into those arguments are drawn from all three categories, which I think is what Gary was attempting to point out. Mike Meanwhile, I believe that most Peirce scholars see abduction as a 1ns when it is considered within a tripartite inquiry (what Peirce calls "a complete inquiry") such that: a) 1st, 1ns, abduction (a hypothesis is formed) b) 2nd, 3ns, deduction (there is an analysis of the implications of the hypothesis were it valid in the interest of constructing tests of it c) 3rd, 2ns, induction (the actual experiment testing of the hypothesis occurs) Those numbers go beyond what Peirce said.  And they suggests that there is a starting point and a stopping point.  Peirce emphasized perception and purposive action.   If you start with perception and end with action, the order of reasoning would be observation, induction, abduction, deduction and action. But every action is a test of some prediction (deduction), which leads to new observations, which lead to a new inductions, which leads to an abduction, which revises previous theories (hypotheses), which leads to new deductions (prediction), which leads to new action (testing), which leads to new observations... The whole cycle is an endless inquiry, which may be considered a sequence of arguments -- all of which are a kind of Thirdness. Furthermore, there may be cycles within cycles, as the inquiry goes into side issues, corollaries, revisions, debates... As an illustration of the cycle, see the attached soup1.jpg. John -- __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman Cognonto Corporation 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman http://cognonto.com http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________

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