Edwina, List:

The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those
quotations, *only
*existential particulars can interact, and *only *with other existential
particulars.  A general cannot interact with anything *as a general*, so it
does not interact with existential particulars; instead, it  *governs* them.

CSP:  But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and
prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP 2:274; 1903)

CSP:  By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over
again, translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or
algebraical formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not
mean any existing individual object but a type, a general, which does not
exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply have
> to agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which I fully
> agree with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my view] - which
> I'll repeat below:
>
> " I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from
> its Tokens'. My view is that both are informationally functional and
> interact informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate individual
> existence for each. Informational action between information encoded as a
> general and information encoded as a particular is, in my view, quite
> possible."
>
> That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my view,
> interact with the existential particular.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns.
>
> CSP:   Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just
> what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists
> in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening  then and there. The
> specifications  then and there  involve all its relations to other
> existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in its relations to the
> universe of existents ... We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and
> resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of
> actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing
> which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24;
> 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the cognate
> origin of the terms actuality and activity is one of the most deeply
> illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies a generalization
> of effort; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and resistance being
> inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has also a dyadic form.
> (CP 4.542; 1906)
>
> CSP:  The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and
> facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute
> forces ... (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908)
>
> CSP:  Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in
> their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events,
> qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last
> analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more
> unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. (EP
> 2:479; 1908)
>
>
> Only Existents (2ns)--including Tokens--act, react, or interact; and they
> do so only on/with other Existents.  For Peirce, this was literally the 
> defining
> attribute of existence.
>
> CSP:  The modern philosophers ... recognize but one mode of being, the
> being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the
> object’s crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and
> reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that
> Existence. (CP 1.21; 1903)
>
> CSP:  The existent is that which reacts against other things. (CP 8.191;
> c. 1904)
>
>
> CSP:  Whatever exists, ex-sists, that is, really acts upon other
> existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual. (CP
> 5.429, EP 2:342; 1905)
>
> CSP:  ... I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense of
> "react with the other like things in the environment." (CP 6.495; c. 1906)
>
>
> From such a standpoint, strictly speaking, Possibles (1ns) and
> Necessitants (3ns)--including Tones and Types, respectively--do not act,
> react, or interact on/with anything.  That is why any Dynamic Interpretant
> (Experiential Information)--an actual feeling, effort, or further
> Sign-Replica--is always the result of a "then-and-there" Instance of the
> Sign (Token), while the Final Interpretant (Substantial Information)
> pertains to the non-temporal/non-spatial Sign itself (Type), and the Immediate
> Interpretant (Essential Information) pertains to the qualities/characters
> of its expression within a given system of Signs (Tone).  Consequently, I
> do not see how anything except Tokens could "interact informationally" or
> engage in "informational action."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> I wasn't referring at all to the difference between reality and existence
>> - and as I said in my post, I was indeed talking about Thirdness as
>> mediation in a Legisign role. Obviously, then, I agree that the
>> Representamen in a mode of Thirdness within the triadic semiosic process
>> does not 'exist but governs existents'....So- I'm unsure of the reason for
>> your comment.
>>
>> With reference to your problem with my use of the word 'interaction',
>> which you confine to a mode of Secondness - I guess we'll just have to each
>> agree to differ in our use of the word. I don't agree that it implies that
>> the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. My view is that both are
>> informationally functional and interact informationally - and this doesn't
>> imply a separate individual existence for each. Informational action
>> between information encoded as a general and information encoded as a
>> particular is, in my view, quite possible.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 09/08/18 9:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> I suppose we can say that a Type depends on its Tokens for its existence,
>> but certainly not for its Reality, because the mode of Being of a Type
>> is not reaction (2ns) but mediation (3ns).  Consequently, I still think we
>> should avoid saying that a Type "interacts" with its Tokens, because this
>> implies that the Type exists apart from its Tokens, such that it can react
>> with them.  As the quote below from Peirce states, a Type "does not
>> exist but governs existents" (CP 8.313; 1905, emphasis added); the
>> Sign's unchanging ideal Final Interpretant logically/semiotically
>> determines (constrains) its various actual Dynamic Interpretants, not
>> the other way around.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 8:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R, JAS, list
>>>
>>> 1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its
>>> Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond
>>> is dependent on its ever actually being scratched.  Such is the nature
>>> of a Real "would-be."
>>>
>>> My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, is
>>> most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals do
>>> not exist except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the
>>> experiences of the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and
>>> enable adaptation and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know,
>>> growth and increasing complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..]
>>>
>>> "I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general,
>>> which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform"
>>> 8.313.
>>>
>>> That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the
>>> instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word
>>> again!].
>>>
>>> 2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in
>>> their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will
>>> also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well!
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
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