Edwina, list, Thank you for a very stimulating and intellectually generous post.
I will continue to disagree with Gary F's position in this matter, but want to explore it further and so will begin reading other chapters of Bellucci's book. I'll keep the question open until, as Gary F has suggested, I have grasped enough of Bellucci's argument (more than which appears in Chapter 8 and which Gary F has presented on list) to assess it more adequately. But since much of his argument appears in Chapter 8 and I have not yet been convinced by it, this is something of a kind of "leap of faith" that Gary Fuhrman, a scholar I very much respect, would not be advocating for it so strongly if there weren't *something* to it. For it has become quite clear to me since reading Stjernfelt's book and engaging in a slow read of it here a few years ago (organized, btw, by Gary F), that the dicisign is of particular interest for human and biosemiotics. However, I will not be reading any additional Frege! :-) I rejected his logic decades ago in reading John Sowa on the derailment of logic as a consequence of the analytic turn--begun by Frege, Russell, and Carnap--which dismissed Peirce's contribution to logic with faint praise (actually, the praise was often effusive, but Peirce's work was then either (mis)appropriated or ignored). For now I will only 'touch' very lightly upon the interesting biosemiotic question you've posed as to whether there even is a rheme in biological processes (my present sense is that there *perhaps* is one for a reason extrapolated from the conclusion of your post which I'm responding to; so, see below). I would be interested, of course, in what other Peircean influenced biosemioticians think about this matter if there's anything in the literature concerning the role the rheme might play in biosemiosis. I'm glad that for human semiosis at least that you've begun entertaining the notion that the link between, "the external Dynamic Object and the processing triadic Sign of IO/R/I," as you phrased it, might be in futuro. ET: This link [from the DO to the Sign as semiosic process] provides information from the DO which is transformed into the IO..and then, further transformed within the Representamen/mediation ..as an II and IO. But - again - could this link be future-oriented rather than actual? As I suggested in my earlier posts, it is my sense that at least in human semiosis that an uninterpreted rheme yet carries with it any number (perhaps thousands or more) of associations, connotation, partial characters, vague possible qualities, etc. All these are, as I see it, *in some way* connected to the dynamic object, but what that particular information is (or, rather, will be) cannot be revealed at least until the rheme becomes a part of a proposition (and probably only very partially even then). Gary F has argued in line with Bellucci--*contra* Peirce's assertion in the very quotation I employed to note that Peirce explicitly stated that "Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so." The interpretation, I've been arguing, *may be *forthcoming when the pertinent information is, as it were, 'revealed', in the dicisignic and, perhaps, argumentative future. I have also suggested that its connection to the dynamic argument might relate to collateral knowledge (but I'm quite uncertain of that at the moment). Finally, I like to consider these comments at the end of your post for two reasons, one concerned with human semiosis, and another related one to biosemiosis. You wrote: ET: If the rheme [i.e., that which is emerging in the Interpretant phase] is vague, lacking in definite information ..and as Peirce notes, is thereby not interpreted as providing information about some possible Object - then, agaidfn - could it not be the case that the rheme is a powerful cognitive process for enabling a future Object to be developed? I am here focusing on the power of man - to imagine and create new technology, etc. FIrst, I like your characterizing information as "emerging in the Interpretant phase." It is not as if information suddenly and instantly appears when, for example, a dicent sign appears. In my view, semiosis principally concerns the *emergence* of information and, finally, meaning. However, I will again note that it was Peirce who wrote (see above) that most any rheme "*affords some information*." That that information in not--cannot be--interpreted until the rheme is a part of a dicisign is not at all the same as saying that it contains *no* information at all and lacks an immediate object. But both Jon S and I have given our reasons why we disagree with Belluci (and Gary F) in this matter, so I won't rehearse them here. I am totally intrigued by your suggestion "that the rheme is a powerful cognitive process for enabling a future Object to be developed? I am here focusing on the power of man - to imagine and create new technology, etc." This immediately brought to my mind these questions: How in human semiosis does a new term (rheme) come into being? In Bellucci's analysis does this new term (say one in science or technology) wholly lack any reference to a dynamic object? Does it convey no information whatsoever? Does it completely lack connection to a Dynamic Object.\ Certainly chance is necessary for novelty to emerge in human and biological forms, but chance has no structural characteristics. So, more questions; Does the rheme provide that loose structure--or is that structure *brought about* by "chance sporting" in the context of, for example, the already present structures of some biological system and its Umwelt? If man can "imagine and create new technology, etc." with some sort of assistance of the rheme, why shouldn't this be the case in nature? This is why I wrote at the top of this message that I think that the rheme *is *present in biosemiosis, this suggested by the observation that nature is at least as creative as man, actually even more so. I think that the possibly information which the rheme holds might prove to be a testable hypothesis (in human or biosemiotics or, perhaps, both). So, again, thanks for a most thought-provoking post. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 4:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > List > > Even if the rheme does not direct attention to an actual DO in current > time - then, my question is that it might direct attention to one in the > future. That was my point that in the physico-chemical and biological > realms - I'm not sure if a rheme can exist. That is - if a lizard 'feels' > something, then, this feeling is actually the result of an indexical > interaction.. I am not at present going to totally reject the rheme in > these two realms - but, within the conceptual realm of mankind - then, the > rheme as a possibility might indeed be linked to the future, by way of our > capacity for imagination. > > But I think I get Gary F's focus on the necessity for the link, the > interaction between what I am visualizing as Site A and Site B [the > external Dynamic Object and the processing triadic Sign of IO/R/II]….. This > link provides information from the DO which is transformed into the IO..and > then, further transformed within the Representamen/mediation ..as an II and > IO. But - again - could this link be future-oriented rather than actual? > > If the rheme [i.e., that which is emerging in the Interpretant phase] is > vague, lacking in definite information ..and as Peirce notes, is thereby > not interpreted as providing information about some possible Object - then, > again - could it not be the case that the rheme is a powerful cognitive > process for enabling a future Object to be developed? I am here focusing on > the power of man - to imagine and create new technology, etc. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > On Sun 24/06/18 4:32 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Jon S, Gary F, list, > > I've just discarded the greater part of a draft of a response to Gary F > which I was formulating as you, Jon, say much better than I would have, and > you include more pertinent analysis than I was considering in this matter. > So for now I will only note that I fully concur with your analysis. > > Gary F wrote: > > Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote (from > the Syllabus ) which I think could throw some light on the distinction > between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition of the > rheme: > > [[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of > qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and > such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some > information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] > > That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because > dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” are interpreted > as affording information, while rhemes are not. The crucial point here is > that in order to convey information, a sign must have an actual object, > i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as well as intension. > The reason that a rheme is not interpreted as affording information is > that it is not interpreted as directing attention to an actual object, as a > dicisign is, by definition. > > You completely ignore here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will perhaps > "afford some information." Again, as I, Jon S and, I think, Jeff have > argued contra your assertion above (that "a sign must have an actual > object"), Rhemes may offer possible information about the DO which later may > be interpreted. Rhemes much less frequently than not, it seems to me, > are parts of dicisigns > . > (In reading one of Edwina's recent posts, I thought that for biosemiosis > that the Rheme is probably never > found apart from a dicisign > .) > > Still, at least for Anthroposemiotics, the information which they might > afford as rheme is real enough and will possibly--even probably--be of > considerable significance when the rheme or term finds its place in a > proposition. Indeed, because of the rheme's vague connotations (if that's > the right word) the pertinent information that it contains will not be > clear until it is included in a proposition. But that doesn't mean that > there is no information in the Rheme whatsover, and a close reading of > the snippet we're discussing strongly suggests that there is information > perhaps to be interpreted later. > > In my view, the reason that the rheme is not interpreted as affording > information is principally because that information is vague until it is > contextualized (typically for Anthroposemiotics, in a proposition). My > example of the quite varied possible information that the rheme '-is a > book' holds suggests that vagueness, I believe. To assert, as you have, > that it offers no information, is not supported by the Peirce quote. > > And while I earlier had some little doubts concerning the language you > used, Jon, to express this basic description of a Sign (one question > remains: see below), I have come to a greater appreciation of your > expression of what a Sign does. > > JAS: ". . . a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some > of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, > constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to > represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)." > > > That little remaining doubt: Peirce says that the Object (within the sign, > the Immediate Object) determines the Representamen which, in turn, > determines the Interpretant. In the quotation above you omit the > Representamen in your analysis. This would seem to conflate the IO and the > R (which may be the case as in consideration of triadic semiosis we are not > discussing three units any more than we are in a discussion of the flow of > Time such that we absolutely separate Past/Present/Future). But would you > explain why the Representamen is not included in your formulation > whatsoever? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > 718 482-5690 > > On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: The real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an immediate >> object? >> >> >> In simplest terms, the IO is "the Object as the Sign itself represents >> it" (CP 4.536; 1906). Therefore, if a Sign does not have an IO, then it >> does not represent its Object at all--which is clearly absurd, since a >> Sign is defined as something that represents its Object. >> >> GF: The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a >> sign must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as >> depth, extension as well as intension. >> >> >> But the Dynamic Object of a Dicisign/Pheme need not be actual (Existent), >> it can also be general (Necessitant); and the Dynamic Object of a >> Rheme/Seme need not be Possible, it can also be actual (e.g., a proper >> name) or general (e.g., a common noun). So the difference between a >> Dicisign/Pheme and a Rheme/Seme is not solely to be found in the nature >> of the Dynamic (or Immediate) Object, since the only difference in that >> regard is that a Rheme/Seme can have a Dynamic and/or Immediate Object >> that is merely Possible. >> >> The issue, or at least a key aspect of it, seems to be whether the depth >> of a Sign belongs to its Object or to its Interpretant. You (and >> Bellucci) apparently ascribe only the breadth to the Object and the depth >> to the Interpretant. My view is that breadth (Matter) and depth (Form) >> are two different aspects of the Object, while information as their product >> belongs to the Interpretant--i.e., the two dimensions are only brought >> together in and by the Sign (Entelechy). >> >> I see this as evident in Peirce's concept of the continuous >> predicate--the purely logical relation that is left over when everything >> that fills its blanks is "thrown into the subject." This is the end of >> analysis precisely because it fully isolates the components of the Object >> (both subjects and predicates) from the Interpretant that brings them >> together in a certain way. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 8:13 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Gary R, list, >>> >>> To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an >>> immediate object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is pointless, >>> for reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance of context, but >>> mostly because taking either side in the debate presupposes a fixed opinion >>> about what an immediate object is. The real question for inquiry, in my >>> view, is What is an immediate object? — taking that to be a technical >>> term, and an important one, in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, >>> one fruitful approach to that inquiry is to ask Why did Peirce find it >>> necessary in 1904 to make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and >>> immediate objects of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, >>> and so has Stjernfelt in Natural Propositions, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is >>> the passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with >>> immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy of the >>> book, and that passage will do nicely.) >>> >>> You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of Peirce's >>> dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung (reference) and his >>> immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn (sense) ”. That of course >>> is the interpretation that Bellucci is arguing against in his paper; >>> and I do accept that characterization of “the Fregean interpretation,” and >>> take it to be equivalent with the position you and Jon are taking in the >>> debate that I don’t want to engage in. You may find, if you download and >>> read the paper, that it differs from your position in some respects. I just >>> used it as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that you >>> would recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue. >>> >>> Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote >>> (from the Syllabus) which I think could throw some light on the >>> distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s definition >>> of the rheme: >>> >>> [[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of >>> qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and >>> such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some >>> information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]] >>> >>> That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because >>> dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” are >>> interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are not. The crucial >>> point here is that in order to convey information, a sign must have an >>> actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth, extension as >>> well as intension. The reason that a rheme is not interpreted as >>> affording information is that it is not interpreted as directing attention >>> to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by definition. This point is closely >>> related to one that Peirce makes in the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces >>> graphs >>> of graphs: >>> >>> [[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a proposition >>> that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to be true. But >>> to say that it is true implies that it really is affected by its object; >>> and in order that this object should have a real effect upon it, this >>> object must be a subject of force, which is an individual. Consequently, an >>> adequate interpretant of a graph must represent it as a sign of an >>> individual. How, then, can there be a graph of a graph, considering >>> that a graph is a legisign, or sign which has the mode of being of a general >>> type, just as any word is a general type, and not a single individual >>> object in a single definite place at a single instant. The answer is that a >>> graph can only have a graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can >>> only refer to a graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any >>> graph-replica you please so long as it be equivalent to a given graph >>> replica. ]R 470 CSP 126-8] >>> >>> The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being really >>> affected by its object, but only “understood as representing such and >>> such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object by making it a >>> part of a dicisign, and it will afford the depth component of the >>> information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the absence of some part of >>> the sign indicating what that information is about, it can’t be >>> interpreted as informational. >>> >>> I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of the >>> “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for that purpose >>> is, of course, up to you. >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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