Dear Francesco,
That is very interesting and new to me. I had thought, a rheme was a term. In the below quotation from Commens Dictionary "rheme", Peirce writes, that it may be a term, but a term "contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature" . Now I wonder, does the replacement argument cover a term-as-rheme too? Maybe in children´s language?
"
1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10
If from a propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a rhema; but I shall take the liberty of calling it a term. [—] On the whole, it appears to me that the only difference between my rhema and the “term” of other logicians is that the latter contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature. But this is as much as to say that logically their meaning is the same; and it is for that reason that I venture to use the old, familiar word “term” to denote the rhema.
"
Best,
Helmut
02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci" <bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>
wrote:
"Francesco Bellucci" <bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>
wrote:
Dear Helmut
an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.
Best
Francesco
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Dear Francesco, list,For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?Best,Helmut----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Dear All,I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme.But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a proper name, like "Hamlet", this does not yield again a proposition: "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction to all signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:"a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague, singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters (arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular?Best,Francesco
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