Gary F., List: Peirce indeed referred repeatedly to Tokens as Signs, but I believe that this was a form of shorthand. Just like he acknowledged using "word" in two different senses, he also used "Sign" in two different senses. Just like embodying a Graph (Type) in a Graph-Instance (Token) is scribing the Graph (not the Instance), embodying a Sign (Type) in a Replica (Token) is uttering the Sign (not the Replica).
My suggestion is that for the sake of greater clarity, we should more carefully draw an explicit distinction between Signs as Types and their Replicas as Tokens, as well as the significant characters of the latter as Tones. My post earlier today spelled out how I see this facilitating a systematic explication of what is going on whenever an event of concrete semiosis occurs. In any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or set of characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the Sign-Replica to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with the system of Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and sufficient for this. It is analogous to the role of the Immediate Object as that by which the interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the Dynamic Object of the Sign, for which Collateral Experience (Experiential Information) is necessary and sufficient (cf. CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909). As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an Existent, the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a Necessitant, only the Type has a Final Interpretant--"the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered," which corresponds to the ideal Habit of Interpretation (Substantial Information). In other words, "The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends" (SS 111; 1909). As for EP 2:326, "token" clearly did not yet carry the very specific technical meaning that Peirce attributed to it in "Prolegomena." Moreover, he went on to state that "signs by themselves can exert no brute force," which is another way of saying that "a sign is not a real thing"; that which *can* exert brute force--i.e., any *actual* Thing--is *not* a Sign. These are, after all, constituents of two *different* Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 7:41 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, John, list, Regarding the type/token/tone trichotomy: > > This was introduced in Peirce’s 1906 “Prolegomena”, and I think the > paragraph in which it appears is worth another look. I’m leaving open the > question of whether this trichotomy is conceptually identical to the 1903 > legisign/sinsign/qualisign trichotomy. But I would ask readers to notice > that if Peirce meant in “New Elements” (1904) that *all Signs are Types* > (and therefore Tokens are not Signs), he must have changed his mind about > that by 1906. Here is the paragraph (CP 4.537): > > [[ A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed > book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about > twenty *the's* on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In > another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one word “the” in > the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie > visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a > Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things > that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a > *Type*. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited > to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single > place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant > only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on > a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture > to call a *Token*. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of > voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a > Sign a *Tone*; In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in > a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the > Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an *Instance* of > the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type “the” on a page. > The term (Existential) *Graph* will be taken in the sense of a Type; and > the act of embodying it in a *Graph-Instance* will be termed *scribing* > the Graph (not the Instance), whether the Instance be written, drawn, or > incised. A mere blank place is a Graph-Instance, and the Blank *per se* > is a Graph; but I shall ask you to assume that it has the peculiarity that > it cannot be abolished from any Area on which it is scribed, as long as > that Area exists. ]] > > Peirce says here that a Token is “a sign of the Type, and thereby of the > object the Type signifies.” (Notice that the Type does not *denote* this > object but *signifies* it.) In one of the drafts of the “Prolegomena” (MS > 293, “PAP”), Peirce had written that “it is requisite that I explain > exactly what I mean by a Diagram, a word which I employ in a wider sense > than is usual. A Diagram, in my sense, is in the first place a Token, or > singular Object used as a Sign; for it is essential that it should be > capable of being perceived and observed. It is, however, what is called a > General sign; that is, it denotes a general Object.” Here the Token is said > to be “used as a Sign.” But the earliest text I’ve found where Peirce uses > the term “token” in direct connection with signs is from late 1904 > (EP2:326) — not long after “New Elements” — where he says that he is > > [[ including under the term “sign” every picture, diagram, natural cry, > pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, > concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, > chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical > universe, be it in the world of thought, that, whether embodying an idea of > any kind (and permit us throughout to use this term to cover purposes and > feelings), or being connected with some existing object, or referring to > future events through a general rule, causes something else, its > interpreting sign, to be determined to a corresponding relation to the same > idea, existing thing, or law. ]] > > The above instances of the word “token” used by Peirce in semiotic > contexts, not to mention several others of later date, are hard to > reconcile with the hypothesis that for Peirce, tokens are *replicas* but > are *not signs*. > > As for the word “type,” its etymology and usage history (including its > role in Peircean semiotics) are fascinating in their own right, but I think > I’ll save that for a blog post rather than posting about it here. > > Gary f. >
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