Jon, John, list, Regarding the type/token/tone trichotomy: This was introduced in Peirce’s 1906 “Prolegomena”, and I think the paragraph in which it appears is worth another look. I’m leaving open the question of whether this trichotomy is conceptually identical to the 1903 legisign/sinsign/qualisign trichotomy. But I would ask readers to notice that if Peirce meant in “New Elements” (1904) that all Signs are Types (and therefore Tokens are not Signs), he must have changed his mind about that by 1906. Here is the paragraph (CP 4.537):
[[ A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one word “the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone; In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type “the” on a page. The term (Existential) Graph will be taken in the sense of a Type; and the act of embodying it in a Graph-Instance will be termed scribing the Graph (not the Instance), whether the Instance be written, drawn, or incised. A mere blank place is a Graph-Instance, and the Blank per se is a Graph; but I shall ask you to assume that it has the peculiarity that it cannot be abolished from any Area on which it is scribed, as long as that Area exists. ]] Peirce says here that a Token is “a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies.” (Notice that the Type does not denote this object but signifies it.) In one of the drafts of the “Prolegomena” (MS 293, “PAP”), Peirce had written that “it is requisite that I explain exactly what I mean by a Diagram, a word which I employ in a wider sense than is usual. A Diagram, in my sense, is in the first place a Token, or singular Object used as a Sign; for it is essential that it should be capable of being perceived and observed. It is, however, what is called a General sign; that is, it denotes a general Object.” Here the Token is said to be “used as a Sign.” But the earliest text I’ve found where Peirce uses the term “token” in direct connection with signs is from late 1904 (EP2:326) — not long after “New Elements” — where he says that he is [[ including under the term “sign” every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be it in the world of thought, that, whether embodying an idea of any kind (and permit us throughout to use this term to cover purposes and feelings), or being connected with some existing object, or referring to future events through a general rule, causes something else, its interpreting sign, to be determined to a corresponding relation to the same idea, existing thing, or law. ]] The above instances of the word “token” used by Peirce in semiotic contexts, not to mention several others of later date, are hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that for Peirce, tokens are replicas but are not signs. As for the word “type,” its etymology and usage history (including its role in Peircean semiotics) are fascinating in their own right, but I think I’ll save that for a blog post rather than posting about it here. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Sent: 13-Aug-18 17:23 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing On 8/13/2018 1:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. > > It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of > the thread is to explicate it. Oh. I admit that the thread was so long (over 40 messages) that I had forgotten how it started. I copied the two relevant excerpts in the attached EP2_303.jpg (from 1904) and EP2_480.jpg (from 1908). In EP 2:303, he did not use (or even think of) his more precise terminology of 1908. Between those two dates, Peirce (1906) began to talk about real possibilities, and he published his tinctured EGs with the three "universes" of possibility, actuality, and the necessitated. His correspondence with Lady Welby, which started in 1903, gave him an educated audience (Lady W and the Significs group) over a sustained period of years. That audience was critical for inspiring the development of his later terminology, in particular the letters of December 1908 (EP 2:478-491). Note the last three sentences of EP2_480.jpg: > For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a _Tone_, > thought I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a > really good name? An Actual sign I call a _Token_; a Necessitant Sign > a _Type_. If you interpret EP 2:303 in terms of EP 2:480, it seems clear that he was talking about the type/token distinction before he had chosen those words. When he said "a sign is not a real thing", he was referring to the type, but he did not yet have the word "type". In talking about a replica, he did not yet have the word "token". JAS > In fact, less than two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby > specifically about Tone vs. Mark (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember > right--I do not have a copy of her reply--she found Tone preferable > because a tone of voice is a paradigmatic example. Peirce also used > Tone in what I think is one of his clearest passages about this > division of Signs (CP 4.537; 1906). Note what he says in EP 2:480 (Dec 23). At the bottom of p. 488 (Dec 24-28) he wrote the first triad as Mark/Token/Type, and he continued to use the word 'Mark' on p. 489. That appears to be his final decision. He considered Lady W's point, asked for a "really good" term, and decided not to use 'Tone'. Also note his letter to William James on p. 502 (1909), where he wrote "Deduction involves the observation of a Diagram (whether Optical, Tactile, or Acoustic)" and then "I myself always work with Optical Diagrams." That would suggest another reason why he would prefer Mark to Tone. John
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