Edwina, List: I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II because I hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on that basis, to reconcile our two different models of semiosis. It became evident a few months ago that this is not the case, since we still cannot even agree on how Peirce defined "Representamen." Consequently, I took a closer look at his usage and came to realize what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a Representamen with a mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were basically synonymous and interchangeable. More to the point, nowhere in Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a *component *of the Sign. Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of terminology, if one wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes the IO, the II, and whatever is left over after those are "removed," one must come up with a new name for the latter; Peirce never called it a "Representamen," or anything else as far as I can tell.
Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > I have to include myself with Gary R as - in my 1stness - stunned by your > abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of II-R-II! You > fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for months. I recall your > chastising me for daring to include the DO within the definition of the > full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in the night, you casually tell us that > you..some time ago...abandoned this notion. > > Whew. > > Edwina > > On Sun 24/06/18 8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary R., List: > > Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the Sign > itself as a triad of IO-R-II? This goes back to the fact that Peirce never > distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in the specific way that > such a model entails. I still affirm that the IO and II are internal to > the Sign, while the DO and DI are external to it; and below I quoted > Peirce's statement that the two Objects determine the Sign, which > determines the three Interpretants; so I suspect that this indeed boils > down to "a terminological matter." > > Does that clarify things? If not, maybe I have just been staring at the > pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours consecutively. > :-) > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon S, list, >> >> >> Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by this, >> and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter. Still, Peirce >> says in many, many places that what happens within the sign is this >> tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which determines some >> Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject this internal structure >> (or am I wrong about that too?) >> >> In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure in >> your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you, etc." >> prologue to an response? :-) >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons the >>> fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the Sign for >>> its Interpretant? I am sincerely baffled by this suggestion. Here is what >>> I said. >>> >>> JAS: a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of >>> that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, >>> constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to >>> represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns). >>> >>> >>> I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does. I am not >>> at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic relation with the >>> Object and Interpretant. Peirce himself differentiated the two Objects and >>> three Interpretants when he wrote, "the Dynamoid Object determines the >>> Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the >>> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which >>> determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). >>> >>> As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually did say contradictory >>> things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because he >>> changed his mind sometime during the interval between them--he decided >>> that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because "Sign" ended up >>> suiting his original purpose after all. I now agree with that decision. >>> Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in the 1908 quote above, or >>> anywhere else in those crucial December letters to Lady Welby. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon S, list, >>>> >>>> Thanks.This was quite helpful. >>>> >>>> But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that the >>>> Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he give up this >>>> formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you call it >>>> "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that it would >>>> appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the second moment >>>> of that triadic formulation. >>>> >>>> According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental >>>> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP >>>> 2:273). >>>> >>>> >>>> Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation. >>>> Since I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long and hard >>>> on this. >>>> >>>> Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not >>>> Signs" (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous example), >>>> then there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made between Sign and >>>> Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and just now to Gary F you >>>> say the Sign and Representamen are "effectively synonymous." So, it appears >>>> to me that Peirce is perhaps saying contradictory things when one looks >>>> from one quotation to another on this not inconsequential matter of >>>> terminology. It seems to me more than a matter of terminology. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary >>>> >>>> Gary Richmond >>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>> Communication Studies >>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>> 718 482-5690 >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary R., List: >>>>> >>>>> GR: But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in >>>>> your formulation whatsoever? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from the >>>>> Sign? >>>>> >>>>> According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental >>>>> Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP >>>>> 2:273). If you favor these definitions, such that a Sign is only a >>>>> certain >>>>> kind of Representamen, then simply substitute "Representamen" for "Sign" >>>>> in >>>>> my formulation. >>>>> >>>>> However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest >>>>> sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use >>>>> of >>>>> a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition >>>>> ... I formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no >>>>> need of this horrid long word" (SS 193). I have come to agree with that >>>>> assessment. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>
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