Gene, List, Thank you for your interesting discussion of music in the natural world, and notably amongst songbirds, I intend to explore the references you pointed to this week as I was unfamiliar with most all of them. I believe we are in agreement that music originates in the natural world (i.e., that it is not just a human invention) and that human music precedes language and is probably essential in the development of language.
You wrote: EH: Suzanne Langer had some interesting ideas on dance and origins of language, but she was too locked in the human-centered perspective, in my view, to appreciate the central place of the wild others as revered teachers worthy of reverence, mimicry, and even sources for identity. I was and remain deeply influenced by Susanne Langer's work in the origins and structure of feeling, especially its importance in the development of art (for example, her theory of virtuality in art, one which shows some similarities to Peirce's theory), but also in the development of the human mind. However, I referred to Susanne Langer's work specifically to point to her theory of the origins of language. While her aesthetic theory has probably been more influential than the extension of that theory in her magnum opus, the three volume, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling*, and while she most certainly was greatly influenced by Whitehead and, perhaps especially, by Cassirer and his work in symbolization, I do not think of her as "too locked in the human-centered perspective." At least she was much less so than her mentors (just mentioned) and many of her contemporaries. One see this in the consideration of the biological basis of feeling in art forms and in the development of mind. Thus, even as early as her *Philosophy in a New Key,* she wrote: SKL: I believe that in this physical, space-time world of our experience there are things which do not fit the grammatical scheme of expression, but they are not necessarily blind, inconceivable, mystical affairs; they are simply matters which require to be conceived through some symbolistic schema other than discursive language. She tried to show that expressions of feeling have a structure, but that their symbol structure is different from that of language. Best. Gary xx *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 9:11 PM Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> wrote: > Yes Gary R, > I agree with the idea that music proceeded spoken language and some > related ideas you mentioned. The idea that humans invented music is a human > conceit. We only discovered it already in the air. Credit should go to > songbirds, who were already singing their melodies long before humans came > along. I addressed some of these ideas in a talk in Toronto a few weeks > back. In my opinion birds helped us to come along into humankind and into > linguistic speech. A number of researchers have looked to "syntactic-like" > bird song as the closest analog to human speech rather than other primates > (Doupe > and Kuhl, 1999; Jarvis, 2004; Bolhuis et al., 2010). And they have brain > analogs to the human Broca and Wernicke areas for speech production and > recognition. > Philosopher and Sanskritologist Frits Staal claimed to have found > structural analogies between Sanskrit and bird songs, between Hindu Vedic > “Mantras and Bird Songs,” in an article he wrote with with that title. He > held that mantras, though often using linguistic language, also have > non-linguistic ritual aspects he thought chronologically predated human > language, and repetitions he traced as structurally closely analogous to > birdsong repetitions. His idea is speculative but I like the idea of > mantra-like proto-linguistic speech in human evolution, drawing from the > music already in the air, especially since many indigenous peoples know how > being aware of bird song communication is a source of deep learning, > practically as well as aesthetically. > Participation by hunter gatherers in conversations with the wild > others through close attunement, wherein the wild others were treated as > potential teachers, involved learning sophisticated levels of > communication. As master tracker and naturalist Jon Young has shown in his > book, *What the Robin Knows*, songbird calls in the woods can act as a > kind of radar, indicating movements of creatures a kilometer or two away. > The calls are echoed out from the source area, like a stone thrown in a > pond. Other species, such as deer, also understand these calls. And hunter > gatherer humans do as well, though settled and civilized peoples fall away > from immersion in it. These calls can indicate location and approximate > size of prey or a predator, and so are not only good for survival, but are > also beautiful. > Participating in the conversation not only as a listener, but as a > maker of calls through mimicry, can be a way to hunt birds and other > species who pursue birds as prey. Suzanne Langer had some interesting ideas > on dance and origins of language, but she was too locked in the > human-centered perspective, in my view, to appreciate the central place of > the wild others as revered teachers worthy of reverence, mimicry, and even > sources for identity. > Gene Halton > > On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 6:04 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Gene, Mary, Daniel, List, >> >> I also agree that spoken language precedes written language. >> >> There are even some philosophers and scientists who have suggested that >> perhaps *music* preceded spoken language. >> >> You recently mentioned, Gene, and I recall studies I read long ago which >> suggested that response to music and vocal imitative play with the mother >> occurs long before a baby begins to develop any of the other of the human >> 'intelligences' (cf. Gardner's multi-intelligence model) such as speech or >> being able to walk! >> >> The American aesthetician and philosopher of Mind, Susanne Langer, argued >> that while music isn't actually a language (in her ground breaking 1942 >> work, *Feeling and Form: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and >> Art*, she refers to it an "unconsummated symbol"), yet music bears some >> interesting structural similarities to music. >> >> "Music, like language, is an articulate form. Its parts not only fuse >> together to yield a greater entity, but in so doing they maintain some >> degree of separate existence, and the sensuous character of each element is >> affected by its function in the complex whole. . [it] is *articulated*, >> i.e. its internal structure is given to our perception. >> >> "Music has *import*, and this import is the pattern of sentience — the >> pattern of life itself, as it is felt and directly known." >> >> The "sensuous characters" affected by the whole 'composition' is present >> in the simplest ditty, child's song, or lullaby. >> In the mid-50's, in *Mind: An Essay in Human Feeling*, she hypothesized >> that music might have worked in tandem with ritual dance and ecstatic >> vocalizing to have created the first vocal symbols. Perhaps in some >> ecstatic communal dance associated with some significant recurring event >> affecting human physiology and feeling, one known as doing so by a tribal >> community--the hypothetical example which Langer gives, as I recall, is how >> the moon affects a woman's menstrual cycle, the tides, etc.--certain >> ecstatically uttered sounds, perhaps first vocalized loudly by a tribal >> leader or shaman in a tribal dance, became associated with that shaman's >> utterance, was repeated by the community, and became their word for 'moon'. >> >> >> On the "significance of music" Langer wrote: >> >> Let us therefore call the significance of music its “vital import” >> instead of “meaning,” using “vital” . . . as a qualifying adjective >> restricting the relevance of “import” to the dynamism of subjective >> experience. >> >> Some have gone even deeper into the science involved in such a theory. >> One example is the cognitive scientist, Mark Changizi, in his book, >> *Harnessed*. From the publisher's blurb >> >> In *Harnessed,* cognitive scientist Mark Changizi demonstrates that >> human speech has been very specifically “designed” to harness the sounds of >> nature, sounds we’ve evolved over millions of years to readily understand. >> Long before humans evolved, mammals have learned to interpret the sounds of >> nature to understand both threats and opportunities. Our speech—regardless >> of language—is very clearly based on the sounds of nature. >> >> >> Langer's work in this area has been largely neglected, while Changizi's >> remains controversial. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> Even more fascinating, Changizi shows that music itself is based on >> natural sounds. Music—seemingly one of the most human of inventions—is >> literally built on sounds and patterns of sound that have existed since the >> beginning of time. >> ccc >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *718 482-5690* >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:47 PM Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> >> wrote: >> >>> I also agree. To twist Ernst Haeckel's saying: ontology does not >>> recapitulate philology, contra Derrida. >>> Gene H >>> >>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018, 3:20 PM Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett < >>>> danleveret...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and >>>>> ontogenetically. Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that >>>>> lack any form of writing, I have written extensively on language >>>>> evolution. >>>>> I have heard Derrida’s unfortunate claim before. >>>>> https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120/ref=dbs_a_w_dp_0307386120 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957 >>>>> >>>>> Dan Everett >>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 16:40, Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jon A S and list, >>>>> >>>>> I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just >>>>> some observations for possible discussion. >>>>> >>>>> Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the >>>>> tinge/tone/mark precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly being >>>>> alluded to: sight, sound, and touch? >>>>> >>>>> In regard to the sound and touch, I recall Peirce’s use of the >>>>> utterer and the graphist. >>>>> >>>>> The latter two suggest more agency. Saussure discussed the >>>>> signifier/signified relation in terms of the phoneme and speech, and >>>>> rarely >>>>> the grapheme and writing. Speech can not be removed or erased, and it >>>>> assumes permanence with quote marks. >>>>> >>>>> Derrida argued the grapheme preceded the phoneme, the written vs the >>>>> spoken. How relevant that is remains to be seen. Frederick Sternfelt in >>>>> the >>>>> title of his insightful book _Diagrammatology_ makes implicit reference to >>>>> Derrida’s _Grammatology_, whose work is given short shrift. It may be that >>>>> preceed-ence is not an issue with the decisign, or not relevant. >>>>> >>>>> I do recall Peirce using tinge with regard to existential graphs, and >>>>> tinges perhaps served a purpose, perhaps with reference to layering and >>>>> juxtaposition in logic, that could not achieved with the spoken or >>>>> written. >>>>> >>>>> It may be possible that Peirce ultimately chose mark rather than tinge >>>>> or tone because it is more permanent. >>>>> >>>>> I apologize for lacking a thesis and any mistakes, and I look forward >>>>> to your responses. >>>>> >>>>> Mary Libertin >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> John S., List: >>>>>> >>>>>> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of >>>>>> the thread is to explicate it. >>>>>> >>>>>> JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge >>>>>> or tone. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In the referenced passage, Peirce stated, "I dare say some of my >>>>>> former names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488; 1908). In fact, >>>>>> less than two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby specifically about >>>>>> Tone vs. Mark (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember right--I do not have a >>>>>> copy >>>>>> of her reply--she found Tone preferable because a tone of voice is a >>>>>> paradigmatic example. Peirce also used Tone in what I think is one of >>>>>> his >>>>>> clearest passages about this division of Signs (CP 4.537; 1906). >>>>>> >>>>>> JFS: General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or quasi-mind >>>>>> as >>>>>> a token of some type. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This may be a case of hair-splitting on my part, but I would suggest >>>>>> instead that in any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or set >>>>>> of characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the >>>>>> Sign-Replica to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with >>>>>> the >>>>>> system of Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and sufficient for >>>>>> this. It is analogous to the role of the Immediate Object as that by >>>>>> which >>>>>> the interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the Dynamic Object of the Sign, >>>>>> for >>>>>> which Collateral Experience (Experiential Information) is necessary and >>>>>> sufficient (cf. CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909). >>>>>> >>>>>> As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its >>>>>> peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an >>>>>> Existent, >>>>>> the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that which is >>>>>> experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a Necessitant, only the >>>>>> Type has a Final Interpretant--"the one Interpretative result to which >>>>>> every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently >>>>>> considered," which corresponds to the correct Habit of Interpretation >>>>>> (Substantial Information). In other words, "The Immediate Interpretant >>>>>> is >>>>>> an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant >>>>>> is >>>>>> a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the >>>>>> actual tends" (SS 111; 1909). >>>>>> >>>>>> JFS: In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real >>>>>> actualities. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree, and would add that semiosis also governs Real actualities in >>>>>> accordance with Real regularities. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:15 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about >>>>>>> real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes: >>>>>>> the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual >>>>>>> existence is just one of the three ways of being real. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> He also distinguished logical possibility and necessity >>>>>>> from real possibility and necessity. A theory is logically >>>>>>> possible if it's consistent by itself. It's a real possibility >>>>>>> if it's also consistent with the laws of nature. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Given the above, apply the principles to signs. For that, >>>>>>> consider Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby in 1908, in which >>>>>>> he wrote about signs and the three universes (EP 2:478-480). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In EP 2:488, he wrote that the triad Potisign (possible sign) / >>>>>>> actisign (sign in act) / and famisign (familiar or general sign) >>>>>>> might be called (tinge or tone or mark) / token / type. Since >>>>>>> mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>>>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or >>>>>>> quasi-mind as a token of some type. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Prior to semiosis, the perceptible thing exists in actuality. >>>>>>> But it's only a possible mark. It doesn't become an actual mark >>>>>>> until it is sensed by some mind or quasi-mind. Then as soon as >>>>>>> it's recognized, the actual mark becomes an actual token of some >>>>>>> type. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> John >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> null >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> null >>>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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