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Jon, list
Good heavens - I didn't know that your adamant arguments for the
triad of IO-R-II was due to any attempt on your part to 'reconcile
with my model of semiosis'!!! I thought you were arguing for that
triad because you believed in it as a valid model! After all - you
were quite insistent on its validity, and openly rejecting my
inclusion of the DO!
And I didn't know that you abandoned it - not because you didn't
believe any longer in its validity - but because you couldn't use it
to 'reconcile with my model'. So- I'm to blame both for your support
for the model and also, for your abandoning it. Hmmm.
And the argument isn't over the term 'Sign' as differentiated from
the term 'Representamen'. Peirce does that already. And he readily
uses the term 'Sign' when he means the full triadic process - and
also - when he refers only to the action of mediation. Therefore, one
has to be careful when reading the text.
The argument is over the operative nature of the basic semiosic
triad - which I claim is DO- [IO/R/II].
Edwina
On Mon 25/06/18 9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II
because I hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on
that basis, to reconcile our two different models of semiosis. It
became evident a few months ago that this is not the case, since we
still cannot even agree on how Peirce defined "Representamen."
Consequently, I took a closer look at his usage and came to realize
what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a Representamen with a
mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were basically
synonymous and interchangeable. More to the point, nowhere in
Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a component of
the Sign. Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of
terminology, if one wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes
the IO, the II, and whatever is left over after those are "removed,"
one must come up with a new name for the latter; Peirce never called
it a "Representamen," or anything else as far as I can tell.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list
I have to include myself with Gary R as - in my 1stness - stunned
by your abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of
II-R-II! You fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for
months. I recall your chastising me for daring to include the DO
within the definition of the full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in
the night, you casually tell us that you..some time ago...abandoned
this notion.
Whew.
Edwina
On Sun 24/06/18 8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
Gary R., List:
Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the
Sign itself as a triad of IO-R-II? This goes back to the fact that
Peirce never distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in
the specific way that such a model entails. I still affirm that the
IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI are external
to it; and below I quoted Peirce's statement that the two Objects
determine the Sign, which determines the three Interpretants; so I
suspect that this indeed boils down to "a terminological matter."
Does that clarify things? If not, maybe I have just been staring at
the pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours
consecutively. :-)
Jon S.
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, list,
Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by
this, and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter.
Still, Peirce says in many, many places that what happens within the
sign is this tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which
determines some Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject
this internal structure (or am I wrong about that too?)
In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure
in your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you,
etc." prologue to an response? :-)
Best,
Gary
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons
the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the
Sign for its Interpretant? I am sincerely baffled by this
suggestion. Here is what I said.
JAS: a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some
of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken
together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its
Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form
(Entelechy/3ns).
I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does. I am
not at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic
relation with the Object and Interpretant. Peirce himself
differentiated the two Objects and three Interpretants when he wrote,
"the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines
the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which
determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit
Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908).
As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually did say contradictory
things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because
he changed his mind sometime during the interval between them--he
decided that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because
"Sign" ended up suiting his original purpose after all. I now agree
with that decision. Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in
the 1908 quote above, or anywhere else in those crucial December
letters to Lady Welby.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, list,
Thanks.This was quite helpful.
But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that
the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he
give up this formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you
call it "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that
it would appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the
second moment of that triadic formulation.
According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a
mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are
not Signs" (EP 2:273).
Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation.
Since I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long
and hard on this.
Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not
Signs" (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous
example), then there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made
between Sign and Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and
just now to Gary F you say the Sign and Representamen are
"effectively synonymous." So, it appears to me that Peirce is perhaps
saying contradictory things when one looks from one quotation to
another on this not inconsequential matter of terminology. It seems
to me more than a matter of terminology.
Best,
Gary
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
GR: But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in
your formulation whatsoever?
In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from
the Sign?
According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a
mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are
not Signs" (EP 2:273). If you favor these definitions, such that a
Sign is only a certain kind of Representamen, then simply substitute
"Representamen" for "Sign" in my formulation.
However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest
sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular
use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific
definition ... I formerly preferred the word representamen. But there
was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193). I have come to agree
with that assessment.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
Links:
------
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[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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