Edwina, List: ET: I acknowledge your specification of terms - though I continue to differentiate, terminologically, between the Sign [IO-R-II] and the Representamen and think it a rather important distinction.
Understood, although we should also acknowledge that this is not a distinction that Peirce ever made in that specific way. ET: ... what actually happens when a DI is in a mode of 1ns, or 2ns, or 3ns - never mind the term - I want to know the actual pragmatic result. According to Peirce (cf. CP 4.536; 1906), the DI is the *actual *effect that an *individual *Instance of a Sign produces by determining an interpreting Quasi-mind to a feeling (1ns), to an exertion (2ns), or to another Sign-Replica (3ns). ET: What kind of existential actuality is there - when some thing is functioning without any 3ns, or without any 2ns or even - pure 1ns? Nothing ever *actually *functions without exhibiting aspects of all three Categories. We can only distinguish them *analytically*, and must always do so for a particular *purpose*. Since our purposes are different, it is not surprising that our analyses are different. My concern has been and remains to be faithful to Peirce's usage of terminology as we proceed with such efforts. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 1:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > I acknowledge your specification of terms - though I continue to > differentiate, terminologically, between the Sign [IO-R-II] and the > Representamen and think it a rather important distinction. > > But I don't think that providing specific names to these interactions is > where I want to go in my analysis of semiosis. My focus of interest is what > pragmatically happens within each interaction and for that, I focus on the > actual result of the categorical modes rather than the term. I want to > know, morphologically and informationally, what actually happens when a DI > is in a mode of 1ns, or 2ns, or 3ns - never mind the term - I want to know > the actual pragmatic result. What kind of existential actuality is there - > when some thing is functioning without any 3ns, or without any 2ns or even > - pure 1ns? And so on. > > Edwina > > On Thu 09/08/18 2:00 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > There can be no Relation where there are no Correlates; by definition, a > Correlate is simply that which has a Relation with at least one other > Correlate. > A dyadic Relation is one that has two Correlates, and a triadic Relation > is one that has three Correlates. > > No one disputes that the Sign has Relations with its Dynamic Object, > Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant, and can be classified > accordingly. The problem is conflating these divisions with those for > the Correlates themselves, which must be distinguished just as Jeff did > below. > > - The ontological nature (Mode of Being) of the DO is one trichotomy > (Abstractive/Concretive/Collective), and the dyadic Relation of the > Sign to its DO is another (Icon/Index/Symbol). > - The ontological nature (Mode of Being) of the DI is one trichotomy > (Feeling/Exertion/Sign or Sympathetic/Percussive/Usual), and the dyadic > Relation of the Sign to its DI is another (Presented/Urged/Submitted or > Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative). > - The normative nature (purpose) of the FI is one trichotomy > (Gratific/Actuous/Temperative or to produce Feeling/Action/Self-Control), > and the dyadic Relation of the Sign to its FI is another > (Rheme/Dicent/Argument or Seme/Pheme/Delome). > - The Sign's genuine triadic Relation to the DO and FI is yet another > trichotomy (Abducent/Inducent/Deducent or assurance of > Instinct/Experience/Form). > > Of course, the 1903 ten-Sign classification included only two of these > seven trichotomies--the ones for the S-DO and S-FI Relations--along with > the one for the Sign itself. The phenomenological nature (Mode of > Presentation) of the Immediate Object (Descriptive/Designative/Copulative) > and Immediate Interpretant (Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative) are the > remaining trichotomies in the 1908 66-Sign classification; there are no > distinct Relation trichotomies for these because they are both internal to > the Sign. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 11:59 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jeff, list >> >> A very interesting post - I have time now for only a few perhaps >> sidelining comments. >> >> 1] I'm pleased that you refer to both the representamen and the >> relation between it and the DO, and between it and the >> interpretants. Peirce himself uses the term of 'relation' [see 8.335, >> 337] - and I use the term though I've often been chastised on this list for >> so doing, as I've been told that there is ''no such thing and the correct >> term is 'correlate'. A relation, to me, is the correct term, as it suggests >> a deeper interaction than a mere correlate. >> >> 2] I obviously agree with the suggestion that the definition of a Sign >> can't be restricted to only those that include a Representamen as a >> Legisign. The power of semiosis as an adaptive and evolutionary pragmatic >> function is that it operates when a system is developing generals [before >> they are even functioning as such] and operates when a system is >> entropically changing its nature [outside of the constraints of generals]. >> >> 3] Accidents or freedom or deviations-from-the-norm are, I think, vital >> in a complex adaptive system [CAS]- and, my view is that semiosis is an >> integral agent in a CAS. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Thu 09/08/18 12:38 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu >> sent: >> >> Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List, >> >> It appears that I may be missing something when it comes to understanding >> the suggestion Jon S is making with respect to interpreting the claim that "a >> sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). As such, let me raise some >> straightforward questions about the thesis that Peirce revised his >> definition of the sign in the hopes of getting clearer about the >> suggestion. For the sake of generalizing the point, let's state it in the >> following way: "all signs have the character of a general rule, and only >> things that have the character of a general rule are signs." >> >> 1. Is the interpretative hypothesis being restricted only to the >> classification of signs based on the manner of the apprehension of the sign >> itself? That is, does it apply only to representamens that are apprehended >> as general types? >> >> 2. Or, should one go further and say that the interpretative hypothesis >> applies to other ways of classifying signs, including: >> >> (a) the nature of the dynamical object, >> >> (b) the nature of the dynamical interpretant, >> >> (c) the relation that holds between the representamen and the dynamical >> object, >> >> (d) the relation that holds between the representamen and the final >> interpretant. >> >>
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