I also agree. To twist Ernst Haeckel's saying: ontology does not
recapitulate philology, contra Derrida.
Gene H
On Mon, Aug 13, 2018, 3:20 PM Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt.
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett <danleveret...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically.
>> Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form of
>> writing, I have written extensively on language evolution. I have heard
>> Derrida’s unfortunate claim before.
>> https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120/ref=dbs_a_w_dp_0307386120
>>
>>
>> https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957
>>
>> Dan Everett
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 16:40, Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Jon A S and list,
>>
>> I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just some
>> observations for possible discussion.
>>
>> Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the tinge/tone/mark
>> precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly being alluded to: sight,
>> sound, and touch?
>>
>> In regard to the sound and touch, I recall Peirce’s use of the utterer
>> and the graphist.
>>
>> The latter two suggest more agency. Saussure discussed the
>> signifier/signified relation in terms of the phoneme and speech, and rarely
>> the grapheme and writing. Speech can not be removed or erased, and it
>> assumes permanence with quote marks.
>>
>> Derrida argued the grapheme preceded the phoneme, the written vs the
>> spoken. How relevant that is remains to be seen. Frederick Sternfelt in the
>> title of his insightful book _Diagrammatology_ makes implicit reference to
>> Derrida’s _Grammatology_, whose work is given short shrift. It may be that
>> preceed-ence is not an issue with the decisign, or not relevant.
>>
>> I do recall Peirce using tinge with regard to existential graphs, and
>> tinges perhaps served a purpose, perhaps with reference to layering and
>> juxtaposition in logic, that could not achieved with the spoken or written.
>>
>> It may be possible that Peirce ultimately chose mark rather than tinge or
>> tone because it is more permanent.
>>
>> I apologize for lacking a thesis and any mistakes, and I look forward to
>> your responses.
>>
>> Mary Libertin
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> John S., List:
>>>
>>> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues.
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of the
>>> thread is to explicate it.
>>>
>>> JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or
>>> tone.
>>>
>>>
>>> In the referenced passage, Peirce stated, "I dare say some of my former
>>> names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488; 1908). In fact, less
>>> than two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby specifically about Tone vs.
>>> Mark (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember right--I do not have a copy of her
>>> reply--she found Tone preferable because a tone of voice is a paradigmatic
>>> example. Peirce also used Tone in what I think is one of his clearest
>>> passages about this division of Signs (CP 4.537; 1906).
>>>
>>> JFS: General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is always
>>> a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or quasi-mind as a
>>> token of some type.
>>>
>>>
>>> This may be a case of hair-splitting on my part, but I would suggest
>>> instead that in any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or set
>>> of characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the
>>> Sign-Replica to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with the
>>> system of Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and sufficient for
>>> this. It is analogous to the role of the Immediate Object as that by which
>>> the interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the Dynamic Object of the Sign, for
>>> which Collateral Experience (Experiential Information) is necessary and
>>> sufficient (cf. CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909).
>>>
>>> As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its
>>> peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an Existent,
>>> the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that which is
>>> experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a Necessitant, only the
>>> Type has a Final Interpretant--"the one Interpretative result to which
>>> every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently
>>> considered," which corresponds to the correct Habit of Interpretation
>>> (Substantial Information). In other words, "The Immediate Interpretant is
>>> an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is
>>> a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the
>>> actual tends" (SS 111; 1909).
>>>
>>> JFS: In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real
>>> actualities.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree, and would add that semiosis also governs Real actualities in
>>> accordance with Real regularities.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:15 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues.
>>>>
>>>> In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about
>>>> real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real.
>>>>
>>>> In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes:
>>>> the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual
>>>> existence is just one of the three ways of being real.
>>>>
>>>> He also distinguished logical possibility and necessity
>>>> from real possibility and necessity. A theory is logically
>>>> possible if it's consistent by itself. It's a real possibility
>>>> if it's also consistent with the laws of nature.
>>>>
>>>> Given the above, apply the principles to signs. For that,
>>>> consider Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby in 1908, in which
>>>> he wrote about signs and the three universes (EP 2:478-480).
>>>>
>>>> In EP 2:488, he wrote that the triad Potisign (possible sign) /
>>>> actisign (sign in act) / and famisign (familiar or general sign)
>>>> might be called (tinge or tone or mark) / token / type. Since
>>>> mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone.
>>>>
>>>> General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is
>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or
>>>> quasi-mind as a token of some type.
>>>>
>>>> Prior to semiosis, the perceptible thing exists in actuality.
>>>> But it's only a possible mark. It doesn't become an actual mark
>>>> until it is sensed by some mind or quasi-mind. Then as soon as
>>>> it's recognized, the actual mark becomes an actual token of some type.
>>>>
>>>> In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities.
>>>>
>>>> John
>>>
>>> --
>> null
>>
>>
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> null
>
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