Mike, List: MB: I am not looking at "blueprint" through the lens of representation, I am looking at "blueprint" in terms of the nature of the object. When it comes to categorize the reality of our real world, I think this is the proper basis.
I am inclined to agree, but as I have suggested in the past, it seems to me that Peirce ultimately maintained a subtle distinction between the phenomenological/phaernoscopic Categories that describe three different kinds of predicates and the metaphysical Universes that contain three different kinds of subjects. Of course, in accordance with his overall architectonic, the latter would in some sense depend on the former. Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Michael Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi Jon, Edwina, List, > > See below: > > On 10/20/2017 1:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > >> Mike, List: >> >> I took Gary F.'s point to be that no phenomenon can be properly >> categorized as /only /Firstness, /only /Secondness, or /only /Thirdness. >> >> CSP: What I term /phaneroscopy /is that study which, supported by >> the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its >> observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; >> describes the features of each; shows that although they are so >> inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is >> manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, >> beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of >> these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally >> proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the >> principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, c. 1904; >> italics in original) >> > > For there to be reality, there must be real things (objects), and, by > contrast, everything else. What I objected to was the facile transition > from idea to blueprint to whatever, with the object changing in each change > of reference. In the context of the blueprint object, no matter what the > phenomenology, nor the sign interpretation (see below), the referenced > object, the ground, is the blueprint, completely and perfectly understood. > > However, I wonder if Mike's point is manifest in Peirce's later >> discussions of the three Universes of Experience. >> >> CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the >> first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the >> mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another /might /give local >> habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, >> the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting >> thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their >> Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of >> things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in >> reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections >> redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third >> Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power >> to establish connections between different objects, especially >> between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is >> essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not >> essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its >> Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and >> a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the >> power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a >> daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." (CP 6.455, >> 1908; italics in original) >> >> Only the /Idea/ of the building belongs to the first Universe as a real >> possibility. It is /represented /(in different ways) by both the blueprint >> and the constructed building itself, which themselves belong to the second >> Universe of Brute Actuality. The relations among these different objects >> that facilitate such mediation belong to the third Universe of Signs. In >> multiple drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," Peirce >> also directly associated the second Universe with Matter and the third >> Universe with Mind. >> > > EXACTLY SO. In fact, this same kind of relationship can be seen in dozens > of examples (actually, more than 60) of the universal categories drawn from > Peirce's writings [1]. > > In Edwina's comments on this thread, she told me to go study the Signs. > The problem is, semiosis, logic and many other Peircean concepts are > subsumed under the universal categories, the most succinct expression of > Peirce's architectonic, not the other way around. We need to talk about > signs when our discourse is representation, we need to talk about the > universal categories when our discourse is Peirce's metaphysics and the > "true" nature of Objects. That includes the concepts of real, existence, > identity and truth. > > So, Edwina, in this case, I am not looking at "blueprint" through the lens > of representation, I am looking at "blueprint" in terms of the nature of > the object. When it comes to categorize the reality of our real world, I > think this is the proper basis. > > Thanks, Mike > > [1] http://www.mkbergman.com/2077/how-i-interpret-c-s-peirce/; the table > at bottom is an updated and corrected version of an earlier one. Many on > this list, including Edwina and Gary, helped point out those earlier > errors, and there likely still remain some. ;) > > Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/Jo >> nAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSch >> midt> >> >> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 12:30 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com >> <mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote: >> >> Hi Gary F., List, >> >> I separately responded to Jon on his quotes, so will not discuss >> further here. >> >> On 10/20/2017 10:45 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca >> <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> >>> Mike,____ >>> >>> __ __ >>> >>> I think Jon’s post should clarify what is meant by a “real >>> possibility.” But I’d like to add a point about the “universal >>> categories”: they are not watertight compartments, or separate >>> bins into which phenomena can be sorted. Any given phenomenon, >>> such as an argument or a blueprint, can have its Firstness, its >>> Secondness /and/ its Thirdness. In fact you can’t have Thirdness >>> that doesn’t involve Secondness, or Secondness that doesn’t >>> involve Firstness. >>> >>> I would say, in contrast, that it is EXACTLY the process of sorting >> things into the bins of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness that >> Peirce was, throughout many all of his writings, trying to instruct >> us. I very often hear common themes of categorization and natural >> classes in Peirce's writings, don't you? Sure, there are always edge >> cases, and the inspections of those are partly what helps bring >> clarity and understanding to our thinking, so should be highly >> valued. And, of course, we may not always categorize them correctly >> (but should try to). >> >>> >>> ____ >>> >>> A blueprint is a First relative to the universe of real buildings, >>> i.e. it is the mere idea of a building. A physically instantiated >>> blueprint, like a “replica” of an existential “graph,” is a Second >>> in the universe of representations, a token of a type. And it is a >>> Third in its function as an iconic sign interpretable by the >>> builders. >>> >>> With all due respect, I could not disagree more, and I think this >> shows the muddied thinking around the universal categories. A >> blueprint and a physical building are both Secondness, period. There >> is certainly Firstness associated with a building, such as design >> and form and possible materials, but not a blueprint. A blueprint is >> its own Secondness. To my understanding, nothing material or in >> existence can ever be in Firstness; they are characters or >> attributes, not instances. We also have a Thirdness about a >> building, but that relates to methods for constructing buildings, >> limits and laws that govern how and within what constraints it can >> be built, or inclusion of buildings as a type of architectural >> artifact. >> >> Thanks, Mike >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
