Seems to me the three punctuations make these different signs. They are unified expressions that differ. They are meanings that differ. As written they are not the same. I am used to being ignored in these threads. But I want to at least record a sense that by delving deeply into authenticating what Peirce had in mind there s a risk of ignoring the forest for the trees. For me the forest is what Peirce means for theology and Biblical studies. Call it an orchard. amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 4:44 PM Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same > Proposition? For example ... > > - We are going to the restaurant. > - We are going to the restaurant? > - We are going to the restaurant! > > The only change here is the punctuation at the end, but I trust that the > reader can imagine how these three sentences would also *sound *quite > different when spoken, rather than written. Clearly Peirce held that these > are *not *three different Signs; so are they three different Types of the > same Sign, or three different _____ of the same Type? Once again, if the > latter, what fills the blank? > > > Worth noting that the distinction here is of course the characteristic > focus of speech act theory of John Searle. I think Peirce had a somewhat > similar albeit deeper notion as well. Jarrett Brock wrote an interesting > paper on Peirce’s speech act theory in *Transactions *back in the 80’s > that I have in my notes. > > https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319937?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents > > One can debate how close this is to Searle of course. I think unlimited > semiosis undermines a lot of Searle’s particular approaches. > > One rather key difference as well is how Peirce conceives of propositions. > Quoting Peirce, > > A proposition, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as the > lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign of > which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another. But a > judgment is distinctly *more *than the mere mental replica of a > proposition*. *It not merely *expresses* the proposition, but it goes > further an *accepts* it. I grant that the normal use of a proposition is > to affirm it; and its chief logical properties relate to what would result > in reference to its affirmation. (MS 517, 40-41; NEM 5.248) > > This is just the illocutionary act and its content. > > It is very important that this distinction should be understood. The > various acts of assertion or assevation, judgment, denial, effective > command, and teaching are acts *which establish general rules by which > real things will be governed*. No mere icon does that, for it only > signifies a character and is perfectly passive; no index does it, although > it is effective in the special case. No mere proposition does it. But it is > of the nature of *every complete symbol that it effects a general mode of > real happening*. (ibid, 36-38) > > > So I’d say there are either three different modes of meaning of the same > sign. > > >
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